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1971

AN APPROACH TO CHANGING INTERPERSONAL CLIMATE
IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

A Dissertation

Presented to

the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Leadership and Human Behavior
United States International University

by

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Approved by:

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ABSTRACT

AN APPROACH TO CHANGING INTERPERSONAL CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

by

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The thesis is: for the personnel of the United States Navy to perform more efficiently as a force, their interpersonal climates need to change in a direction that will promote the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

The purpose of the study was twofold: (1) to examine the hypothesis, and (2) to construct a tentative and partial model for facilitating the proposed change.

The Navy's top level leadership desires that the organization function as smoothly and efficiently as possible. To that end, it has sought to establish throughout the organization an interpersonal climate of trust, respect, commitment, and comradeship. That it has been unable to achieve that objective is evidenced by the Navy's critical retention problem.

Examination of climate-centered research reveals that a perceived defense-reductive climate both facilitates growth in individuals toward becoming more fully functioning and increases efficiency in an organization.

The problem of changing the interpersonal climates in an organization toward a supportive one is complicated by the fact that planned organizational change is still in its infancy. Nevertheless planned change is being practiced with varying success. There is a group of change strategies, normative-re-educative, which operate effectively at the level of the determinants of interpersonal climate: assumptions, values, norms, behaviors, conceptual structures, and the organization itself. The basic principle involved in these strategies is the collaborative, problem-centered interaction between the change agent and the client system in all phases of the change effort from initial data gathering to final stabilization. The major interventions are laboratory training and survey feedback.

Whether or not the changes correlative to producing and maintaining a supportive climate are militarily feasible center in the issue of control. The fear is of loss of control, but the planned change does not destroy control, it substitutes a great amount of emergent control.

The problems facing a change effort in a bureaucratic-military organization the size of the Navy are formidable but not impossible. The keys to success are (1) knowing the deterrents unique to the Navy,

(2) modifying change principles and interventions accordingly, and (3) starting at the very top.

One reason naval leadership has been unable to produce the interpersonal climate it desires is that it has not recognized the determinants and, therefore, has not been using the appropriate methods.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THESIS

For the personnel of the United States Navy to perform more efficiently as a force, their interpersonal climates need to change in a direction that will promote the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

II. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to take a look at the hypothesis, and (2) to construct a tentative and partial model for facilitating the proposed change.

III. NEED FOR THE STUDY

Several factors point not only to the need for a study which examines the problem of interpersonal climates within the Navy but also to the need for the Navy to make it possible for competent, highly motivated personnel to work at the field level in a continuing effort to discover and validate processes that in fact do produce interpersonal climates appropriate to the Navy's efficient functioning.

Failure to Achieve Appropriate Climate

The first factor is that plans to produce what the Navy now feels is an appropriate interpersonal climate have not produced that climate in spite of instructions to do so and inspections that emphasize it. At the root of the Navy's current concept of an appropriate interpersonal climate is its emphasis on the individual. A statement by Admiral Claude Ricketts, former Vice Chief of Naval Operations, is representative:

Modern technology and its adaption to military uses receives much publicity, attention and stress. They are rightfully sources of pride. However, regardless of the importance of scientific achievement, the prime ingredient of our profession is the same as it has always been and always will be—the human being—the individual.¹

Navy leadership would like to see a teamlike spirit built on this foundation of interest in the individual. They would like to have a sense of closeness and mutual esteem securely laced throughout the Navy organization. In December of 1969, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, wrote, "Traditionally, the Navy is a close-knit team marked by comradeship and mutual respect between officers and their men, and between petty officers and non-rated people."² He clarified this by saying,

My comments in this respect are not intended to modify the time-tested rules of naval leadership. Neither discipline nor

¹Editorial in the Navy News, October 24, 1969.

²Thomas H. Moorer, From the Front Office, December 1, 1969.

the prerogatives of leadership have changed. Each Navyman in a supervisory role should give considerable thought to treating his men as he himself would want to be treated if in a similar situation. Senior people owe it to their juniors to be fair, to be perceptive in recognizing ability and to put their ability to best use.³

Though this is the interpersonal climate that is desired, there is evidence that it is not being achieved to the degree that one could say that it is the interpersonal climate of the Navy. John H. Chafee, Secretary of the Navy, in a recent address before Navy and Marine Corps officers in Washington, D.C., said in connection with the current retention problem, "One direction we must go is simply to be more and more personnel conscious up and down the line, to exert better leadership."⁴ The statement implies that the present level of personnel consciousness is not adequate.

The Navy's Inspector General, Vice Admiral Arthur R. Gralla, is being guided in his inspections by a "special interest" list which comes to him from the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. A new item on the list this year requires inspectors to look into the following matters, all having to do with interpersonal climate:

Impediments to the rights of Navy personnel to correspond through channels and rights to take advantage of request mast.
The conduct of administrative searches.
Challenges to the word of an officer.

³Ibid.

⁴The Officer Personnel Newsletter, February, 1970, p. 4.

Non-voluntary fund drives.
 Punishment of a group for offenses of individuals.
 Barring of working uniforms from Navy Exchanges which are
 open only during working hours.
 Required uniform-of-the-day wearing for dirty work.
 Unexplained restrictive leave and liberty policies.⁵

Admiral Gralla observes that to the individual sailor the Inspector General staff is more and more assuming the role of "ombudsman"—a sort of grievance man, or friend of the people, who acts on complaints and can get things started to correct wrongs.⁶ The newly added items of "special interest" and the IG's growing role of grievance man does not indicate a prevailing atmosphere of comradeship and mutual respect in the Navy.

Further evidence that naval leadership has not achieved its goal regarding interpersonal climate is seen in the existence of a type of behavior which I see as damaging, widespread, and for the most part non-inspectable. It is non-inspectable because it has to do with verbal and non-verbal communication between people. It is neither written nor recorded—except in the minds of those involved—and yet it has been, in my experience, both pervasive and potent. An example of what I mean involves a Navy nurse, a lieutenant. She had come off duty, changed clothes, and had just driven off the hospital grounds when she noticed a woman faltering on the sidewalk. The nurse parked

⁵News item in the Navy Times, February 18, 1970.

⁶Ibid.

and ran to help the woman. A passing doctor also stopped. The nurse ran into the nearby outpatient clinic to obtain a wheelchair. She approached the nurse Supervisor, a commander, and breathlessly said she needed a wheelchair immediately. The Supervisor with critical stance and tone asked, "What are you doing here out of uniform?" The message that came across was, "You're a bad, incompetent nurse who cannot be trusted." This particular nurse, in fact, had a hospital reputation of unusual nursing competence. The supervisor's response had been immediate, inappropriate, and derogatory. The nurse obtained the wheelchair and brought the woman into the clinic. However, on the way in with the woman she passed another nurse commander who gave her a look of reproof.

Such communications—far from comradeship and mutual respect—have been witnessed at many levels within the Navy structure. That is not to say that mutual respect does not exist in the Navy, it's just that I have found such negative events widespread enough and forceful enough to color the interpersonal climate in negative tones for a significant number of personnel. The point is that the Navy's efforts to establish what it feels to be an appropriate interpersonal climate have not done so. There is a need for a re-examination of the whole problem of interpersonal climates—what they should be and what can be done to bring them into existence.

Critical State of Retention

A second factor indicating a need for this study is that retention is still a critical problem in spite of efforts to improve the living conditions for Navy personnel. Retention is the rate of retaining personnel at the close of their agreements. In early January, 1970, Secretary of the Navy Chafee said,

. . .the reenlistment rate of our first-term sailors is less than half of what it should be and going down. The objective is 31% retention. In fiscal year 1968, it was 17%. In 1969, 16% (Editor's note: so far in fiscal 1970, it is 8.5%). And we are faced with the same grim statistics when we look at officer retention.⁷

The low retention rates are especially critical in view of President Nixon's declared policy to terminate the draft, except during periods of national emergency, and to establish a Volunteer Force.

Chafee went on to say that ". . .this situation is not going to get any better unless we can come up with some imaginative and feasible measures."⁸ He then proceeded to reveal the main thrust of his proposed solution:

One direction we must go is simply to be more and more personnel conscious up and down the line, to exert better leadership. For instance, I could go so far as to suggest that our "can do" operational attitude may have to give way occasionally in peacetime in favor of better treatment for our people. At the same time, I believe we must do something to restore the adventure, the fun of being a Navy man. We have been asking almost wartime type sacrifices

⁷The Officer Personnel Newsletter, loc. cit.

⁸Ibid.

and devotion to duty from our men for almost 25 years now. I think this is stretching our people more than is reasonable.⁹

Chafee and his staff are looking at a number of other proposals to improve conditions in the Navy and thus improve retention. They are: (1) additional family housing; (2) a system of motels for transients at principle naval bases; (3) sea pay for officers and men at decent rates; (4) isolation of funds for shipboard habitability; (5) maintenance of petty officer promotion opportunities in spite of budget cuts; (6) variable housing allowance for those without government quarters in an expensive area.¹⁰

Chafee doesn't stand alone. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird stated his basic position back in September, 1969:

Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual had infinite dignity and worth. . . . In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman and civilian employee as a person, recognizing his individual needs, aspirations and capabilities.¹¹

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, in discussing both retention and the Navy of the future said,

To get and keep the kind of career men we need we are trying to provide for each man an individual reading light, individual locker, more separation—semi-privacy, air-conditioned living spaces. And above all, better eating conditions.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Editorial in the Navy Times, March 4, 1970.

This is the way we live as a people, as a nation, and we must have essentially the same environment—though it will never be quite the same as the shore environment—to keep the fully qualified people we have got to have to do the job.¹²

The list of top level people acting to solve the problem of retention could be extended to include the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Inspector General, and others. It seems reasonable that what is being done in Washington will eventually make a significant difference in the retention rate. However, as good as all of this is—and it is excellent—it is not the whole story. A recent editorial in the Navy Times which listed an imposing total of positive actions closed with this statement:

They add up, as we said, to an impressive total, and one that service people should be aware of. At the same time, not every action of the past months has been beneficial and we'll point them out, in time, too. And we'll not overlook that counter-effect on the things Washington is trying to do for military people—the unenlightened attitudes of some people down in the chain in command. We intend to point out some specific examples of "chicken" and some areas which still can be improved.¹³

It is my opinion that the extensive operational separations and the prevalent negative interpersonal climates (referred to in the above quotation by the expressions "unenlightened attitudes" and "chicken") are the two most effective deterrents to a high retention rate. Chafee, in his statement above, directly connects the two in describing the chief direction of his own thinking. An instance of what he calls more personnel consciousness would be modification of the intense operational

¹²News item in the Navy Times, October 29, 1969.

¹³Editorial in the Navy Times, op. cit.

commitments of ships and crews during peacetime in favor of better treatment of personnel. One reporter referred to Chafee's "more personnel consciousness" and "better leadership" as intangibles, and to a large degree they are intangibles in the minds of many Navy personnel. It is this very intangibility and what appears to be at present their high factor rating in the retention problem that makes it important to provide an operational content to these concepts. It appears unlikely that the retention problem will be resolved until the Navy has a working theory of interpersonal climates, and that will not come about until there is a tentative theory presented along with methods of field implementation. This study has that aim.

Differences in Young Personnel

A third factor is that today's young Navy man is different than yesterday's, and tomorrow's will be even more so. He had different values, and those values produce a different behavior. It means that old methods of motivation and control are no longer valid. In early February, 1970, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Robert H. Finch, said the following to nearly 10,000 delegates to the annual convention of the National Association of Secondary School Principals,

We sense intuitively that the first thoroughly televised generation in the history of the world cannot simply be passed into and through the same rigid institutional structures that its parents and even grandparents traveled.¹⁴

¹⁴News item in Newsweek, February 16, 1970.

Many of tomorrow's Navy personnel are in high school today. What are they like? The staff of Newsweek in a major presentation of the state of the public high school in the U.S. reported the following:

The signs of disruption and discontent are evident on all sides. Last year, some 6,000 "incidents"—ranging from racial strife through political protests to arson attempts—were registered in the nation's public high schools. An estimated one-third to one-half of the U.S.'s 14.5 million high-school students have tried a variety of drugs, and the number of users is steadily rising. . . . The wave of student activism that engulfed college campuses in the late '60s is now beginning to hit high schools in full force, "radicalizing" many of the brightest and most politically aware students just as it did their elders a few years ago (significantly, SDS's Weatherman faction now plans to direct its major recruitment effort at urban high-school students).¹⁵

According to Newsweek the students' complaint is

. . . that their schools are out of touch with what is most important in their lives, that they have failed to keep pace with the great changes in American life during the past two decades. The society, the students know, has granted them more liberty than any previous generation; but their schools, they feel, restrict and thwart them in everything from dress and deportment to curriculums.¹⁶

Newsweek's conclusions:

Piecemeal reform and concessions to student pressure, most educational experts agree, will not be sufficient. What is needed is a frontal assault on the existing school structure that will replace outmoded teaching methods, impersonal or authoritarian teacher-student relations and obsolete behavior codes with new forms and ideas more in tune with the times. And such fundamental changes, of course, will require years to effect.¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

If such changes come about in our high-school system, the majority of the students graduating in the future would find the Navy environment almost totally incompatible with their experience. Enough already find it intolerable today.

The current college generation is also basically different. Psychology Today commissioned a year-long survey of student action and attitudes. The six-foot stack of computer readouts made no sense until they were checked against David Reisman's idea of an impulse toward the private—that students have a preference for feeling over thinking, place an emphasis on the subjective, and have a belief in "one's own inner juices."¹⁸ Jeffrey Hadden at Tulane's Urban Center did the work and came up with the term "privatism". He writes,

This generation rejects meaning or authority outside of the self. If the organization slave or other-directed man saw his existence in harmony with social institutions, the new style of privatism not only cries for freedom from established institutions, it fundamentally rejects their legitimacy.¹⁹

And later,

Their response is to retreat into privatism and there to resist further inroads into their personal domain. Their predominant mood, then, takes the form of rejection of authority and the desire to follow their own modes of conduct.²⁰

¹⁸Editorial, Psychology Today, III (October, 1969), 26.

¹⁹Jeffrey K. Hadden, "The Private Generation," Psychology Today, III (October, 1969), 32.

²⁰Ibid., 69.

These emergent attitudes are not limited to the young in the high schools and the colleges. They are already in the armed forces and making themselves known. Newsweek reports,

The Stars and Stripes flapped bravely from the turret of a tank as it churned down a muddy road north of Saigon last week. And standing in the turret, naked from the waist up, was a U.S. soldier—decked out in long side-burns and love beads, a peace medallion around his neck. "It used to be," marveled a veteran sergeant as he watched the tank pass from the side of the road, "that they wore St. Christopher medals or a cross. Now it's hippie beads." Shaking his closely cropped head, he noted that everywhere in South Vietnam young American soldiers were saluting each other with a "V" finger gesture. "Most lifers like me think it means victory against the Communists," the sergeant said. "It took me a while to learn that they mean it as a symbol for peace."

They, as the sergeant would agree, are a curious new phenomenon in the U. S. armed forces—young antiwar warriors who flout the conventional "my-country-right-or-wrong" military values of yesteryear. The "new GI's" of 1970 prefer pot and peace posters to the beer and pin-ups of their more traditional comrades. And worst of all, from the military establishment's point of view, the young soldiers are not only increasingly outspoken in their opposition to the war but openly irreverent toward their superior officers.²¹

It's happening in the Navy, too. Newsweek states,

Many American commanders in Vietnam refuse to acknowledge openly that all this constitutes a serious morale problem. But privately some will admit to a deep concern and puzzlement. "I never had to think about morale in the past, it just took care of itself," says a career Navy officer. "Now I spend half my time worrying about it." As if to confirm the existence of a morale problem, AWOL and desertion rates have been soaring—not just in Vietnam but throughout the armed forces.²²

²¹News item in Newsweek, February 2, 1970.

²²Ibid., 24-25.

I asked the executive officer of a destroyer if he saw anything different about the young Navy personnel aboard his ship. His response was immediate. "They're more outspoken, but we've managed to control it so far."

It's clear that not all of the new generation are like this, and that among those who are there is ample individual variation; but it is equally clear that there is a strong move in the direction of (1) the rejection of traditional forms of authority, (2) the will to live by their own discovered values, and (3) the courage to speak out. This very different young person will not quietly accept an interpersonal climate that makes subordinates feel helpless, insignificant, and used. The problem of interpersonal climate in the Navy needs a careful assessment and a program begun to incorporate corrective elements at the grass roots level. As Secretary Chafee has observed,

. . . each echelon of command must review what it can best do to improve conditions of service. Each officer and man must be considered as an individual. It will be the aggregate effort that makes the difference. I'm convinced that many small factors, which can be handled only on the local level, are as important as the big ones, such as pay, which are out of our control.²³

Deep Shifts in Societal Values

A fourth factor is that deep shifts in values are taking place within society. I see these value shifts centering around a core made

²³The Officer Personnel Letter, loc. cit.

up of two intertwining strands. The one is the right of the individual to decide what his life shall be, the other is the right of the human to be affective, that is, a feeling person. In the past a broad spectrum of authority systems—religious, scientific, legal, scholarly, military, governmental—told individuals what they were to be and how they were to live. The authority was generally accepted. These authority systems were primarily cognitively determined, feelings were discounted. But now such institutional authority has rapidly disintegrated in the face of the dissolution of so many of its certainties. Societal upheavals are common. Afro-Americans, Mexican-Americans, the young, the old, the poor, the workers, and perhaps the most potent of all—women—are dissenting against cultural and institutional factors that seem to limit their existence. Whole systems are under pressure from within and without to change on the basis of new knowledge and experience but particularly on the basis of a new recognition of the individual and his feelings. Illustrative is the newly passed abortion law in the state of Hawaii. As in most states, Hawaiian law permitted physicians to perform an abortion only to save the mother's life. The present law allows any woman to have an abortion if she does not choose to have a child.

Further illustration is occurring in our faltering system of education. Growth in new directions already prophesy extensive modification in line with the value changes noted. Men and books are challenging the old tenets—George Leonard's Education and Ecstasy,

John Holt's How Children Learn and How Children Fail, Carl Roger's Freedom to Learn. There are experiments on a large scale such as the John Adams High School in Portland, Oregon, designed by seven Ph.D. candidates at the Harvard Graduate School of Education; and the three year experiment in educational innovation conducted by the Center for Studies of the Person in a large Los Angeles Catholic school system.

The established modes of business and industrial management have been shaken by the work of such men as Douglas McGregor, Chris Argyris, and Warren Bennis. This, too, has been innovation in the direction of recognizing the individual and the affective domain.

There is hardly an area of human endeavor that is not currently undergoing critical scrutiny and beginning to feel the anxieties of transition. The fact is that our society is changing. It is moving toward greater recognition of the right of the individual to decide what his life shall be and of the importance of the affective life of the person. This general shift means to me that we are not going back to the kind of society that developed and supported our present military system. It also means that the changes observed in our young people are more than a fad; they are, to some degree, reflections of a broader societal change as well as part of the change agency. If this is the trend, and I believe it is, then there is need for an examination of the problem of interpersonal climates in the military with a view to finding both the most appropriate atmosphere for a defense force that grows out of this kind of society and the means of achieving it.

Philosophical Inconsistency

A fifth factor has to do with philosophical inconsistency. I don't think that it is essential that one be philosophically consistent, nor do I think that simply because our founding fathers thought a certain way that that somehow makes it essential that we think the same. But I am especially impressed by one of the philosophical bases for the foundation of these United States, that every man has certain fundamental rights and that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It seems to me that the appropriate goal of a culture built on that philosophical assumption would be like that suggested by Dumas Malone, ". . .to provide a society within which all men can enjoy the largest feasible degree of liberty and attain the fullest measure of happiness."²⁴ It also seems to me that, in this setting, the legitimate exercise of power—whether governmental, economic, military, or religious—is toward enhancing such individual liberty and happiness. The arbitrary use of power denies both this assumption and the structure built on it. Unhappily, wherever power exists, it seems that at least to some degree it is wielded arbitrarily. It is out of this historical reality that the statement was made: power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. It follows that the exercise of power in the Navy will at times deviate from what I perceive the writers of the

²⁴Dumas Malone, The Story of the Declaration of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 266.

Declaration of Independence saw to be the genuine basis of strength and freedom. Here is Dumas Malone's paraphrase of the Declaration's philosophical section:

By birth all men are equal, not in ability or condition, for that has been untrue in all the ages of which we have any record, but in the possession of fundamental rights. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are mentioned in the great Charter; but more important than any list is the 'truth' that men possess these rights, not because of race or creed or station, but because they are human beings. Here is the eternal answer to bigotry and intolerance of any and every sort.

Government and every other form of public control is a means to human well-being, not an end in itself. Man is not made for the state but the state for man, and it derives its just powers only from the consent of the governed. In extreme cases, like the one in 1776, this 'truth' justifies political revolution, and in all cases it provides the criterion by which any government or institution should be judged. No sort of rule can justly rest on power alone, and here is the eternal answer to all forms of tyranny over the persons, the property, and the minds of men.²⁵

I take from this what I consider to be a key statement, "Government, and every other form of public control is a means to human well-being, not an end in itself." Whatever interpersonal climate exists in any sub-section of the Navy organization exists there largely because of the assumptions held by the immediate leadership. If the above statement were the underlying assumption in the minds of the local leadership, it would tend to produce organizational policies and practices in line with it, and it would tend to produce an interpersonal climate that reflected it. Luigi Petrullo, former head of the Office of

²⁵Ibid., pp. 266-67.

Naval Research, presents two concepts of leadership that are constructed on the sort of philosophical base I have been discussing.

(1) The "...concept of the leader, whether selected from above or below, as a freely followed person who is concerned with fulfilling the purposes of the group and the needs of the individual in it."²⁶ (2) The concept of "...the follower as an aspiring and creative individual, seeking and seeing, in the leader, a means of accomplishing his own purpose."²⁷ Such leadership theory poses a host of problems for military leadership. It is not my purpose at this point to speak to these problems but to show that underlying philosophical assumptions make a difference in leadership—especially in its practice. When a leader communicates verbally, his tone of voice, his facial expression, and his body posture can communicate his assumptions about the addressees. "I need six warm bodies," can be said in a way that means, "You're all nothing but things to be used for my purposes." Or it can be said in a way that denies the insult of the words and conveys warmth, support, strength, prizing, understanding, and humanity. Underlying assumptions are among the determinants of behavior. Some present behavior in the Navy denies the cornerstone assumptions undergirding the establishment of our society. I present two specific examples selected

²⁶Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (eds.), Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), pp. xvii-xviii.

²⁷Ibid., p. xviii.

because of their broad impact and because of their apparent disparity. The one has to do with male hair-style and the other has to do with compulsory church attendance at recruit training commands and at the Naval Academy.

To present the issue regarding hair I quote at length from an editorial in the Navy Times:

Now we come to hair.

We haven't seen the show of that name. Seeing some excerpts on a TV program last year was enough. Five minutes of rock and roll, even at bearable loudness, is as much as we want at a time.

Nor do we like curls (unless they are his girls') swirling about a man's neck or (ugh!) his shoulders.

But the point is, what WE like isn't the point.

The point is, hair (and rock and roll) are what today's young people (and a number above 30) do like.

More than "like." Long hair is "in," and no one can tolerate being too much out of style. Why, style is so compelling that young servicemen, even those at the academies, are taking to wearing wigs so as not to appear as freaks to their civilian contemporaries.

That they do so means they cannot live with a service regulation. That they "bend" one regulation has the unfortunate effect of conditioning them to violate other regulations which must be inviolate.

We of the "establishment" should do a little thinking. If we do, we will recall that long hair on men has been "in" more eons than short hair. We recall that the last previous short-hair epoch was way back in the mid 1600s. We will recall that the now ending short hair epoch was ushered in with World War I (probably the infamous "cootie" had much to do with it.). We will realize, if we really are aware of what's going on in the world, that the epoch of short hair began to wane shortly after World War II.

We will think of our sons not in service. (Did you see that photograph of the son of General of the Army Bradley the other day?) We will think of the women and their styles.

We will, if we consider, see the unfairness of allowing service women to adjust to style when the most we allow for the men (with a little judicious blinking at the wigs and longer sideburns here and there) is an occasional change in necktie

width. Why, since the women have been permanent members of the forces, we've seen their hemlines everywhere from mid-calf to inches above the knees. No micro-minis, of course, just as shoulder bobs for the males would be going too far. But let's "get with it"—within reason.

Does "within reason" include beards? We don't know. Some mighty deeds were done by the services in the last half of the last century though some of the men were bearded and some were not.

Maybe the time for the beards is not yet here for the active forces. But at least we can look around us and see that all those who wear beards are not hippies. And we can avoid such flaps as that attempt to deny a retired senior chief the station facilities which were his right by law and by a career of military service.

After we ran a news item about that, Navy Times received two letters upholding the denial of station privileges to the retiree. One was from another senior chief, the other from the commanding officer of another large station.

With the best of intentions, both showed an unawareness of the styles of the times and of the reasonable rights of Americans. Both unwittingly, are part of the retention problem, not part of the solution to it.

"I believe," to repeat Mr. Chafee, "we must do something to restore the adventure, the fun of being a Navy man."²⁸

The problem is not simple. Recently an enlightened commanding officer of a destroyer began permitting longer hair and longer sideburns. The majority of his chief petty officers were offended by the policy and applied such pressure that the commanding officer found it wise to modify his experimental hair policy. Implementing the idea of the largest feasible degree of liberty for all men is bound to be both a difficult and a complex process, but that is hardly reason not to make the effort. It seems to me that the current regulation regarding male hair style has been arbitrary. The personal preference of those with

²⁸Editorial in the Navy Times, April 1, 1970.

power are being imposed on those who are not in a position to ignore that preference because it exists in the form of official sanction. It is inconsistent with what we say we stand for.

The second example is the present compulsory church attendance that exists at the Naval Academy and at the recruit training commands. Though at any one time such regulations affect only a small percentage of Navy personnel, most of them on active duty have been exposed to the experience, and it is widely recognized as a Navy policy. My own awareness of the issue has grown through repeated unsolicited resentment expressed to me by young Navy men, both enlisted and commissioned. This issue differs from the hair issue in a significant aspect—the compulsory church attendance issue has been thoroughly objected to via command channels right up to the Secretary of Defense, and it is still being practiced.

In January, 1963, Captain D. I. Thomas, Commander, Naval Training Center, San Diego, addressed a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel stating that unless otherwise directed he was instituting a system of voluntary attendance at Divine Services beginning February 1. His reasoning, in brief, was as follows: (a) it is an offense against conscience; (b) Chaplains should not be placed in the position of accessories in violating the principle of their churches that duress should not be applied in connection with worship; (c) recent Supreme Court decisions clearly define government compulsion in matters of religion as a trespass against constitutional civil rights; (d) the system does

not work in practice, that is, there is irreverence such as notable inattention, sleeping, and sometimes recalcitrance; firm military supervision to enforce reverent conduct is inconsistent with an atmosphere of worship.

Captain Thomas' action was not approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel, but the Chief included a statement in his response which said that provision should be made to exempt bona fide objectors from this requirement. I quote his reason for denial in full, "Elimination of this requirement would be inconsistent with the Navy's traditional concern with the spiritual well-being of its personnel."²⁹ This same letter instituted compulsory church attendance at the Naval Training Center, Bainbridge, Md., where it had not been practiced.

Rear Admiral Almon E. Loomis, Commandant, Eleventh Naval District, then wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel strongly recommending that church attendance be made voluntary in recruit training. Some of his reasons, in brief, were: it exceeds the authority granted to commanding officers by Navy Regulations (Article 0711 states in part, "Divine services shall be conducted on Sunday if possible. . . .The religious tendencies of individuals shall be recognized and encouraged. . . ." Article 0807 states, "The chaplain. . .shall be responsible for the performance of all duties relating to the religious

²⁹Letter from the Chief of Naval Personnel to the Commander, U.S. Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, March 1, 1963.

activities of the command.""); it strikes a blow at genuine religion; it is contrary to prudent public policy (contradicts our nation's commitment to freedom of religion); it degrades chaplains in the exercise of their role of religious leadership; it deprives recruits of their civil constitutional rights ("The courts have traditionally held that the 'free exercise' of religion involves not only the right to worship but also the freedom to abstain from worship without prejudice. This violation of guaranteed freedom is not made more tolerable because it purports to exempt those 'bona fide' objectors from compulsory church attendance."³⁰).

This request for reconsideration of the matter was turned down by the Chief of Naval Personnel. His argument was that it is a limited group to which compulsory church attendance applies and that that group was a unique one since it is made up of young people well below the age of twenty-one, many of whom have no knowledge of what can be gained by attendance at religious services since they have never set foot in a church before, and most of whom have some religious training, and some of whom are highly motivated to attend at every opportunity. He concludes,

In the light of the conglomerate composition of the group, the youth and inexperience of the great majority and the need to show to each one of them that the Navy does indeed derive

³⁰Letter from the Commandant, Eleventh Naval District to the Chief of Naval Personnel, March 14, 1963.

much of its basic strength from a belief in God, the only reasonable solution is to require, of every individual, except those properly excused, attendance at a church service of his choice on Sunday.³¹

He further states that it was just enough pressure to get the waivering boy to church and that "The system has worked well for many years at the Naval Academy and at the Recruit Training Commands."³²

In July of 1963, Chaplain Roland W. Faulk, staff chaplain for the Commandant, Eleventh Naval District, wrote a ten page letter to the Secretary of the Navy via channels requesting him to promulgate

. . .such regulations as will restore the civil rights of all naval personal, will insure compliance with the law of the land respecting the establishment and the free exercise of religion and will deliver the service from the odium of compelling free men in a matter which is ". . .too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a . . .magistrate." (Madison, quoted in Engel v Vitale, . . .).³³

In this letter Chaplain Faulk carefully reviewed the previous correspondence and then argued cogently from the Constitution, law, religious authority, Navy tradition, and reason. He also commented on the Naval Academy practice as well as that of the recruit training commands. Two statements are especially pertinent:

³¹Letter from the Chief of Naval Personnel to the Commandant, Eleventh Naval District, April 4, 1963.

³²Ibid.

³³Letter from Chaplain Roland W. Faulk to the Secretary of the Navy, July 9, 1963.

Compulsory Church attendance at the Naval Academy therefore also violates the requirement of Article Six of the Constitution that ". . . no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office of public trust under the United States."

.
 These young men are being taught, in effect, that it is proper for naval officers to violate the spiritual lives of personnel under their command.³⁴

The Commandant's endorsement of this letter was negative and included a statement that his own previous letter had been ill-advised. The chief of Naval Personnel's endorsement observed that the argument of Chaplain Faulk's letter affected by implication other fundamental religious traditions within the United States Navy such as invocations at official ceremonies, the recitation of daily prayers upon ships at sea, etc. He suggested that a committee be appointed to examine the specific complaint of the letter and to formulate recommendations for policy regarding religious observances.

The response of the Secretary of the Navy was a courteous letter to Chaplain Faulk informing him that the committee recommended by the Chief of Naval Personnel would be established. Ten months passed without further word on the issue from the Secretary of the Navy. In May 1964, Chaplain Faulk addressed a letter to the Secretary of Defense. He included in it references to critical remarks in the press and from religious bodies, reviewed his position, and asked redress. The Chief of Naval Personnel's endorsement to the Secretary of the

³⁴Ibid.

Navy stated that the previously appointed committee's report with recommendations had been forwarded on March 26, 1964. The reply from the Secretary of Defense is quoted except for the first paragraph which simply recognized the request:

The Secretary of the Navy has advised me that pertinent Navy regulations now provide that a recruit who objects to attending divine services for reasons of religious conscience may be excused from such attendance by his commanding officer.

The matter of compulsory attendance at religious services at the three service academies is now under study by this office. I am grateful for your remarks, and I assure you that they will be considered in connection with this study.³⁵

Compulsory church attendance still exists at all recruit training commands and at the Academy. The latest development, however, is an effort to have such required attendance outlawed. One cadet at West Point and six midshipmen at Annapolis have brought suit and are being helped by two lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union and a Jesuit priest who is a professor of law at Boston University. Their claim is that the compulsory chapel program violates two provisions of the Constitution: (1) "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." (Article VI). (2) "Congress shall make no law respecting establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." (First Amendment).

³⁵Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense to Chaplain Roland W. Faulk, July 6, 1964.

As I think over the general tendency to use power as it is being used in the hair-style and compulsory church attendance examples, words that John Dewey once wrote come to mind,

What is sometimes called a benevolent interest in others may be but an unwitting mask for an attempt to dictate to them what their good shall be, instead of an endeavor to free them so that they may seek and find the good of their own choice.³⁶

My perception of the American ideal certainly includes the endeavor to free people so that they may seek and find the good of their own choice. In my judgment the practices just described and many other instances of unnecessary arbitrary uses of power in the Navy are inconsistent with the theoretical premises of the society it exists to protect. I picked up a Navy blue book of matches the other day. On the cover in bold print were the words, "United States Navy, World Symbol of Strength and Freedom." It is important to discover how to bring the interpersonal climates in that Navy to as reasonable a place of consistency with that match book claim as possible. This study confronts that problem.

Technological Change

A sixth factor is that technological change within the Navy is complicating individual and group relations. Increasing complexity means increasing specialization and consequent social fragmentation—

³⁶John Dewey, Democracy and Education (Free Press edition; New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 121.

it becomes more and more difficult for crews to find common understanding within the group and to function at optimum levels as a team.

The F-4 Phantom II, one of today's fighter planes, weighs and costs more than an entire squadron of propeller driven fighters in the nineteen-thirties. It can fly faster straight up than the F-4 of the thirties could straight down. The variety and depth of technical specialties required to maintain such modern aircraft extend far beyond what was necessary thirty-five years ago. Such a trend is manifest throughout the Navy. The electronic and nuclear sophistication of our present floating weapons systems matches that of the flying ones. The modern man o' war is machine-dense, forty percent ship and sixty percent machinery—weapons systems, communications and sensing systems, etc. And the future holds increasing change in the direction of technical complexity. The Chief of Naval Operations forecasts,

In general, I foresee a somewhat smaller but more efficient Navy as we move into the future. Many of the ships which we will have, like the LHA, will carry out missions which now take several ships. This smaller Navy, however, will be even more technical than today's, as we move into an era of more sophisticated technology.³⁷

In the face of these inexorable pressures creative and collaborative adaptations in the skills of human relating are essential not only for efficient team functioning but individual functioning as well. A study of the interpersonal climates within the Navy is to the point.

³⁷The Officer Personnel Newsletter, op. cit.

Acceleration of Change

A seventh factor is the acceleration of change in our culture to the point where the acceleration itself produced special problems.

K. Keniston puts it this way,

Stated more generally, the faster the motion, the more difficult it is to maintain a sense of relationship to one's surroundings, be they temporal and historical or physical and geographical. Extremely rapid and accelerating social change as we know it today in America increasingly entails a psychological distancing of the past, a sense of the unknowability of the future, and a new emphasis on the present.³⁸

But in its extreme, it disorients from the present as well. Sociologist Alvin Toffler has coined the label future shock for this phenomenon and thinks that it may become the most obstinate and debilitating social problem of the future. He explains it this way:

The quickest way to grasp the idea of future shock is to begin with a parallel term—culture shock. . . . Culture shock is the queasy physical and mental state produced in an unprepared person who is suddenly immersed in an alien culture. . . . Culture shock is what happens when a traveler suddenly finds himself surrounded by newness, cut off from meaning—when, because of a shift of culture, a yes may mean no, when to slap a man's back in friendly camaraderie may be to offer a mortal insult, when laughter may signify not joy but fury. Culture shock is the bewilderment and distress. . . triggered by the removal of the familiar psychological cues on which all of us must depend for survival.³⁹

³⁸Charlotte Buhler, "The Human Potential From the Perspective of an Emergent Psychology," Human Potentialities, The Challenge and the Promise, ed. Herbert A. Otto (St. Louis: Warren H. Green, Inc., 1968), p. 106, citing K. Keniston, The Uncommitted (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).

³⁹Alvin Toffler, "Future Shock," Playboy, XVII (February, 1970), 94.

Toffler then discusses future shock itself:

A product of the greatly accelerated rate of change in society, future shock arises from the superimposition of a new culture on an old one. It is culture shock in one's own society. But its impact is far worse. . . most travelers—have the comforting knowledge that the culture they left behind will be there to return to. The victim of future shock does not.⁴⁰

Toffler points out that, ". . . a new society—superindustrial, fast-paced, fragmented, filled with bizarre styles, customs and choices—is erupting in our midst."⁴¹ He goes on to observe that it is a culture alien to the one in which most of us have our roots. But the rate of change is so accelerated that it can be anticipated that this culture too will be displaced by another. In certain quarters the rate of change is already blinding, and there is reason to believe that we are only at the beginning of the accelerative curve. If the last 50,000 years of man's existence were divided into life spans of 62 years each, there have been about 800 spans. Only in the last six lifetimes have masses of men seen a printed word. Only during the last four has it been possible to measure time with any precision. Only in the last two has anyone used an electric motor. The overwhelming majority of all the material goods we use in daily life today have been developed within the present lifetime, the 800th. Ninety percent of the scientists who ever lived are alive today. The gap between invention and application is rapidly decreasing. It took 65 years for the electric motor to be applied, 33

⁴⁰ibid.

⁴¹ibid., pp. 94, 97.

years for the vacuum tube, 18 for the X-ray tube, only 10 for the nuclear reactor, 5 for radar, and only 3 for the transistor and the solar battery.

But the increased pace not only means a rapidly changing environment, it means changes in our perception of our environment and of ourselves. For example, the clock came along before the Newtonian image of the world as a clocklike mechanism, a philosophical notion that has had the utmost impact on man's intellectual development.

Toffler writes about the innovative process:

Recently, the computer has touched off a storm of fresh ideas about man as an interacting part of larger systems, about his physiology, the way he learns, the way he remembers, and the way he makes decisions. Virtually every intellectual discipline, from political science to family psychology, has been hit by a wave of imaginative hypotheses triggered by the invention and diffusion of the computer—and its full impact has not yet struck. And so the innovative cycle, feeding on itself, speeds up.⁴²

He goes on to say that this acceleration is a psychological force as well. Unconsciously we are conditioned to move faster, to interact more rapidly with other people, to expect things to happen sooner. In short, we are moving toward a high-transience society.

We make and break ties with people at a pace that would have astonished our ancestors. This raises all kinds of profound questions about personal commitment and involvement, the quality of friendship, the ability of humans to communicate with one another, the function of education, even of sex, in the future.⁴³

⁴²Ibid., p. 202.

⁴³Ibid., p. 204.

The rapidly increasing use of ad hoc committees, task forces, and project teams within great corporations and bureaucracies, and the changing state of knowledge illustrate the reality of the move toward high-transiency.

An indication of what this can mean to the individual—and to organizations—is revealed in some unpublicized findings of medical research. Toffler reports,

Research conducted at the University of Washington Medical School, at the U.S. Navy Neuropsychiatric Unit at San Diego, as well as in Japan, Europe and elsewhere, documents the disturbing fact that individuals who experience a great deal of change in their lives are more prone to illness—and the more radical and swift the changes, the more serious the illness.⁴⁴

A major part of the problem of the increasing high-transiency and the vulnerability to future shock is the matter of establishing and disrupting interpersonal relationships. What interpersonal climates make it easier to initiate, maintain, and cessate such relationships with a minimum trauma and maximum enablement for personal functioning? Since the Second World War the Navy has been an organization living with technological change and with personal transciency, but it appears that it, too, will be increasingly involved in the general acceleration. Unless it takes specific action to understand the nature of its own interpersonal climates and to discover those elements which will produce the range of climates needed, more serious inroads against efficient operation can be expected.

⁴⁴Bid., p. 206.

Developments in the Behavioral Sciences

An eighth factor is that the burgeoning developments in the behavioral sciences demand a specific means of applying relevant findings to field situations in the Navy and, after field testing, of cutting lag time between validation and broad application.

Kenneth E. Clark, president-elect of the American Psychological Association, has observed that what we lack is the engineering effort that translates laboratory knowledge into useful social systems.⁴⁵

Naval leadership in an area that falls within that described by Leland F. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne as the "... processes of action-decision where efficiency, win-lose competition, and 'tribal' defense and offense tend to dominate."⁴⁶ They go on to make these pertinent observations:

Frequently, human facts are not faced by practical decision makers—facts about feelings, motivations, personal and collective potentialities for growth, contribution potentials of persons and subgroups—as they define and attempt to solve social problems. Not only do decision makers neglect to face the facts of other people's behavioral involvements, but they also frequently neglect to face and manage their own involvements as persons. Their difficulty arises partly from lack of knowledge and skill in making sense of behavioral facts, and

⁴⁵Kenneth E. Clark, "Too Much Basic Research," Psychology Today, III (April, 1970), 22.

⁴⁶Leland F. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne, "Two Educational Innovations," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-education, eds. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 8.

also from resistances toward becoming aware of the human consequences of their actions.⁴⁷

Part of the engineering problem of applying research findings to live activity is that the three functional areas of action, research, and education tend to isolate from each other because of their different goals and methodology, and yet each of these functions contains data essential for the effective operation of the other two. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne illustrate in part:

Decisions about social action are typically taken without the utilization of relevant findings and methodologies from social and behavioral research, while research efforts, though incidentally producing findings relevant to action choices, typically are undertaken without awareness of the knowledges needed by people who must take action. Where action leaders do employ competences in the social and behavioral sciences, they often make a limited and truncated use of them—often in the service of unexamined goals, values, and assumptions. And researchers, concerned with the violation of their own inherent values and goals, resist superficial, applied employment of their resources.⁴⁸

It seems to me that an adequate engineering process within the Navy would need to bring together action leaders, researchers, and educators in a situation which would promote a growing appreciation of each other as potent and necessary resources and a growing collaboration leading to the production of effective means for applying significant findings of the behavioral sciences. There is a need for such an engineering process; this study examines the problem as it applies to modifying the interpersonal climates within the Navy.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Change in Organizational Theory and Practice

A ninth factor that points up the need for this study is that significant changes are taking place in organizational theory and practice—changes that involve interpersonal climates within organizations. As is true for the section just finished, there is a need for awareness and tentative, limited application of those changes which have been practiced with rewarding results elsewhere to learn whether they are valid in the Navy setting.

Douglas McGregor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology stated ten years ago that if our methods for selecting young men with capacity to become top executives were perfected, the result in industry would be negligible under the then present conditions. The reason is

. . .that we have not learned enough about utilization of talent, about the creation of an organizational climate conducive to human growth. The blunt fact is that we are a long way from realizing the potential represented by the human resources we now recruit into industry.⁴⁹

I think that what he has said regarding industry applies to the Navy. The Navy has many programs currently operative which are designed to utilize and develop the talents and skills of its people along lines contributing to fulfillment of the Navy's mission. But the programs are not as effective as hoped. The breakdown appears to be in the management climate. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy Delbert D. Black

⁴⁹Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. vi.

recently leveled a criticism against senior petty officers for not learning and passing on to their men the many benefits of Naval service. He said, "There's a tendency on the part of many senior petty officers to say, 'I made it on my own, so why can't those coming into the Navy today do the same.'"⁵⁰ He further claimed that too often the career counselors have not been backed by commanders. And where commanders have backed the program, petty officers often do not support the counseling with their own efforts.

The Navy has its own special problem in management since it is basically an authoritarian organization with extensive manuals for detailed guidance and a line command that places unusual power over others into the hands of individuals. Working in such a system arouses hostility in many. Abraham H. Maslow observes the effect of excessive authoritarian practices on the part of management:

Everybody seems to be aware at some level of consciousness of the fact that authoritarian management outrages the dignity of the worker. He then fights back in order to restore his dignity and self-esteem, actively with hostility, vandalism, and the like, or passively as a slave does, with all sorts of underhanded, sly, and secretly vicious counter measures. These reactions are puzzling generally to the dominator, but on the whole they are easily enough understood, and they make very real psychological sense, if they are understood as attempts to maintain one's dignity under conditions of domination or of disrespect.⁵¹

⁵⁰News item in the Navy Times (issue unknown).

⁵¹Abraham H. Maslow, "Seminar Notes on Social Psychology of Industry and Management at Non-Linear Systems, Inc.," mimeographed manual (Del Mar, California, 1962), p. 35, cited by McGregor, op. cit.

The Navy has a special organization and management environment, and it needs some ongoing means of testing, evaluating, and applying within the Navy structure significant changes occurring in organizational and management practice elsewhere, especially as they apply to the utilization of human resources at the level of ship's organization. McGregor predicted that,

Once management becomes truly persuaded that it is seriously under-estimating the potential represented by its human resources—once it accepts assumptions about human behavior more consistent with current social science knowledge. . . — it will invest time, money, and effort not only to develop improved applications of such ideas as have been discussed in these pages, but to invent more effective ones.⁵²

His prediction has come true in many areas of industry today, and the Navy is in an unprecedented period of producing positive changes affecting the human side of its enterprise, but it is only a taste of what is possible. Part of the Navy's management problem is finding a way to capture the assumptions and attitudes and spirit that underlie the caring decisions being made at the highest levels these days and effectively planting them deep in the inner lives of personnel at all levels right down to the novice seaman. This study addresses itself to the beginning state of that task.

Summary

In summary, (1) the efforts of Navy leaders to develop what they see as an appropriate interpersonal climate has not succeeded;

⁵²McGregor, op. cit., p. 246.

(2) retention of personnel is an increasingly critical problem; (3) the young people entering the Navy now tend to have personal values that are in conflict with the authoritarian military environment; (4) the societal milieu within which the Navy exists is rapidly becoming more personal, outspoken, and complex; (5) the philosophical principle of maximum feasible freedom to each, which underlies the Declaration of Independence, has intrinsic value today as a basic assumption for Navy leaders but does not exist at all levels of command structure; (6) increasing technological sophistication tends to fragment organization at operational levels; (7) the acceleration of change imposes unique pressures; (8) rapid and extensive developments are occurring in the behavioral sciences, and (9) significant changes are taking place in organizational theory and practice.

These nine factors together demonstrate a need for studying the problem of interpersonal climates within the Navy seeking specifically (1) to find a realistic basis for determining those climates most suitable and (2) to develop a tentative model for facilitating change in the desired direction using those findings in the behavioral sciences and those developments in organizational theory and practice which may be pertinent.

IV. DEFINITIONS

The thesis is: for the personnel of the United States Navy to perform more efficiently as a force, their interpersonal climates need

to change in a direction that will promote the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons. Three key terms need definition: (1) perform efficiently, (2) interpersonal climates, (3) growth toward fully functioning persons.

Perform Efficiently

To perform efficiently is to complete missions successfully over extended periods of time with the optimal use of energy, time, materials, and personnel. In this definition I am assuming that personnel determine the efficient use of energy, time, and material and that the optimal use of personnel is, therefore, the major determinant of efficient performance. I further assume that optimal use of personnel cannot be achieved apart from the meeting of their human need for expression, respect, participation, understanding, and personal meaning. These assumptions being true, efficient performance would be reflected in the following measurable areas: the re-enlistment rate, the time expended in handling discipline problems, the number of people reporting at sick call, the number of people absent without leave, and the number of accidents. There are other areas that reflect efficient performance in this sense more directly but they are far more difficult to measure. Some examples are the degree of reality in planning and decision making as seen in the rate of flow and the degree of accuracy of information up and down the line and in lateral directions; the degree of commitment in personnel, the other side of the coin being the degree

of behavior designed to "beat the system"; the degree of openness through the command to innovative suggestions regardless of source; the degree of participation of personnel in the processes for setting and maintaining standards of output.

The experience of an officer commanding a destroyer illustrates in part this definition. He was plagued with a series of unexpected engineering breakdowns that hampered his operational capability. His examination of the problem revealed that his engineering officer was creating a climate in the engineering department that had aroused hostility in his division. The upward flow of accurate information ceased, the level of commitment was minimal, and the breakdowns began and continued. When a different engineering officer was assigned, he created a different climate, the flow of accurate information and the commitment of personnel increased, and the epidemic of casualty reports stopped.

Interpersonal Climate

I see interpersonal climate as being a complex psychological environment emanating from persons and based upon personal assumptions about self, others, role, and meaning of life, and which modifies the behavior of the individuals in its aura in accordance with their perception of it. The assumptions may be conscious or subliminal, they may be verbal or non-verbal. They are determinants of attitudes, feelings, and behavior, and are expressed through body postures, gestures, facial expressions, vocal contours, words used, subjects discussed,

life tempo, dress, selection of physical environment, personal modifications of that environment, policies, and practices.

To illustrate, here is a set of assumptions that might exist in a manager according to Douglas McGregor. They are the assumptions underlying what he calls Theory X: the Traditional View of Direction and Control and are deceptive in the sense that for most of us our assumptions are not this well focused and ordered in verbal symbols.

1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he can.

2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives.

3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all.⁵³

McGregor presents another set which he calls the assumptions underlying Theory Y: The Integration of Goals:

1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest. The average human being does not inherently dislike work. Depending upon controllable conditions, work may be a source of satisfaction (and will be voluntarily performed) or a source of punishment (and will be avoided if possible).

2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed.

3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their achievement. The most significant of such rewards, e.g., the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization needs, can be direct products of effort directed toward organizational objectives.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 33-34.

4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility. Avoidance of responsibility, lack of ambition, and emphasis on security are generally consequences of experience, not inherent human characteristics.

5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.

6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized.⁵⁴

A manager with the assumptions that produce Theory X will create an interpersonal climate far different from that created by a manager with the assumptions underlying Theory Y. Jack Gibb, an organizational consultant, discusses some of the intermediate processes between the assumptions of management, the formation of an interpersonal climate and the resultant modification of worker behavior. His research team working with one company ". . . found deep-seated feelings of fear and distrust prevalent at all levels in most of the company. Management distrusted the workers. Workers distrusted management."⁵⁵ His research indicated that management contributed to the formation of this interpersonal climate of distrust in four ways:

Treating individuals as objects and tools rather than as persons;

Being closed, secretive and "strategic" in communications;

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 47-48.

⁵⁵Jack Gibb, "Building A Teamwork Climate," Weyerhaeuser Management Viewpoint, I (August, 1969), 11.

Making decisions about the lives and work of others without including them in the decisions;

Setting up unnecessary controls on people.⁵⁶

The modified behavior of those involved in this climate of distrust fell into four categories:

De-personalized feelings that cause people to give less than they would otherwise give to the job;

Circumventive behavior that channels creativity into rule-breaking, hidden strategy, and endless efforts to "beat the system";

Apathy or frenetic in-company competition, each of which deflects energy toward unproductive goals;

Channeling energy into conformity or rebellion, each of which works against productive problem-solving.⁵⁷

The steps of the process in this case were as follows: (1) assumptions in the minds of key managers; (2) practices based on those assumptions; (3) an interpersonal climate formed largely by those practices; and (4) modification of worker behavior growing out of their involvement in that climate.

The Growth of Individuals Toward Becoming More Fully Functioning Persons

It seems to me that one way to delineate what "growth toward becoming a more fully functioning person" means would be to follow the basic principle that a fully functioning person is one who can freely express those behaviors which spring directly out of those capacities inherent in his essential humanness. An oversimplified example would be: assuming that the capacity to make decisions is an essential

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

characteristic of the human, then the fully functioning person would be able to freely express decision-making behavior.

The procedure I'm going to follow in this defining process is:

(1) to make some reasonable assumptions about the essentials of humanness; (2) to establish the pattern of the functioning of these essentials in a relatively free environment; (3) and to draw some conclusions regarding growth toward more fully functioning persons.

To write intelligently about the human organism it is necessary to write inaccurately because intelligent discussion requires labeling parts and systems and the human organism functions as an intricate whole not as a collection of parts. With that limitation in mind, I see the following general statements as true of the human. (1) He has an animal base, but what he shares with the animal is not exactly the same, for it is changed in some degree by its incorporation into a much more sophisticated creature. (2) He has a complex self identity that develops through the interaction of his almost undifferentiated life impulses at infancy with his societal environment. (3) He has three major psychophysiological systems which support the development and maintenance of his self identity: a sensory system, a thought support system, and an affect support system. (4) These three systems and his developing self identity interlace to form a base for a series of functions common to all humans but which as expressions of the individual human take on unique characteristics. The following are such functions: sensing, having feelings, thinking (including imagining and remembering),

deciding, desiring, striving, relating, erring, etc. One could say that the fully functioning person is one who can freely express these functions, but that would be a definition without sufficient direction or meaning. It is unsatisfactory because in the individual these functions all hang together in a pattern that derives its order and meaning from the self-identity at the core. To resolve this difficulty and at the same time to give more body to the definition I turn to the work of Gordon Allport.

Once it develops, the sense of selfness—separate identity—becomes the core of all subsequent experience. It becomes the chief determinant of the pattern of functioning in the individual. But the infant is not born with this sense of self. Allport writes,

We do not know what an infant's conscious experiences may be like. Years ago William James called it a "big, blooming, buzzing, confusion," and he may be right. One thing is quite certain: the young infant is not aware of himself as a self. He does not separate the "me" from the rest of the world. And it is precisely this separation that is the pivot of later life. Consciousness and self-consciousness are not the same, neither for the infant nor for the adult. The infant, though presumably conscious, lacks self-consciousness completely; the adult has both, but they are not identical.

Self-consciousness, as we shall see, is a gradual acquisition during the first five or six years of life, making most rapid strides with the coming of language in the second year. Although the process is gradual, it is no doubt the most important development that occurs during a person's entire life.⁵⁸

Allport perceives seven separate strands that interweave to form together the self that is known. Each strand begins separately and

⁵⁸Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 111-12.

gradually evolves combining with each new strand as it begins and continues to grow until all strands are present and growing together. He calls this new entity the proprium. Its seven aspects are:

- Aspect 1: Sense of bodily self
- Aspect 2: Sense of continuing self-identity
- Aspect 3: Self-esteem, pride
- Aspect 4: The extension of self
- Aspect 5: The self-image
- Aspect 6: The self as a rational cop
- Aspect 7: Propriate striving⁵⁹

Aspect 1: Sense of bodily self. Allport observes that it is probable that the first aspect of selfhood to evolve is the sense of a bodily me. The infant's internal organs, his muscles, joints, and tendons bombard him with sensory messages. When his cortex matures sufficiently to retain traces of experience, he can sense recurrence, continuity. These recurrent organic sensations plus frustrations that arise from the "out there" (e.g. when he cannot satisfy hunger feelings when he wants to or when he bumps his head) produced a sense of bodily me. This bodily sense becomes and remains the lifelong anchor for his self-awareness.

Aspect 2: Sense of continuing self-identity. The elderly person is sure that he is the same "I" that he was at age three, although everything about him has changed many times over, including the cells of his body. Without entering into the philosophical problem of a continuing identity, we can look at psychological factors important to the

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 113-127.

establishment and maintenance of a sense of continuing self-identity.

One is the factor of language. Allport writes,

When the child can speak and think in terms of toys, or his shoes or daddy, he has tools for relating the it to the I. By sometimes leaving and sometimes returning to the object and speaking its name, the inference grows that the I is the continuing factor in these intermittent relationships.⁶⁰

This happens in the second year of life. At this time he also becomes aware of the most important linguistic aid for continuing self-identity—his name. Hearing his name repeatedly he gradually sees himself as a distinct and recurrent point of reference.

But the boundaries between "out there" and "in here" are still vague. His difficulty with the meaning of pronouns (you, me) indicates this. His ready and complete surrender to another identity in play is another indicator.

Clothing, ornamentation, and special grooming are additional factors in underlining the child's continuing identity. His own clothing acts to mark the child off from his environment.

Allport is careful to point out that this clear demarcation of the I is characteristic of Western culture, but not of all cultures. In other cultures it blends more readily with nature and with society. It seems that continuing self-identity is a universal human phenomenon, but the lines of demarcation and their clarity vary.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 115.

Aspect 3: Self-esteem, pride. Allport notes, "Before the age of two a child wants to push his stroller, wants to control his world, wants to make things do things. He has a fierce passion to manipulate objects."⁶¹ Allport goes on to observe that the sense of self does not enter into these activities until they are thwarted. When this behavior is frustrated, the child feels it as a blow to his self-esteem, and he becomes acutely aware of himself. This new dimension in his self awareness is reflected in his new need for autonomy—"I want to do it myself!" Allport says, "The child of this age regards almost any adult proposal as a potential threat to his integrity. And so he develops a generalized habit of saying 'No,' even though on second thought, he meant 'Yes.'"⁶²

During the period from four to six these three aspects—bodily self, continuing self-identity, and self-esteem—continue to evolve while two new aspects begin to develop.

Aspect 4: The extension of self. Allport describes it this way,

We have said that the sense of competition starts only after the age of three. With it comes the sense of possession. This ball is mine. I own the tricycle. My daddy, my brother, my dog, my house are felt to be warm parts of one's self. The child cannot yet, of course, extend himself to embrace his country, his church, or his career. But the foundations are laid for this important extension of selfhood. At the adult level we sometimes say, "A man is what he loves." By this statement we mean that we know personality best by knowing what the extended-self embraces. But the young child has only the rudiments of such self-extension.⁶³

⁶¹Ibid., p. 118.

⁶²Ibid., p. 119.

⁶³Ibid., p. 122.

Aspect 5: The self-image. In the child's interaction with his parents he is beginning to sense their expectations regarding him and to compare these with his behavior. He begins to see his behavior as good or bad in terms of these parental standards. Allport comments,

Of course, as yet, he has no clearly developed conscience, nor any image of himself as he would like to be in adulthood. He is, however, laying the foundations for the intentions, goals, sense of moral responsibility, and self-knowledge that will later play a prominent part in his personality.⁶⁴

These five facets of the self continue to develop during the period from six to twelve years. All are greatly enhanced by entrance into school. For example, peer standards of dress and speech come into conflict with parental standards. The child learns to shift from one to the other and the very process of shifting intensifies his sense of self.

Aspect 6: The self as rational coper. During this period of his early school years his intellectual life is developing. From early in life he has been able to solve simple problems, but now he is realizing that he has a rational capacity to bring to bear upon them. "Previously he thought, but now he thinks about thinking."⁶⁵ It is an awareness of himself as a thinking self.

Aspect 7: Propriate striving. During adolescence all six strands of the evolving self suffer stress. Sudden and erratic growth increases his awareness of his bodily self. Testing out new roles and ways of relating with both old and new relationships is a further working out of

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 123.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 124.

his continuing self-identity. That part of him that pushes him to be on his own, to do things himself and in his own way, is the strand of self-esteem. And so on. In the midst of this, a new element appears when he realizes that he must select an occupation or a life goal. Allport states, "The future, he knows, must follow a plan, and in this respect his sense of selfhood takes on a dimension entirely lacking in childhood."⁶⁶ It's true that as a young child he wanted to be a fireman or a pilot, but at that time there was no integrated effort. Until long-range purposes and distant goals are set and planning begins, the sense of self is not complete, it is rudimentary. It is this purposeful movement that Allport calls *proprie striving*.

These seven interwoven strands form what Allport calls the *proprium*. It is ". . . the me as felt and known."⁶⁷ It is a helpful concept in terms of defining "fully functioning person" in that it provides a meaningful cognitive structure by which we can "see" what is to be fully functioning. It helps us to approach conceptually whatever reality is at the core of a person, a reality which, once it is formed, is the base for all subsequent behavior.

So far, I am assuming that the human has three systems (sensory, thought support, affect support) which function together in such a way that a complex selfhood develops—the *proprium*. The questions I now raise are: if the *proprium* finds itself in a relatively free environment,

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 126.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 127.

i.e., where perceived threat is minimized, what direction will its free functioning take? And if a number of persons were exposed to that sort of environment, would there be a discernable pattern to propiate free functioning?

I turn to the clinical and research findings of Carl Rogers at the University of Chicago and the University of Wisconsin for the answers to these questions. Rogers' observations have particular value because they have to do with processes that occurred in people when they began to sense that they were in a relatively free situation—a unique experience for them—and began to appropriate the freedom offered. In other words, they indicate the direction of movement in a person when he is free to be himself. Rogers describes his intention with regard to setting up this freedom for his clients:

In my relationship with these individuals my aim has been to provide a climate which contains as much of safety, of warmth, of empathic understanding, as I can genuinely find in myself to give. I have not found it satisfying or helpful to intervene in the client's experience with diagnostic or interpretative explanations, nor with suggestions and guidance. Hence the trends which I see appear to me to come from the client himself, rather than emanating from me.⁶⁸

In what directions did these people move? Rogers lists ten; Sidney Jourard has condensed them to seven.⁶⁹ I give them here with minor modifications in wording.

⁶⁸Carl Rogers, On Becoming A Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 167.

⁶⁹Sidney Jourard, Personal Adjustment (New York: The Mac-Millan Company, 1963), p. 15.

1. Movement away from facades. His clients seek to cease struggling to be what they are not.
2. Movement away from "oughts." They cease guiding their conduct in terms of unreal, internalized images of what they ought to be.
3. Movement away from "meeting others' expectations" in slavish fashion. They stop trying compulsively to please others.
4. Movement toward self-direction. His clients move toward choosing their own behavior in responsible fashion.
5. Movement toward accepting themselves. They accept themselves as persons in process of "becoming."
6. Movement toward being open to their experience. They do not blot out thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and memories which might be unpleasant.
7. Movement toward acceptance. They accept others and trust themselves.

Rogers summarizes this way:

It seems to mean that the individual moves toward being, knowingly and acceptingly, the process which he inwardly and actually is. He moves away from being what he is not, from being a facade. He is not trying to be more than he is, with the attendant feelings of insecurity or bombastic defensiveness. He is not trying to be less than he is, with the attendant feelings of guilt or self-depreciation. He is increasingly listening to the deepest recesses of his physiological and emotional being, and finds himself increasingly willing to be, with greater accuracy and depth, that self which he most truly is.⁷⁰

⁷⁰Rogers, op. cit., pp. 175-76.

This is the process I have in mind when I think of growth toward a more fully functioning person. In my thinking, Rogers has come the closest to providing us with a genuine pattern of growth that occurs when the proprium begins to move toward free functioning. This particular definitive approach to growth has the added advantage of a scale for measurement. Rogers has developed a Process Scale⁷¹ which can be applied operationally to excerpts from recorded interviews.

Here is one of Rogers' own statements describing what he perceives to be the process of functioning more fully:

It appears that the person who is psychologically free moves in the direction of becoming a more fully functioning person. He is more able to live fully in and with each and all of his feelings and reactions. He makes increasing use of all his organic equipment to sense, as accurately as possible, the existential situation within and without. He makes use of all of the information his nervous system can thus supply, using it in awareness, but recognizing that his total organism may be and often is, wiser than his awareness. He is more able to permit his total organism to function freely in all its complexity in selecting, from the multitude of possibilities, that behavior which in this moment of time will be most generally and genuinely satisfying. He is able to put more trust in his organism in this functioning, not because it is infallible, but because he can be fully open to the consequences of each of his actions and correct them if they prove to be less than satisfying.

He is more able to experience all of his feelings, and is less afraid of any of his feelings; he is his own sifter of evidence, and is more open to evidence from all sources; he is completely engaged in the process of being and becoming himself, and thus discovers that he is soundly and realistically social; he lives more completely in this moment, but learns that this is the soundest living for all time. He is becoming a more fully functioning organism, and because of the awareness of himself

⁷¹Carl R. Rogers and Richard A. Rablen, "A Scale of Process in Psychotherapy," (unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin, 1958).

which flows freely in and through his experience, he is becoming a more fully functioning person.⁷²

Where does this process of more fully functioning lead? What could one expect to find at an advanced stage of the process? In a universal sense the answer is not known, but a reasonable estimate has been expressed by Allport in his six criteria of maturity.⁷³

1. Extension of the Sense of Self. This is the capacity to become interested and involved in events and processes beyond one's own body and possessions.

2. Warm Relating of Self to Others. This is the capacity for close personal relationships unmarred by intrusive and possessive characteristics but marked by respect for persons.

3. Emotional Security (Self-Acceptance). This is the capacity to face life's situations without undue sense of threat and to be able to have a high level of tolerance for frustration. It means very low levels of defensiveness and hostility.

4. Realistic Perception, Skills, and Assignments. This is the ability to be in close touch with what we call "the real world"—to see objects, people, and situations for what they are. It means having some basic problem solving skills and having important work to do.

5. Self-Objectification: Insight and Humor. This is the ability to see oneself objectively and to laugh at the things one loves

⁷²Rogers, op. cit., pp. 191-92.

⁷³Allport, op. cit., pp. 275-307.

(including the self) and still to love them. It includes a lack of affectation.

6. A Unifying Philosophy of Life. This is a directedness or orientation in life that gives it marked integration and meaning.

My perception of what Rogers has observed in terms of process is that when the proprium becomes aware of a genuine "freeness" in its environment, it begins tentatively to drop its "fronts" and to be more open to its own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. A congruency between inner reality and outward behavior begins to develop. A greater sense of genuine personal response begins to appear. The person begins to know and accept his authentic self. Propriate energies are expended more and more in authentic modes and less and less in modes designed simply to meet the expectations of others.

I do not see Allport's six criteria of maturity as static goals to be attained—another set of externally initiated expectations—but rather as a six part differentiation of an advanced form of the natural process of becoming authentic. The more fully functioning person is so chiefly in terms of propriate authenticity. Increasing propriate authenticity can be viewed through Allport's six categories but each person will have his own idiosyncratic pattern.

On the basis of Rogers' and Allport's work I define growth toward becoming a more fully functioning person as personal change in the form of increasingly authentic propriate behavior roughly measurable on

Rogers' Process Scale and, in its advanced forms, perceivable in terms of Allport's six criteria of maturity.

Summary

The three key concepts of the thesis are defined as follows:

(1) efficient performance is the completion of missions successfully over extended periods of time with optimal use of energy, time, materials, and personnel;

(2) interpersonal climate is that complex psychological environment emanating from persons and based on personal assumptions about humans and the meaning of life and which modifies the behavior of individuals in its aura in accordance with their perception of it;

(3) growth toward becoming a more fully functioning person is personal change in the form of increasingly authentic appropriate behavior roughly measurable on Rogers' Process Scale and, in its advanced forms, perceivable in terms of Allport's six criteria of maturity.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The thesis to be examined is that for the personnel of the United States Navy to perform more efficiently as a force, their interpersonal climates need to change in a direction that will promote the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

The following nine factors demonstrate a need for studying the problem of interpersonal climates within the Navy seeking specifically

(1) to find a realistic basis for determining those climates most suitable and (2) to develop a tentative model for facilitating change in the desired direction using those findings in the behavioral sciences and those developments in organizational theory and practice which may be pertinent: (1) the efforts of Navy leaders to develop what they see as an appropriate interpersonal climate has not succeeded; (2) retention of personnel is an increasingly critical problem; (3) the young people entering the Navy now tend to have personal values that are in conflict with the authoritarian military environment; (4) the societal milieu within which the Navy exists is rapidly becoming more personal, outspoken, and complex; (5) the philosophical principle of maximum feasible freedom to each, which underlies the Declaration of Independence, has intrinsic value today as a basic assumption for Navy leaders but does not exist at all levels of command structure; (6) increasing technological sophistication tends to fragment organization at operational levels; (7) the acceleration of change imposes unique pressures; (8) rapid and extensive developments are occurring in the behavioral sciences, and (9) significant changes are taking place in organizational theory and practice.

The key terms have been defined as summarized in the previous section. With this foundation laid, I move in the next chapter to answer two basic questions: (1) what sort of interpersonal climate promotes the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons;

and (2) what is the relationship between this climate and efficient performance in an organizational setting.

CHAPTER II

INTERPERSONAL CLIMATE, GROWTH, AND EFFICIENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the relationship between interpersonal climate, growth toward becoming more fully functioning persons, and efficiency in an organizational setting.

Method

The method of examining these relationships centers around the answering of two questions: (1) what interpersonal climate promotes the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons and (2) what is the relationship between this climate and efficiency in an organizational setting.

Review of Definitions

The key definitions, in brief, are: (1) interpersonal climate is that complex psychological environment which emanates from persons and is based upon personal assumptions about self, others, role, and meaning of life, and which modifies the behavior of those individuals in its aura in accordance with their perception of it; (2) growth toward

becoming a more fully functioning person is personal change in the form of increasingly authentic appropriate behavior roughly measurable on Rogers' Process Scale and, in its advanced forms, perceivable in terms of Allport's six criteria of maturity, and (3) efficient performance is the completion of tasks successfully over extended periods of time with the optimal use of energy, time, materials, and personnel.

Assumptions

This approach to the problem of the relationship between interpersonal climate, growth, and efficiency is based on some assumptions. Making them explicit may provide a helpful setting for approaching the issues at hand. The first assumption is that man changes. Individuals, with some exceptions, do have capacity for change and do, in fact, change.

A second assumption is that man has great potential. In terms of innate structure he is neither good nor evil but may become either in terms of almost any system of morality. Extreme man is frightening in his capacity for distortion and violence and awesome in his capacity for creativity, productivity, and self-transcendence.

A third assumption is that man, generally speaking, is less fully functioning because of that aspect of socialization which tends to cause the individual to suppress his authenticity. Barry Stevens captures the process by citing Matthew Arnold and then recounting her own early experience of the process:

I knew the mass of men concealed
 Their thoughts, for fear that if revealed
 They would by other men be met
 With blank indifference, or with blame reproved;
 I knew they lived and moved
 Tricked in disguises, alien to the rest
 Of men, and alien to themselves. . . .

Matthew Arnold "The Buried Life"

It's a crazy gift we have, the trickery. My inside knowing of it is remembered only as far back as my own third year when:

My mother and father laugh at me because I am enchanted by a hole in the ground. The hole is being dug on the next street so I cannot go there alone. I wait with excitement for my father to take me. When he does, I look into that ever-deepening hole with the same fascination that I watch my mother peel potatoes, noticing the changing form, the changing color, the changing texture, and the changing fragrance of both holes in the ground and potatoes.

My father tells my mother, "A hole in the ground!" (The way that he says it, I know this is not much.) "You'd think there was a magnet at the bottom. If I didn't hold her hand, she'd tumble right in." (I don't catch all those words at the time. There are too many that I don't know. I hear them later on, when my father tells someone, and I remember my pain, and what I did about it.)

My mother and father laugh together and are tender with me and love me, but they do not understand. I feel alone, and my enchantment is bleeding around the edges. I am the angry which is hurt. Being at the moment true to me, I scowl at my parents.

They jolly me then, because children must be kept happy. And then I am not true to me. I laugh, because in that grownup world of which I would like to be a part, that is the thing to do. (A few years later, when I am attracted by a hole in the ground, I drop a marble into it, so that if anyone comes along I can say that I am looking for my marble, not that I am enjoying the hole, which would be ridiculed.)

There are times when I scowl at my parents not because I am misunderstood, or not understood, but because I have discovered that that is a way to get their attention. And then, when they have brought me around from scowls to laughter they are very pleased with both themselves and me.

And I am pleased with myself for having figured this out.

That's a long way from being happy with a hole in the ground.

Less than three years in this world, and I have got involved in cleverness. I didn't develop that all by myself. Already my parents have been tricking me, and I have watched other trickery go on with aunts and uncles, grandpa. . . .

My parents and I love each other and enjoy each other. Most of the time we are sensitive to each other at some level. We don't know that increasingly we are being superficial, that there is a dimension missing, and that their lack of respect for me is developing in me a lack of respect for them. They respect me in the outside things, like letting me paint the railings on the porch and carry things that would break if I dropped them, but they don't respect my insides because they think I haven't any.

.....
 My sister, six years older than I, bewilders me, because sometimes she is a child with me, and then suddenly she switches and talks like a grownup. She tells me what to think and feel. What I think and feel she says is silly. A moment ago, she was agreeing with me. Sometimes I fight my sister about this. But sometimes I say that I think and feel what she does, and then I feel BIG¹

Martin Buber said that there is a craving in man to be confirmed by another, to come into being as he can only through another person. In one place he expressed it this way,

An animal does not need to be confirmed, for it is what it is unquestionably. It is different with man: Sent forth from the natural domain of species into the hazard of the solitary category, surrounded by the air of a chaos which came into being with him, secretly and bashfully he watches for a Yes which allows him to be and which can come to him only from one human to another. It is from one man to another that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed.²

Why is this Yes so hard to come by? Maurice Friedman condenses Buber's extended treatment of that problem into what I see as a profound paragraph:

¹Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human (Lafayette, California: Real People Press, 1967), pp. 85-86.

²Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 71.

The essential problematic of the sphere of the between, writes Buber, is the duality of being and seeming. The man dominated by being gives himself to the other spontaneously without thinking about the image of himself awakened in the beholder. The 'seeming man', in contrast, is primarily concerned with what the other thinks of him, and produces a look calculated to make himself appear 'spontaneous', 'sincere', or whatever he thinks will win the other's approval. This 'seeming' destroys the authenticity of the life between man and man and thus the authenticity of human existence in general. The tendency toward seeming originates in man's need for confirmation and in his desire to be confirmed falsely rather than not to be confirmed at all.³

The person "tricked in disguises", the seeming person, without being aware of it harnesses some of his energy into the processes of maintaining his facades. This not only deprives him of energy for other functions, but it seals off his authentic self with its capacity for becoming a freely-functioning, unique contributor to himself and to society.

As Abraham Maslow has written, "The sources of growth and of humanness are essentially within the human person and are not created or invented by society, which can only help or hinder the development of humanness, . . ."⁴ The question, then, is what sort of interpersonal climate in that society promotes the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

³Maurice Friedman, "Introductory Essay" (Buber, op. cit.), pp. 27-28.

⁴A. H. Maslow, "Some Basic Propositions of a Growth and Self-Actualization Psychology," Perceiving, Behavior, Becoming (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, National Education Association, 1962), p. 46.

II. GROWTH PRODUCING CLIMATES

The separate experience and research of two men, Carl Rogers and Jack Gibb, have been chiefly concerned with growth producing climates. Rogers' work has grown out of his clinical and laboratory experiences and is concerned with a therapeutic climate. Gibb's work has grown out of extensive research with small groups and large organizations and is concerned with supportive or defense-reductive climates.

The Therapeutic Climate

Theory. Out of an important transition in his thinking Carl Rogers has developed a general hypothesis for bringing about growth and development in others—a hypothesis which emphasizes interpersonal climate. The transition is reflected in the changed phrasing of a question. Early in his professional life he was asking the question, "How can I treat, or cure, or change this person?" Now he phrases the question this way, "How can I provide a relationship which this person may use for his own personal growth?"

A negative learning has been critical in this transition. He describes it this way,

It has gradually been driven home to me that I cannot be of help to this troubled person by means of any intellectual or training procedure. No approach which relies upon knowledge, upon training, upon the acceptance of something that is taught, is of any use. These approaches seem so tempting and direct that I have, in the past, tried a great many of them. . . . But such methods are, in my experience, futile and inconsequential. The most they can accomplish is some temporary change, which

soon disappears, leaving the individual more than ever convinced of his inadequacy.⁵

His experience brought him ". . .to recognize that change appears to come about through experience in a relationship."⁶ Or, as he expressed it elsewhere, ". . .it is the quality of the interpersonal encounter with the client which is the most significant element in determining effectiveness."⁷ Hence, the following hypothesis: "If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and change and personal development will occur."⁸

Rogers has concluded that there are three conditions which make up the growth producing climate. Writing in 1961, Rogers introduced a brief description of these conditions with the following comments,

. . .I will limit my statements to those for which we have objective empirical evidence. For example, I will talk about the conditions of psychological growth. For each statement one or more studies could be cited in which it was found that changes occurred in the individual when these conditions were present which did not occur in situations where these conditions were absent, or were present to a much lesser degree. . . .It should be of course added that this knowledge, like all scientific knowledge, is tentative and surely incomplete, and is certain to be modified, contradicted in part, and supplemented by the painstaking work of the future. Nevertheless there is no reason to

⁵Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming A Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), pp. 32-33.

⁶Ibid., p. 33.

⁷Carl R. Rogers, "The Interpersonal Relationship: The Core of Guidance" (Rogers and Stevens, op. cit.), p. 89.

⁸Rogers, On Becoming A Person, loc. cit.

be apologetic for the small but hard-won knowledge which we currently possess.⁹

The three conditions are congruency, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding. Rogers' own brief descriptions follow. For congruency he writes,

It has been found that personal change is facilitated when the psychotherapist is what he is, when in the relationship with his client he is genuine and without "front" or facade, openly being the feelings and attitudes which at that moment are flowing in him. We have coined the term "congruence" to try to describe this condition. By this we mean that the feelings the therapist is experiencing are available to him, available to his awareness, and he is able to live these feelings, be them, and able to communicate them if appropriate. No one fully achieves this condition, yet the more the therapist is able to listen acceptantly to what is going on within himself, and the more he is able to be the complexity of his feelings, without fear, the higher the degree of his congruence.

.....
The more genuine and congruent the therapist in the relationship, the more probability there is that change in personality in the client will occur.¹⁰

He describes unconditional positive regard as follows:

When the therapist is experiencing a warm, positive and acceptant attitude toward, what is in the client, this facilitates change. It involves the therapist's genuine willingness for the client to be whatever feeling is going on in him at that moment, —fear, confusion, pain, pride, anger, hatred, love, courage, or awe. It means that the therapist cares for the client, in a nonpossessive way. It means that he prizes the client in a total rather than a conditional way. By this I mean that he does not simply accept the client when he is behaving in certain ways, and disapprove of him when he behaves in other ways. It means an outgoing positive feeling without reservations, without evaluations. The term we have come to use for this is unconditional positive regard. Again research studies show that the more this attitude is experienced by the therapist, the more likelihood there is that therapy will be successful.¹¹

⁹Ibid., pp. 60-61.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 61-62.

¹¹Ibid., p. 62.

Concerning empathic understanding Rogers writes,

When the therapist is sensing the feelings and personal meanings which the client is experiencing in each moment, when he can perceive these from "inside," as they seem to the client, and when he can successfully communicate something of that understanding to his client, then this third condition is fulfilled.

.....
When the therapist can grasp the moment-to-moment experiencing which occurs in the inner world of the client as the client sees it and feels it, without losing the separateness of his own identity in this empathic process, then change is likely to occur.¹²

There is another condition which is essential before growth occurs, but it has to do with the client. Rogers describes it this way:

Unless the attitudes I have been describing have been to some degree communicated to the client, and perceived by him, they do not exist in his perceptual world and thus cannot be effective. Consequently it is necessary to add one more condition to the equation which I have been building up regarding personal growth through counseling. It is that when the client perceives, to a minimal degree, the genuineness of the counselor and the acceptance and empathy which the counselor experiences for him, then development in personality and change in behavior are predicted.¹³

When the client senses congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding, he is experiencing an interpersonal climate that is marked by reality, safety, and freedom. He has a growing awareness that he can count on the counselor being genuine—that whatever comes from him will be real, not phony. He also grows to know that the counselor genuinely accepts him; that his feelings, thoughts, and behaviors will not make the counselor attack him, evaluate him,

¹²Ibid., pp. 62-63.

¹³Rogers, "The Interpersonal Relationship," op. cit., p. 96.

reject him—the climate is safe. He also comes to sense that he can feel, say, and describe things that are inside him but which have always been kept from others and even kept hidden from himself—it is a climate of freedom.

Part of Rogers' general hypothesis states that when exposed to this interpersonal climate the client will discover within himself the capacity to use this relationship for growth. Rogers' experience has pushed him to conclude ". . . that the individual has within himself the capacity and the tendency, latent if not evident, to move forward toward maturity."¹⁴ He describes this hypothesized life force as follows:

Whether one calls it a growth tendency, a drive toward self-actualization, or a forward-moving directional tendency, it is the mainspring of life, and is, in the last analysis, the tendency upon which all psychotherapy depends. It is the urge which is evident in all organic and human life—to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature—the tendency to express and activate all the capacities of the organism, to the extent that such activation enhances the organism or the self. This tendency may become deeply buried under layer after layer of encrusted psychological defenses; it may be hidden behind elaborate facades which deny its existence; but it is my belief that it exists in every individual, and awaits only the proper conditions to be released and expressed.¹⁵

Whether or not there is in fact such a life force operative or potentially operative in every individual, a process of growth does occur in individuals under the four conditions outlined above. Rogers has identified seven continua on which the client moves starting from

¹⁴Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁵Ibid.

wherever he may be at the beginning of therapy and moving toward the upward end. The continua are: (1) feelings and personal meanings, (2) manner of experiencing, (3) the degree of incongruence, (4) the communication of self, (5) the manner in which experience is construed, (6) the relationship to problems, and (7) manner of relating. A process scale has been developed which traces each separate continuum through seven states. The present scale is a product of a procedure involving testing, refining, subjection to further detailed analysis, removal of non-discriminable strand distinctions, and further testing.¹⁶ Rogers, in a very brief summary—but sufficient for the present purpose—presents the results of his empirical research in this area:

In general, the evidence shows that the process moves away from fixity, remoteness from feelings and experiences, rigidity of self-concept, remoteness from people, impersonality of functioning. It moves toward fluidity, changingness, immediacy of feelings and experience, acceptance of feelings and experience, tentativeness of constructs, discovery of a changing self in one's changing experience, realness and closeness of relationships, a unity and integration of functioning.¹⁷

What are the verifiable results of Rogers' interpersonal-climate, produced therapy? He writes,

But let me turn to the outcomes of therapy, to the relatively lasting changes which occur. As in the other things I have said I will limit myself to statements borne out by research evidence. The client changes and reorganizes his concept of himself. He

¹⁶Carl R. Rogers and Richard A. Rablen, "A Scale of Process in Psychotherapy," (unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin, 1958); and Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., pp. 125-158.

¹⁷Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

moves away from perceiving himself as unacceptable to himself, as unworthy of respect, as having to live by the standards of others. He moves toward a conception of himself as a person of worth, as a self-directing person, able to form his standards and values upon the basis of his own experience. He develops much more positive attitudes toward himself. One study showed that at the beginning of therapy current attitudes toward self were four to one negative, but in the final fifth of therapy self-attitudes were twice as often positive as negative. He becomes less defensive, and hence more open to his experience of himself and of others. He becomes more realistic and differentiated in his perceptions. He improves in his psychological adjustment, whether this is measured by the Rorschach test, the Thematic Apperception Test, the counselor's rating, or other indices. His aims and ideals for himself change so that they are more achievable. The initial discrepancy between the self that he is and the self that he wants to be is greatly diminished. Tension of all types is reduced—physiological tension, psychological discomfort, anxiety. He perceives other individuals with more realism and more acceptance. He describes his own behavior as being more mature and, what is more important, he is seen by others who know him well as behaving in a more mature fashion.

Not only are these changes shown by various studies to occur during the period of therapy, but careful follow-up studies conducted six to eighteen months following the conclusions of therapy indicate that these changes persist.¹⁸

Rogers' own tentative formulation of what he calls his "crude equation" sums up what he believes to be the facts about facilitating change in individuals by means of interpersonal climate:

The more that the client perceives the therapist as real or genuine, as empathic, as having an unconditional regard for him, the more the client will move away from a static, fixed, unfeeling, impersonal type of functioning, and the more he will move toward a way of functioning marked by a fluid, changing, acceptant experiencing of differentiated personal feelings. The consequence of this movement is an alternation in personality and behavior in the direction of psychic health and maturity and more realistic relationship to self, others, and the environment.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 66.

Research. This approach to therapy, commonly known as the client-centered approach, has developed in an atmosphere of testing and research. In Rogers' volume, Client-Centered Therapy,²⁰ chapters 2, 4, and 7 contain summarized accounts of research studies of both the process and the outcomes of client-centered therapy made from 1940 to 1951. Psychotherapy and Personality Change,²¹ edited by Rogers and Rosalind Dymond, describes the large scale research carried on at the University of Chicago Counseling Center from 1950 to 1954. In Rogers' On Becoming A Person chapters 11 and 12 contain summarized samples of the research done through the years along with research projects that were contemporary in 1961. In 1957 Desmond S. Cartwright published an annotated bibliography of research and theory construction in client-centered therapy.²² There were 122 references and that did not include research in play therapy and in group therapy of a client-centered nature.

Rogers suggests five reasons why client-centered theory and practice has stimulated so much empirical investigation. I include them here because they communicate something of the objective atmosphere

²⁰Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951).

²¹Carl R. Rogers and Rosalind Dymond (eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

²²Desmond S. Cartwright, "Annotated Bibliography of Research and Theory Construction in Client-Centered Therapy," Journal of Counseling Psychology, IV (1957), 82-100.

in which this approach to therapy has grown. The first reason is that the theory of client-centered therapy has been viewed from the first as a statement of hypotheses to be tested, not as a dogma to be believed.

Rogers writes,

There has been a sense of commitment to the objective testing of each significant aspect of our hypotheses, believing that the only way in which knowledge can be separated from individual prejudice and wishful thinking is through objective investigation . . . publicly communicable and replicable.²³

The second reason is that there has been an attitude that scientific study can begin at any level of crudity or refinement. Consequently individual research workers have felt that they could begin to move in a scientific direction in the areas of greatest interest to them in spite of the formidable lack of instrumentation and methodology. Rogers notes,

Out of this attitude has come a series of instruments of increasing refinement for analyzing interview protocols, and significant beginnings have been made in measuring such seemingly intangible constructs as the self-concept, and the psychological climate of a therapeutic relationship.²⁴

A third reason is that the constructs of the theory have been kept to those which can be given operational definition. They lend themselves to investigation and refinement. A fourth reason is that the constructs have generality, that is, they have broad applicability.

²³Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., pp. 244-245.

²⁴Ibid., p. 245.

Rogers observes, "Such constructs as the self-concept, or the need for positive regard, or the conditions of personality change, all have application to a wide variety of human activities."²⁵ A final reason is that client-centered therapy has always existed in the context of a university setting—Ohio State University, the University of Chicago, the University of Wisconsin. This has meant a process of continual critical scrutiny not only from colleagues but also from the searching minds of graduate students.

Here is an example of the sort of research that has been done. It was completed by N. J. Raskin in 1949.²⁶ I select it because Rogers identifies it as typical in many respects of a large group of the research investigations that have been made. He identifies it at about the intermediate level of research sophistication, ". . . somewhere between the very crude initial studies, and the more meticulously designed recent studies."²⁷ Rogers describes the research pattern illustrated this way:

Starting with one of the hypotheses of client-centered theory, an instrument is devised to measure varying degrees of the construct in question. The instrument is then itself put to the test to determine whether it does in fact measure what it purports to measure, and whether any qualified person can use it and obtain the same or similar results. The instrument is then applied to the data of therapy in a way which can be shown to be unbiassed [sic]

²⁵Ibid., p. 246.

²⁶N. J. Raskin, "An Objective Study of the Locus-of-evaluation Factor in Psychotherapy," Success in Psychotherapy, eds. W. Wolff and J. A. Precker (New York: Gurne & Stratton, 1952).

²⁷Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., p. 250.

The data acquired from the use of the instrument can then be analyzed to determine whether it does or does not support the hypothesis.²⁸

The issue under study involved the locus of the evaluating process. It grew out of the simple formulation that the counselor's task was not to think for the client, or about the client, but with the client. If he is thinking for the client or about the client then the locus of evaluating is in the counselor; if he is thinking and empathizing with the client in the client's own reference structure, then he is respecting the client's own valuing process.

In his study Raskin was raising the question: in therapy is there a decrease in the degree to which the client's values and standards depend upon the judgments and expectations of others, and an increase in the extent to which his values and standards are based upon a reliance upon his own experience? To answer this objectively, Raskin took the following steps.

1. Three judges working independently were asked to select, in several recorded interviews, those statements which had to do with the source of the client's values and standards. It was found that there was more than 80 per cent agreement in the selection of such statements, indicating that the study was dealing with a discriminable construct.

2. Selecting 22 of these items to represent a wide range of source of values, Raskin gave these items to 20 judges, asking them to distribute these statements in four piles according to the continuum being studied, with equal-appearing intervals between the piles. Twelve of the items rated most consistently were used to form and illustrate a scale of locus of evaluation, with values from 1.0 to 4.0. Step 1 represented an unqualified

²⁸Ibid.

reliance on the evaluations made by others. Step 2 included those instances in which there was a predominant concern with what others think, but some dissatisfaction with this state of dependence. Step 3 represented those expressions in which the individual showed as much respect for his own valuing process as for the values and expectations of others, and showed an awareness of the difference between self-evaluation and dependence on others' values. Step 4 was reserved for those instances in which there was clear evidence of reliance upon one's own experience and judgment as the basic source of values.

.....

3. Raskin now used this scale to rate each of 59 interviews in ten brief but fully recorded cases which had been made the subject of other research investigations. After he had made these ratings, but before analyzing them, he wished to determine the reliability of his judgments. Consequently he chose at random one item relating to locus of evaluation from each of the 59 interviews, and had these rated independently by another judge who knew nothing of the source of the items, or whether they came from early or late interviews. The correlation between the two sets of ratings was .91, a highly satisfactory reliability.

4. Having constructed a scale of equal-appearing intervals, and having demonstrated that it was a reliable instrument, Raskin now was ready to determine whether there had been any shift in the locus of evaluation during therapy. The average score, for the final interviews in the ten cases was 1.97, for the final interviews, 2.73, a difference significant at the .01 level. Thus the theory of client-centered therapy on this point was upheld. A further confirmation was available. These 10 cases had been studied in other objective ways, so that there were objective criteria from other studies as to which cases were more, and which less successful. If one takes the five cases judged as more successful, the shift in locus evaluation in these cases is even sharper, the average for the first interviews being 2.12, and for the final interviews 3.34.²⁹

Rogers comments, "Although the number of cases studied is small, and the therapy very brief (as was characteristic of that earlier period) these are the only major flaws in this study."³⁰

²⁹Ibid., pp. 248-250.

³⁰Ibid., p. 250.

There is no intent on my part to exclude the validity of other systems of therapy. This particular system has value for the purposes of this study because (1) it centers in an identifiable interpersonal climate which brings about change in predictable directions of growth toward more fully functioning individuals, (2) its constructs are empirically verifiable, and (3) it has broad applications in society since its general effectiveness turns on an interpersonal climate rather than on technical diagnosis, evaluations, and advice.

Broad application. Though Rogers' theory and research have grown out of the one-to-one therapeutic relationship, he feels that the interpersonal climate that is effective there is also effective in other settings. He writes,

To me, the exciting thing about these research findings is not simply the fact that they give evidence of the efficacy of one form of psychotherapy, though that is by no means unimportant. The excitement comes from the fact that these findings justify an even broader hypothesis regarding all human relationships. There seems every reason to suppose that the therapeutic relationship is only one instance of interpersonal relations, and that the same lawfulness governs all such relationships. Thus it seems reasonable to hypothesize that if the parent creates with his child a psychological climate such as we have described, then the child will become more self-directing, socialized, and mature. To the extent that the teacher creates such a relationship with his class, the student will become a self-initiated learner, more original, more self-disciplined, less anxious and other-directed. If the administrator, or military or industrial leader, creates such a climate within his organization, then his staff will become more self-responsible, more creative, better able to adapt to new problems, more basically cooperative. It appears possible to me that we are seeing the emergence of a new field of human relationships, in which we may

specify that if certain attitudinal conditions exist, then certain definable changes will occur.³¹

Basic encounter group. Partly in line with his hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of the therapeutic interpersonal climate in non-therapeutic settings Rogers has become more and more involved with the intensive small group experience. Working with his therapeutic climate in the small group setting he has been instrumental in developing what has come to be known as the basic encounter group. This is usually a group of eight to eighteen people who meet for a period of time—generally from 20 to 60 hours of intensive sessions—with a person called a facilitator. His title comes from his primary function of facilitating the expression of feelings and thoughts by group members. To this end, sessions are relatively unstructured with the facilitator seeking to be congruent, accepting, and empathic with the aim of keeping the interpersonal climate as close to one of reality, safety, and freedom as the priority of reality permits.

Rogers summarizes the practical hypotheses which tend to be associated with the small group process:

In an intensive group, with much freedom and little structure, the individual will gradually feel safe enough to drop some of his defenses and facades; he will relate more directly on a feeling basis (come into a basic encounter) with other members of the group; he will come to understand himself and his relationship to others more accurately; he will change in his

³¹Ibid., p. 37.

personal attitudes and behavior; and he will subsequently relate more effectively to others in his every-day life situation.³²

B. D. Meador recently completed a study³³ which sought to observe the process variation in individuals in a basic encounter group from the point of view of Rogers' theory of process movement. The study involved a basic week-end encounter during which the participants met for five sessions. Each session except the last was for three to four hours; the final session was two hours; the total time in group was sixteen hours. There were eight group members, four men and four women, plus two male facilitators, Carl Rogers and Richard Farson. The group consisted of two housewives, a teacher, a school principal, three businessmen, and a minister. The entire process was filmed.

The hypothesis to be tested was: positive process movement as measured on the Process Scale will be apparent for each of the eight individual participants in the group. Meador's summary of the methodology follows:

Ten segments, each approximately two minutes in length, were selected for each of eight individuals from a film of a week-end basic encounter group. Two segments for every individual were taken from each of the five sessions the group met. These filmed segments were then spliced together in random order for the eight target individuals, resulting in

³²Carl R. Rogers, "The Process of the Basic Encounter Group," Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, ed. James F. T. Bugental (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 262.

³³Betty DeShong Meador, "An Analysis of Process Movement in a Basic Encounter Group" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, United States International University, San Diego, California, 1970).

eight ten-segment reels. Thirteen judges rated the eighty segments on the Process Scale. Ratings were made independently. Clinically naive judges were used, and ratings were made following a period of training and practice in the use of the scale.³⁴

Meador's hypothesis and Rogers' process theory were supported by the findings. Each person moved through at least two process states, one moved through three and one moved through four. Generally, the movement on the scale was from a minimum of 2.5 to 3.5 to a maximum of 4.0 to 5.5. A clue to the significance of this movement is seen in Rogers' notation regarding stages four and five. He notes that moving into stage four is passing an important threshold in the therapeutic process.³⁵ He also notes that stage five is several hundred psychological miles from the first stage described.³⁶

How well do these changes hold? Some idea can be obtained from the subjective data collected by Rogers from 481 individuals who had participated in groups that he had organized or conducted. The information was gathered from two to twelve months following the group experience, but the greater part was collected after a three to six month period. Rogers summarizes the data:

Of these individuals, two (i.e., less than one-half of 1 percent) felt it had changed their behavior in ways they did not like. Fourteen percent felt the experience had made no perceptible change in their behavior. Another fourteen percent felt that it

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., p. 139.

³⁶Ibid., p. 143.

had changed their behavior but that this change had disappeared or left only a small residual positive effect. Fifty-seven percent felt it had made a continuing positive difference in their behavior, a few feeling that it had made some negative changes along with the positive.³⁷

One of the limitations of the effectiveness of the therapeutic interpersonal climate resides in the capability of the individual to perceive it as marked by reality, safety, and freedom. Regarding the effectiveness of this climate in the one-to-one situation as viewed from the point of view of the Process Scale Rogers comments, "Evidently we do not yet know, with any satisfactory degree of assurance, how to be of therapeutic help to individuals whose behavior when they come to us is typical of stages one and two. . . ."³⁸ It's also clear from Rogers' data that not all who participate in groups characterized by a similar climate experience what they would perceive as a continuing positive difference in their behavior.

Summary. In summary, it appears that congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding create an interpersonal climate marked by reality, safety, and freedom. When an interpersonal climate is perceived as such by an individual either in a one-to-one or in a small group situation over a period of time his attitudes and behaviors will change in a degree measurable

³⁷Rogers, "The Process of the Basic Encounter Group," op. cit., pp. 272-273.

³⁸Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., p. 126.

on Rogers' Process Scale in the direction of becoming a more fully functioning person.

The Defense-Reductive Climate

In independent research beginning in 1937, Jack R. Gibb has developed an empirico-deductive theory of defense arousal and maintenance in small groups with the assumption that such a theory is central to the building of an adequate formal theory of social organization. The theory has special value for this study because it centers in interpersonal climates and was developed independently of Rogers. It also has special value because of the quantity of field testing in large organizations. The overall orientation is broad including education, child rearing, training, and therapy.

Research methodology. The relative utility of the constructs of the theory arise in part from the fact that Gibb, since 1953, has been making a practical and systematic test of a tri-partite theory of research methodology. The theory is based on the assumption that

. . .optimal research progress would be made if there were concurrent reciprocally interactive interrelationship among three necessary phases of effort: (1) hypothesis production and theory building, (2) empirical data accumulation, and (3) engineering tests of derivations from the theory, implications of the data, or intuitive hunches. These theoretical, empirical, and engineering phases of research effort are reciprocally dependent.³⁹

³⁹Jack R. Gibb, "Factors Producing Defensive Behavior within Groups" (Final Technical Report for period 1 February 1960 to 31 December 1962, Washington, D.C.: National Training Laboratories), p. 20.

Research setting. Gibb has done his work in the following settings listed in sequence: Brigham Young University, Michigan State University, the Group Process Laboratory of the University of Colorado, the Fels Group Dynamics Center of the University of Delaware, the National Training Laboratories, and field studies in several large corporations. A major share of the research has been financed through a series of grants from the Group Psychology Branch of the Office of Naval Research.

The empirical research has followed two patterns: "Miniature and artifactual paradigms were constructed in the laboratory as situations for tests of abstracted relationships. Field situations were devised as tests of generalizability of these laboratory-derived propositions in "natural" or "field" situations."⁴⁰

General theory. Before examining in detail the part of Gibb's theory that deals directly with interpersonal climate and growth, it will be helpful to have an overview of the major aspects of his defense-reductive theory. The brief of his ten basic assumptions that follows is based on two presentations of his theory, the first of which is the technical report referenced above which includes references to the empirically supported studies and a list of publications that have

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 2.

resulted from the projects. The second⁴¹ is a more extended treatment without a list of references.

Assumption I: primary modal concerns. There are four basic concerns that arise inevitably whenever there is social interaction: acceptance, data flow, goal formation, and social control. They generate emergent and intrinsic motivations to reduce the concerns. When reduction occurs, it produces growth. Gibb defines the four concerns:

The acceptance concern or dimension has to do with the formation of trust and acceptance of self and of others, the reduction of fear of self and of others, and the consequent growth of confidence. The data-flow concern is related to the flow of feeling and perceptual data through the person or through the group; the system output of behavioral cues and all communicative evidence of attitudes, feelings, and perceptions; and the system input of such data. The goal-formation concern has to do with the continuing assessment of intrinsic motivation in the person or the group, and the integration of motivations at various levels into action sequences, problem solving, and decision making. The control dimension relates to the intrapersonal and interpersonal control or regulatory mechanisms that lead to coordinated sequences of behavior in the person, sequential flow of behavior in the group, formulation of roles and expectancies, and integration of function into structure at all levels of social behavior.⁴²

Since this schema provides the basic framework for the development of the theory, it is important to note some of the evidence for its methodological usefulness. References to empirical support are included in the referenced Technical Report.

⁴¹Jack R. Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, eds. Leland P. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), 279-309.

⁴²Gibb, "Factors Producing Defensive Behavior within Groups," op. cit., pp. 3-4.

(1) The concerns are apparently universal in occurrence in work, action, training, and therapy groups. They continually recur in the verbal and non-verbal behavior of group members.

(2) The categories show a relatively good fit with categories of mental health and personality development as seen in the clinical literature.

(3) Experimental manipulation of each of the four major variables seems to produce increments or decrements in group effectiveness.

(4) Our studies of group growth indicate that significant changes occur along each of the four dimensions with prolonged training or therapy.

(5) Examination of the anthropological studies of group behavior and organizational structure indicates the prevalence of these four concerns.

(6) Handling of the concern by a group is frequently accompanied by high emotionality, neurotic persistence, or neurotic denial.

(7) The categories have high validity for trainees in group therapy, group education, or group training.

(8) The categories have face validity for naive group members, who can easily identify, from their own experiences, instances of change along each of the four dimensions.

(9) Intensive interviews of group members at critical points in group growth show consistent sequences in concern resolution.

Assumption II: derivative modal concerns. Each of the primary modal concerns becomes differentiated into a manifest concern, which often becomes verbalized and conscious. Gibb writes,

. . . the primary, often latent, concern for acceptance becomes differentiated into concerns about degrees of membership in the various groups of which the person is in some fashion a part. . . . The concern for data finds its manifest expression in decision making and choice behavior in the group. The concern for goal formation becomes a concern for productivity, creativity, learning, growth, or other forms of end or means product of the

group. The control dimension becomes a concern for organization, which in the sense the term is used here has all degrees of formality, stability, awareness, and complexity in a variety of social situations.⁴³

In studies of 114 training groups where one or more trainers were present (49 groups at the National Training Laboratories, 43 in various industrial settings, and 22 student and adult groups at the University of Colorado) and 89 training groups where trainers were not present (66 at the University of Colorado and 23 in other industrial and educational settings) the evidence was clear, ". . .that, whether or not a trainer is present, groups work on the four primary modal concerns and the four derivative concerns."⁴⁴

Assumption III: primary social drives. The primary modal concerns are maintained by four comparable social drives which are assumed to exist in all social organisms: acceptance, cognitive-affective clarity, achievement-fulfillment, and interdependence. Gibb states that the evidence for this assumption comes from post-training interviews, the continual ascendance of these drives in multiple leaderless and trainerless groups with minimal norm induction, the rise in defense level when inductions are designed to thwart these drives, and from extrapolations from the general literature on social motivation.

The data in these first three assumptions are charted in columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table I.

⁴³Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁴Ibid.

TABLE I⁴⁵

MODAL CONCERNS IN SOCIAL PROCESS AND STRUCTURE

Primary Modal Concerns (1)	Derivative Modal Concerns (2)	Primary Social Drives (3)	Defensive- Reductive States In Person (4)	In Group (5)
Acceptance	Membership	Acceptance	Acceptance of self and others	Supportive climate Climate of trust
Data flow	Decision	Cognitive- affective clarity	Spontaneity (Output) Awareness (Input)	High reliability feedback system
Goal formation	Productivity	Achievement- fulfillment	Integration Directionality	Goal integration
Control	Organization	Interdependence	Interdependence (Intra-system control)	Interdependent, participative structure and function (Intra- system control)

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 6.

Assumption IV: defense level. The defense level is a dynamic state of a social system and is seen conceptually as the amount and distribution of effort expended by the social system in protecting itself from perceived or anticipated attack from within or from without. The social system referred to may be intrapersonal, dyadic, group, institutional, community, or societal. Although defenses of a system can be differentiated qualitatively, Gibb's interest has been in refining a unitary construct; finding correlates, determiners, and effects, determining properties; and determining the usefulness of the construct in predicting behaviors of social systems and in understanding the nature of social behavior.

The defense level is related to the primary modal concerns.

Studies have shown the following—

(1) The DL is related to the perceived or felt acceptance from within or without the system:

Caring-oriented feedback is more reductive of the DL than neutral feedback.

Positive feedback lowers the DL.

Induced supportive climates reduce decision-time.

Trust formation is central to the induction of the therapeutic community.

A change in language patterns changes DL in both the sender and receiver of communications.

Support-oriented leaderless training in college groups and in elementary classrooms produces decreased DL and subsequent behavior change.

(2) The DL is related to information deprivation and reduced data flow:

Groups whose members get information about feelings, either positive or negative, perform more effectively on the task than do groups without such information.

Continual feedback over periods from three to forty weeks causes significant directional changes in DL and in task effectiveness.

Spontaneous expression of feeling is related to trust formation.

DL is lowered and raised and data flow mediated by postural, tonal, and other non-language cues.

Creativity is related to data flow and defense level.

Self-insight changes occur as a correlate of DL changes during training as compared with situations in which DL remains relatively constant.

(3) The DL is related to goal formation:

In general, when inductions are dissonant with emergent goal structures within the system, DL is raised.

Goal formation is increasingly difficult as the perceived size of the social system increases. Any impairment of goal formation tends to increase the DL.

Supervisors who start with worker perceptions of the goal rather than with supervisor perceptions of the goal arrive at decisions with groups more rapidly and with greater frequency of attained consensus.

Goal formation is dependent upon antecedent growth on the acceptance and data-flow dimensions.

Manipulation of acceptance and data flow can produce polarization and increase DL during goal exploration. This is interpreted as evidence for the genetic antecedence of certain variables in the contingency hierarchy.

(4) The DL is related to the ratio of the emergent-autonomous

control systems to the externality of control systems:

Perceived coercion or persuasion raises the DL.

DL is lowered and provisional behavior increased after forced work on building an internal control system.

Remarks which are perceived as control oriented raise the DL.

Reduction of external controls raises DL in situations of low acceptance and decreases DL in situations of higher acceptance or of further growth on the acceptance dimension.

Assumption V: personal growth. Growth in the person is associated with increasing acceptance of self and others, with increasing spontaneity (output) and awareness (input), with increasing directional integration of goal structure of the organism, and the emergence of an intra-system control system. Susceptibility to growth is assumed to be a major property of social organism. Defense level is assumed to be a major deterrent to growth in all social systems. Change in the direction of growth on any of the above four dimensions brings into being forces making for further growth.

Assumption VI: group growth. Defense level is assumed to be directly related to directionality of group growth. Defense-reductive states (growth-producing states) in the group are associated with the emergence of a trust system, a high reliability feedback system, increasing goal integration in depth and in spread, and increasingly participative structure and function (intra-system control).

Gibb has been unable to find consistent, identifiable stages of development in the many small groups he has studied. The modal concerns are not such stages, he calls them ". . . methodological tools which simplify the task of the diagnostician but bring an artifactitious quality to the flow of processes in the developing groups."⁴⁶ Though Gibb does not see consistent stages of development, he does see consistent sequential changes when looking at groups over a time span. He writes,

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 10.

In the Colorado studies, for example, we brought both naive and trained observers in to observe the third and fifty-eighth hours of the training groups. . . . All observers agreed on the presence of dramatic changes on the four modal dimensions. In contrast to this high agreement, there was low inter-observer agreement in identifying interim "stages" of growth on the four dimensions. . . .⁴⁷

Of the four primary modal concerns acceptance is the basic dimension. Progressive movement on the other three dimensions is not possible without concurrent progressive movement on the acceptance dimension. Gibb notes, "As people grow to trust one another they can share intrinsic motivations, give and receive data from one another, and build an inter-changeable, interdependent organization which spontaneously meets the changing needs of the group."⁴⁸

Gibb reports that analysis of the tapes and coded observations of 88 training groups indicates that change on some of the dimensions does occur in all cases. In all groups that continued for over 60 hours there was significant progress in all four dimensions.

Assumption VII: the contingency hierarchy. There is a consistent genetic sequence in the rise of the four basic modal concerns in a social structure. The deepest and earliest concerns arise in the following order: acceptance, data flow, goal formation, and control. Development on all four dimensions is concurrent and interdependent, but optimal (regenerative) growth occurs when the factors "lead" one another in the optimal sequence.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Gibb points out that growth in each dimension is contingent upon growth in each of the other dimensions of the hierarchy so that each factor in the hierarchy provides a pace-setting or boundary function for the factors lower in the hierarchy. Thus, data flow is possible only within the limits of trust formation. Integration of group goals occurs only as rapidly as members build sufficient trust and awareness to verbalize openly their intrinsic goals. Gibb observes that

In the early stages of group growth, organization is maintained by an appropriate degree of formalization of control mechanisms, imposition of extrinsic goals, filtering of the communication system, and checks and balances appropriate to the trust level. In the later stages of group growth, the organization, growing from a free flow of data in relatively high trust, becomes spontaneously generated through integration of intrinsic motivations.⁴⁹

Assumption VIII: regeneration cycle. Under certain specified conditions within a social structure a regenerative cycle builds up so that the process becomes cumulatively more effective. He writes,

Thus, under certain conditions interaction leads to trust, which allows openness of data, which permits sharing of self-assessed goals, which creates interdependence, which augments trust and acceptance, even greater data sharing, a deeper look at one's goals, greater interdependence, and so on, in a regenerative cycle which under certain conditions at least leads to apparent growth of people and to the production of healthy groups.⁵⁰

Assumption IX: defense-reductive technology. Under certain conditions a constellation of behaviors will arise in social structure which is essentially defense-reductive, ". . . tends to trigger or to sustain the regenerative cycle, can be learned under predictable conditions

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 13.

of tuition, tends to cluster and to feed itself, and leads to growth in the person or in the group."⁵¹ Table II lists such representative behaviors and representative effects in clusters determined by the primary modal concerns.

Assumption X: defense-inductive technology. Under certain conditions a constellation of behaviors will arise in social structure which is essentially defense-inductive, ". . .tends to trigger or to sustain counter-regenerative cycles, can be learned under predictable conditions of tuition, tends to cluster and to feed itself, and either prevents or depresses growth processes in social organisms."⁵² Table III lists such representative behaviors and representative effects in clusters determined by the primary modal concerns.

Regarding persuasive and participative behaviors Gibb states,

Systematic analysis of tapes and observations of training and educational groups indicate the predictive value of coding group member behaviors as "persuasive" (defense-inductive) and "participative" (defense-reductive).

The "persuasive technology" tends to arise predictably and somewhat systematically from the set of conditions that come about in a group that has failed to make great movements on the acceptance dimension. When the group has made great progress on the acceptance dimension, participative behaviors tend to arise. The two technologies indicated in Tables Two and Three represent two "idealized" extremes of patterns observed in both the natural and training groups observed in our studies. In practice, of course, members . . .tend to exhibit mixed and inconsistent technologies. . . .One relationship, for instance, which seems clear is that increasing fear and distrust are accompanied by an increasing use of persuasive technologies.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 15.

REPRESENTATIVE CLUSTERS OF DEFENSE-REDUCTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS EFFECTS

Primary Modal Concern (1)	Representative Behaviors (2)	Representative Effects (3)
Acceptance	Self-confidence Confidence in others Trust of self Trust in others Love Warmth Openness Spontaneity Participation in feedback Expression of feeling Listening Empathy Self-determination Self-assessment Sustained work Intrinsic motivation Verbalizes goals High initiation Permissivity Interdependence Freedom of form Informality Internal controls Acceptance of authority	Diversity, nonconformity Warmth Trust Exposure of larger areas of self Realistic confidence in work product Open discussion of motives, distrusts Spontaneity and open expression of feeling Decision speed related to significance of issue Emergence of data collection Process integrated into work Congruity among multiple measures of agreement Diagnostic stance toward data Acceptance of assessment tasks Realistic, provisional goals Creative work products and patterns Willingness for trial runs Commitment to group tasks Increasing congruence of work and play Fluidity of organization patterns Open expression of conflict and testing Reduced concern for form and regulations Diversity and nonconformity Role flexibility and interchangeability Allocation of work by consensus or ability
Data flow		
Goal formation		
Control		

⁵³Ibid., p. 14.

REPRESENTATIVE CLUSTERS OF DEFENSE-INDUCTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS EFFECTS

Primary Modal Concern (1)	Representative Behaviors (2)	Representative Effects (3)
Acceptance	Fear of self Distrust of self Social distance Fear of others Distrust of others Punitive feelings Strategy, gimmicks Facade	Distrust and denial Fear of therapy, exposure, hurt Cynicism, paranoia, suspicion Protective pairing, concern for inclusion Generalized resistance to influence Requests for direction from authority Extremes of rapid and slow decision making Avoidance of process
Data flow	Secrecy, caution Protective phraseology Dishonesty, distortion Protective screening	Suppression in group, ventilation out of group Low agreement on action plans Evaluative stance toward data Circumvention
Goal formation	Imposition of goals Asking for goals Persuasion Changing others Extrinsic motivations Manipulation of extrinsic rewards	Resistance to self- or group-assessment Cynicism about quality of group product Extremes of apathetic and frenetic work Conventional work patterns and product Unrealistic, overaspirational goals Fear of group pressures and actions
Control	High control Coercion Paternalistic intervention Submissiveness Legalism Bargaining stance	Resistance to taking responsibility Bargaining and barter reactions to power Role fixation; role boundaries Symbolic and displaced fight Demands for structure, formal rules Manipulation planned out of group

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 16.

As confidence and trust increase, patterns of membership and leadership become increasingly congruent with the participative model.⁵⁵

Gibb's theory is well delineated and has support both from empirical laboratory and field studies and from engineering efforts⁵⁶ extended through a broad gamut of natural groups. With this broad outline of his theory of defense reduction in mind, I now set forth in more detail the elements that have to do with climate and growth.

Climate and growth. Gibb holds that the climate or general feeling in a staff meeting or any other group is far more important than the specified rules that can be set up for dealing with one another. He writes, "The general climate that we create of acceptance, of warmth, of emotional togetherness, of accepting differences, of permitting people to live differently—this kind of climate is the important matter in therapy groups or in staff committees."⁵⁷ Gibb states that an observer coming into a group for the first time can sense an "atmosphere" or "climate", but that even a sensitive observer might have difficulty describing the feelings he has which tell him about the climate. He

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 15.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 17-20.

⁵⁷Jack R. Gibb, "Sociopsychological Processes of Group Instruction" (Appears as Chapter VI in "The Dynamics of Instructional Groups," Part II of the Fifty-Ninth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 122.

can sense the climate but the sensing is colored by his own inner state.⁵⁸

Although climates may have many qualitative differentiations, Gibb has approached the problem by delineating two basic types of interpersonal climates: supportive and defensive. The distinction is made in terms of how the climate is affecting the defense level, a construct defined above under the treatment of general defense-reductive theory. Defense climates raise the DL, supportive or defensive-reductive climates lower the DL.

Climates arise out of behaviors. Clusters of defensive behaviors give rise to a defensive climate. Clusters of participative behaviors give rise to a supportive climate. Such clusters are charted in Table IV. The two columns of characteristic behaviors are condensations of column (2) in Tables II and III above. Detailed representative effects of such behavior are listed in column (3) of Tables II and III.

⁵⁸Jack R. Gibb, "The Occupational Therapist Works with Groups," The American Journal of Occupational Therapy, XII (July-August, 1958), 205-214.

TABLE IV⁵⁹

DEFENSIVE AND PARTICIPATIVE BEHAVIOR

Key areas of social behavior	Characteristic defensive behaviors	Characteristic participative behaviors
Climate	Fear Distrust	Warmth Trust
Data flow	Data restriction Facade formation	Openness Spontaneity
Goal formation	Persuasion Manipulation of extrinsic rewards	Problem solving Permissivity (use of intrinsic rewards)
Control	Tight external controls Bargaining	Emergent inner controls Interdependence

Working over an eight-year period with recordings of discussions occurring in varied settings, Gibb developed the six pairs of defensive and supportive categories presented in Table V. They are characteristics of verbal communications. Communicative behavior which a listener perceives as possessing any of the characteristics listed as defensive arouses defensiveness, while that listed as supportive reduces defensive feelings.

⁵⁹Jack R. Gibb and Lorraine M. Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction" (draft of unpublished chapter, Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, 1965).

TABLE V⁶⁰CATEGORIES OF BEHAVIOR CHARACTERISTIC OF SUPPORTIVE
AND DEFENSIVE CLIMATES IN SMALL GROUPS

Defensive climates	Supportive climates
1. Evaluation	1. Description
2. Control	2. Problem orientation
3. Strategy	3. Spontaneity
4. Neutrality	4. Empathy
5. Superiority	5. Equality
6. Certainty	6. Provisionalism

Gibb explains their interrelated function this way:

Speech or other behavior which appears evaluative increases defensiveness. If by expression, manner of speech, tone of voice, or verbal content the sender seems to be evaluating or judging the listener, then the receiver goes on guard. Of course, other factors may inhibit the reaction. If the listener thought that the speaker regarded him as an equal and was being open and spontaneous, for example, the evaluativeness in a message would be neutralized and perhaps not even perceived. This same principle applies equally to the other five categories of potentially defense-producing climates. The six sets are interactive.⁶¹

The behaviors arise out of inner feelings that move on the continuum distrust-trust. Distrust produces forms of defensive behavior, while trust produces forms of supportive or participative behavior.

These inner feelings are critical since they determine the behaviors

⁶⁰Jack R. Gibb, "Defensive Communication," The Journal of Communication, XI (September, 1961), 141-148.

⁶¹Ibid.

which, in turn, produce the climate which, in turn, influences both feelings and behaviors. These feelings are the central issue in the first of the four primary modal concerns—acceptance—and that is why it is the critical modal concern, limiting or promoting development in the other three. In connection with this Gibb writes,

The most impressive dynamic of early group life is the presence of fear. Fear grows out of distrust. We tend to fear events, people, and stimuli for which we feel we have no adequate response. Many factors in the new or immature group increase the normal residual fear that all people share.⁶²

Gibb adds in another place,

These feelings are often denied and deeply buried. Sometimes they are fairly near the surface. They are apparently rooted in lack of acceptance of the self and consequent lack of acceptance of others. The facades produced by socialization make it difficult for a person to find himself, accept himself, or trust himself.

One sees many symptoms of distrust, particularly in the early stages of group formation: persistent defense of one's public image, attempts to change attitudes and beliefs of others, attempts to make decisions for others, avoidance of feelings, avoidance of conflict, advice giving, flattery, cynicism about the powers of the group, derogation of the group's abilities, maintenance of formality in behavior and in control mechanisms, lack of confidence in the product of the group, and denial of membership. In action groups where distrust is strong, one sees insistence upon control, rigid preplanning of the group agenda, preservation of social distance, or fear of controversy.⁶³

Experiences which produce trust tend to reduce the incident of the symptoms cited above. Experiences which produce trust tend to induce personal and group growth.

⁶²Gibb and Gibb, op. cit., p. 6.

⁶³Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," op. cit., 284.

From their research and group experiences and from an examination of the growth literature Jack and Lorraine Gibb are evolving a theory of personal and group growth in terms of "more fully functioning." They write, "Growth is a process of fulfilling, realizing, emerging, and becoming. It proceeds outward from within."⁶⁴ The structure of their theory is diagrammed in Table VI.

TABLE VI⁶⁵

A GROWTH-CENTERED VIEW OF SOCIAL
PROCESSES AND VALUES

Primary social processes	Basic personal needs	Primary growth processes	Antigrowth	Primary personal values
Membership	Belonging	Trust, love	Fear, distrust	Trust
Data flow	Clarity	Openness	Facades, filters	Openness
Goal formation	Fulfill- ment	Self-determi- nation (Auto- genic life)	Apathy, frenetic overactivity	Integrity
Control	Freedom	"True" inter- dependence	Dependency	Freedom

They begin their brief descriptive statement of the theory as follows:

⁶⁴Jack R. Gibb and Lorraine M. Gibb, "Leaderless Groups: Growth-Centered Values and Potentialities," Ways of Growth: Approaches to Expanding Awareness, eds. Herbert A. Otto and John Mann (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1968), p. 101.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 104.

There are four basic processes that seem to occur in all social structure. People work on these processes both in natural groups and in the training groups we have constructed for study. Group members work continuously on the problems of relating to each other, communicating with each other, forming goals, and developing control systems. These primary processes are related to four basic needs that seem to be common to all persons and that direct and sustain human growth. As people get in depth communication, these needs appear most clearly. A person has a need to love and to be loved, to belong to the human race, and to have an emotional relationship to some significant group of relevant others. A person needs to have emotional and intellectual clarity, to know where he stands and where the world is, and to know how he is seen by relevant others. He needs to grow to self-realization, to become what he is to become, to have a sense of emergent worth and achievement, to feel fulfilled, to feel that all parts of his life have integrity and wholeness, and to feel that his motivations and inner self are congruent with his behavior. A person needs to be able to mingle satisfyingly with others in personal relationships, share in their lives, influence and be influenced, live in interdependence.⁶⁶

They continue on to observe that growth is a primary property of human organisms and that its correlates are a reduction of fear, the development of trust, and the removal of defensive states. Table VII describes in some detail the primary aspects of both personal and group growth.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 104-105.

TABLE VII⁶⁷

THE FOUR PRIMARY ASPECTS OF GROWTH

Personal growth is toward:	Group growth is toward:
(1) Trust and love of self and others	(1) Full membership in love and trust
(2) Communication in depth with self and others (awareness and spontaneity)	(2) A functional feedback system permitting consensual decision-making
(3) Integration of a self-determined goal system into creative action	(3) Integration of and creative movement toward group-determined goals
(4) Emergent freedom in creative interdependence	(4) Spontaneous, participative, and emergent structure and function

The following four statements capture the essence of the four dimensions of growth. (1) Growth is a process of reducing fears and defenses and freeing oneself to love and to trust and to be loved and trusted. (2) Growth is a process of increasing the depth and validity of communication with the self and with others. (3) Growth is a process of identifying one's own intrinsic emerging motivations and of maintaining his life activities in congruence with these motivations. (4) Growth is a process of achieving interdependence.

The Gibbs conclude,

Trust is the central process of growth and the resultant central value. Growing people prize for themselves and for others the processes of open, honest, spontaneous communication in

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 105.

depth; the integrity that accompanies congruence of motivations, feelings, and behavior; and the love that can occur among people who are truly free to live in interdependence.⁶⁸

Summary. Gibb has developed a defense-reductive theory of process in small groups. The process is "seen" through an analytical schema consisting of four primary modal concerns that apparently arise in all social interaction: acceptance, data flow, goal formation, and control. The key to the process rests in the first modal concern—acceptance. The issues here are the reduction of fear, the development of trust, and the removal of defensive states—in other words, the building of a supportive interpersonal climate. As movement is made in the direction of an atmosphere of trust, individual personal growth occurs on the dimensions of trust, openness, self-realization, and interdependence. Progress toward an interpersonal climate of trust also facilitates group growth on the other three dimensions of data flow, goal formation, and control. Personal growth and group growth have a positive correlation. The supportive climate, the basic element of which is trust, facilitates personal growth toward becoming a more fully functioning person.

Rogers and Gibb: A Comparison

Since both Rogers and Gibb have done major work in the area of interpersonal climate and its facilitation of personal growth, and since

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 107.

their work has developed in relative independence of each other, it seems to me that whatever agreement may exist between their findings is at least to some degree a further validation.

In the matter of interpersonal climate Rogers describes three behaviors which if perceived as such by the client tend to produce personal growth. The behaviors are congruency, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding. There is a resultant interpersonal climate of reality, safety, and freedom.

Gibb's listing of behaviors characteristic of supportive climates and characteristic of defensive climates are almost like expansions of the positive and negative sides of Rogers' three behaviors. Numbers 3, 4, and 5 are nearly synonymous. Supportive behaviors are: (1) description, (2) problem orientation, (3) spontaneity, (4) empathy, (5) equality, (6) provisionalism. The defensive parallels are clearly excluded by Rogers' three: (1) evaluation, (2) control, (3) strategy, (4) neutrality, (5) superiority, (6) certainty. Gibb's supportive climate is one of warmth and trust the correlates of which are openness, integrity, and interdependence. The terms are close enough to reality, safety, and freedom to be considered describing a very similar climate—especially since the conditioning behaviors are so much alike.

Regarding their views of the more fully functioning person, both have similar ideas of the basic nature of growth. Rogers: "It seems to mean that the individual moves toward being, knowingly and acceptingly,

the process which he inwardly and actually is."⁶⁹ Gibb: "Growth is a process of fulfilling, realizing, emerging, and becoming. It proceeds outward from within."⁷⁰

Rogers' more fully functioning person moves along the following lines (abridged):

1. Movement away from facades. His clients seek to cease struggling to be what they are not.
2. Movement away from "oughts." They cease guiding their conduct in terms of unreal, internalized images of what they ought to be.
3. Movement away from "meeting others' expectations" in slavish fashion. They stop trying compulsively to please others.
4. Movement toward self-direction. His clients move toward choosing their own behavior in responsible fashion.
5. Movement toward accepting themselves. They accept themselves as persons in process of "becoming."
6. Movement toward being open to their experience. They do not blot out thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and memories which might be unpleasant.
7. Movement toward acceptance. They accept others and trust themselves.⁷¹

Gibb's characteristics of the more fully functioning person⁷² are as follows with the numbers of Rogers' corresponding characteristics in parenthesis.

Self acceptance and the ability to accept others, (1, 5, 7).

⁶⁹Rogers, On Becoming A Person, op. cit., p. 175.

⁷⁰Gibb and Gibb, "Leaderless Groups: Growth-Centered Values and Potentialities," op. cit., p. 101.

⁷¹Sidney Jourard, Personal Adjustment (New York: The Mac-Millan Company, 1963), p. 15.

⁷²Gibb and Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction," op. cit., p. 8.

Greater awareness and openness, (6).

Self-determination and self-evaluation of progress toward one's own goals, (4).

Emergence of inner control systems, (2, 3).

There is substantial agreement in the findings of Rogers and Gibb regarding interpersonal climate that promotes growth toward becoming a more fully functioning person.

Other Verifications

It does not seem necessary to examine in detail any other research oriented theoretical systems that deal with interpersonal climates, but perhaps brief references to the outcomes of other research programs and studies will show something of the broad base involved with this particular point of view. I turn to the separate studies made by Rensis Likert, Chris Argyris, and Douglas McGregor.

Rensis Likert. Likert's findings spring from a ten year research program carried on by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The work began in 1947 and was wholly funded in its beginning by the Office of Naval Research; later, several industrial organizations and foundations added their support.

A general formulation regarding interpersonal climate has come out of the research program:

The structure of the organization and the manner in which the organization functions should be such that there is a maximum probability that in all interactions each of the individuals

involved will, in the light of his background, experience, and expectations, view the interaction as supportive and one which contributes to his sense of personal worth.⁷³

The following specific attitudes and behaviors of a superior toward subordinates were found to be associated with the highest productivity, highest motivation, and highest satisfaction.

He is supportive, friendly and helpful rather than hostile. He is. . . genuinely interested in the well-being of subordinates and their families and endeavors to treat people in a sensitive, considerate way.

He has confidence in the integrity, ability and motivations of subordinates rather than being suspicious and distrustful.

His confidence in subordinates leads him to have high expectations as to the level of performance by subordinates. . . . (This is fundamentally a supportive rather than a critical or hostile relationship.)

He sees that each subordinate is well-trained for his particular job. He also endeavors to help subordinates to obtain promotion by training them for the next level job. This includes giving them relevant experience and coaching whenever the opportunity offers.

He coaches and assists employees whose performance is below standard. In the case of a subordinate who is clearly misplaced and unable to do his job satisfactorily, he endeavors to find a position well-suited to that employee's abilities and arranges to have the employee transferred to it.

He helps subordinates to grow by giving them freedom to participate in decisions and to make decisions, and he is supportive rather than punitive when they make mistakes.

He seeks to know and use their "ideas" and to draw upon their experience. To facilitate this flow of ideas and influence, he seeks to develop an atmosphere of confidence and trust and a group form of organization.⁷⁴

⁷³Rensis Likert, "An Emerging Theory of Organization, Leadership, and Management," Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, eds. Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 297.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 295-296.

Paralleling Gibb's findings Likert concludes from his research that the goals of the organization must satisfactorily incorporate the needs of its members. There needs to be an efficient interaction system so that there will be full communication of relevant information between various levels of the organization and across them. Such a system needs to be able to handle the distribution of influence so that the experience, knowledge, and needs of members are reflected adequately in the decisions and actions taken by the organization. His general formulation regarding this is that ". . . management will make full use of the potential capacities of its human resources only when each person in an organization is a member of one or more well-knit, effectively functioning work groups which have high skills of interaction and high performance goals."⁷⁵

In summary, Likert's studies show that a member of an organization is more fully functioning within that organization when attitudes and behaviors of superiors create an interpersonal climate of trust and support.

Chris Argyris. Chris Argyris of Yale University, as a result of field studies involving (a) the impact of the plant manager upon his subordinates, (b) the subordinates' adaptation to the leader, and (c) their adaptation to each other, concluded that the organizational structure

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 298.

itself was a factor in creating the interpersonal climate in an organization. The principles of formal organization—task (work) specialization, chain of command, unity of direction, span of control—and their correlates, directive leadership and managerial controls, have the following impact:

The impact of the principles above is to place employees in work situations where (1) they are provided minimal control over their work a day world, (2) they are expected to be passive, dependent, and subordinate, (3) they are expected to have a short time perspective, (4) they are induced to perfect and value the frequent use of a few skin-surface shallow abilities and (5) they are expected to produce under conditions leading to psychological failure.

All these characteristics can be shown to be incongruent to the ones healthy human beings in our culture are postulated to desire. They are much more congruent with the needs of infants in our culture. In effect, therefore, organizations adapt an initial strategy where they are willing to pay high wages and provide adequate seniority if mature adults will, for eight hours a day, behave in a less than mature manner.⁷⁶

Argyris states his findings in terms of propositions (abridged):

Proposition I. There is a lack of congruency between the needs of healthy individuals and the demands of the formal organization.

Proposition II. The resultants of this disturbance are frustration, failure, short-time perspective, and conflict. Because their self-expression will be blocked, they will not be permitted to define their own goals in relation to central needs or the paths to these goals, they have no control over the clarity and stability of their future.

Proposition III. Under certain conditions the degree of frustration, failure, short-time perspective and conflict will tend to increase.

⁷⁶Chris Argyris, "Organizational Leadership," Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, eds. Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 297.

Proposition IV. The nature of the formal principles of organization cause the subordinates, at any given level, to experience competition, rivalry, intersubordinate hostility and to develop a focus toward the parts rather than the whole.

Proposition V. Employees react to the formal organization by creating informal activities.

Proposition VI. Employee adaptive behavior maintains individual self-integration and simultaneously impedes integration with the formal organization.

Proposition VII. Adaptive behavior of employees has a cumulative effect, feeds back into the formal organization, and further entrenches itself.

Proposition VIII. Certain management reactions tend to increase the antagonisms underlying adaptive behavior.⁷⁷

According to Argyris these propositions predict that the dependence and submissiveness that people will experience will tend to be caused by formal organization, directive leadership, and managerial controls. They predict that dependence and submissiveness will frustrate people and place them in conflict if people aspire toward personal maturity. They predict further that people will tend to react by creating informal activities (apathy, indifference, goldbricking, rate-setting).

Though it is not directly stated by Argyris his conclusions imply that the interpersonal climate created by formal organization, directive leadership, and managerial controls is defensive and thus inhibitive to the full functioning of the individual both as a person and as a member of the organization.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 331-334.

Douglas McGregor. Douglas McGregor, of the School of Industrial Management of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, made a comparative study of management development programs in a number of large companies. His intent was to learn more about the way in which theories and practices within different organizations influence the making of managers. His book, The Human Side of Enterprise,⁷⁸ grew out of the first five years of the research.

In the book McGregor describes two theories of management, Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X is the traditional view of direction and control. He sees it based on assumptions ". . . implicit in most of the literature of organization and in much current managerial policy and practices."⁷⁹ These assumptions are:

1. The average human being has an inherent dislike of work and will avoid it if he can.
2. Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives.
3. The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid responsibility, has relatively little ambition, wants security above all.

McGregor feels that these assumptions would not have persisted if there were not a considerable body of evidence to support them.

⁷⁸Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960).

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 33.

However, he also feels that there are many readily observable phenomena in industry and elsewhere which are not consistent with this view of human nature. Discussing the basis for formulating a more adequate theory, he writes,

The growth of knowledge in the social sciences during the past quarter century has made it possible to reformulate some assumptions about human nature and human behavior in the organizational setting which resolve certain of the inconsistencies inherent in Theory X. While this reformulation is, of course, tentative, it provides an improved basis for prediction and control of human behavior in industry.⁸⁰

The new theory he calls Theory Y, the integration of individual and organizational goals. It is based on the following assumptions:

1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest.
2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the reward associated with their achievement.
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.
6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 35.

McGregor notes, "The assumptions of Theory Y are not finally validated. Nevertheless, they are far more consistent with existing knowledge in the social sciences than are the assumptions of Theory X."⁸¹

The major portion of his book is devoted to the development of a set of managerial behaviors congruent with the assumptions of Theory Y.

In summary, McGregor's thrust is to establish a climate that will release the human potential kept latent by adverse climates. He works from assumptions that lead to behaviors which build a supportive interpersonal climate.

Working separately Likert, Argyris, and McGregor are moving in a direction that is basically similar to that of Gibb and Rogers. Though the schema for viewing the problem in each case is not the same, they all deal with assumptions or behaviors or both that give rise to defense-reductive climates which in turn facilitate personal growth in terms of becoming more fully functioning, especially within the organizational setting.

Summary

The question asked at the beginning of this section was: what interpersonal climate facilitates growth in an individual toward becoming more fully functioning? To answer that question I turned to the theoretical structures of two men whose research was (1) climate-

⁸¹Ibid., p. 49.

centered, (2) empirically oriented, (3) extended, in each case, for well over thirty years, (4) independent of each other's, (5) emphatic about utility, (6) geared to broad application, and (7) tested in a variety of field situations.

Carl Rogers' work has resulted in a theory that says in part that congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding when perceived as such by the individual form a climate characterized by reality, safety, and freedom which in turn facilitates the growth of that individual toward becoming more fully functioning, a growth measurable on a process scale.

Jack Gibb's work has resulted in a theory that says in part that as fear is reduced, trust is developed, and defensive states removed, a supportive interpersonal climate is built. In this process individual growth occurs on the dimensions of trust, openness, self-realization, and interdependence. The process also facilitates group growth on the dimensions of data flow, goal formation, and control.

There is sufficient agreement between the two theories to make them corroborative and complementary on the issue of the interpersonal climate that facilitates individual growth. Additional corroboration comes from Likert, Argyris, and McGregor.

III. GROWTH PRODUCING CLIMATES AND EFFICIENT PERFORMANCE

Introduction

Since it appears that supportive interpersonal climates tend to facilitate the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning, the next question is: what is the relationship between supportive or defense-reductive climates and efficiency in an organization?

Efficient performance has been defined in chapter one as the completion of missions or tasks successfully over extended periods of time with the optimal use of energy, time, materials, and personnel. I think that it is reasonable to assume that a group of more fully functioning persons will be more efficient than a group of less fully functioning persons. Carroll Shartle of Ohio State University applies such reasoning by saying that if we define efficiency in terms of input-output ratio, then even the social psychologist and the client-centered counseling psychologist are trying to make individuals and organizations more efficient. He observes, "In terms of an organization, we may say that an unhappy individual, or a maladjusted individual, will take up more time of administrators and supervisors and therefore reduce the output of the particular units over which an individual has influence."⁸² But it is possible now to go further than making a reasonable assumption,

⁸²Carroll L. Shartle, "Leadership and Organizational Behavior," *Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior*, eds. Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 323.

there is a growing accumulation of laboratory, field study, and engineering data which indicates a positive correlation between the supportive climate and efficiency. In fact, the possibilities indicated by the data are impressive. The Gibbs write,

Behavioral scientists in evaluating potential have looked at persons and groups in the natural setting and judged what they might become. It is as if in wishing to determine how well men could hit golf balls, we lined up fifty average adult males at a golf tee, had each take two swings at the ball, measured the distance each ball travelled, and concluded that the average man's golf-ball-hitting potential was 15.5 yards. After practice and effort, under the same test conditions, the average man could hit the ball approximately 155 yards. This does not take into consideration that after applying new theory to the training process the average person can be trained to hit the ball perhaps 255 yards. Our impression is that the above analogy is relevant to the examination of the potential of groups for creative growth. There is a similar gross qualitative difference between the average discussion group or management team operation in the usual natural organizational setting, and the same group or team performance after the kind of training that is now possible. This phenomenon has led to a new look at human potential in persons and in groups, to new organizational theories, and to new theories of personal and group development.⁸³

The approach to be taken here to the problem of seeing the relationship between supportive interpersonal climate and efficient performance is first to look briefly at some of the theory and data having to do with production related effects of non-supportive climates, and then to look more extensively at theory and data having to do with production related effects of supportive climates.

⁸³Gibb and Gibb, "Leaderless Groups: Growth-Centered Values and Potentialities," op. cit., pp. 103-104.

Production Related Effects of Defense-Inductive Climate

Chris Argyris has concluded from his field studies that the three variables—formal organization, directive leadership, and managerial controls—are intrinsically interwoven so that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate any one of them in a field situation to measure its effects. However, he has also concluded, as discussed above, that the principles of formal organization along with their correlates are inimical to the growth of individuals toward more fully functioning. An examination of his findings from the point of view of efficiency in an organization is enlightening. He points out that there is an incongruity between the needs of the healthy individual and the demands of formal organization which require him to work in situations where he is dependent, passive, and uses few and unimportant abilities. The disturbance will vary with the degree of incongruity. The resultants of the disturbance are frustration, failure, short-time perspective, and conflict. He lists these with supporting studies:⁸⁴

⁸⁴R. G. Barker, T. Dembo, and K. Lewin, Frustration and Regression (University of Iowa, 1941).

J. Dollard, et. al., Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale, 1939).

K. Lewin, et. al., "Level of Aspiration," Personality and the Behavior Disorders, ed. J. McV. Hunt (New York: Ronald, 1944).

K. Lewin, "Time Perspective and Morale," Resolving Social Conflicts, ed. G. W. Lewin (New York: Harper, 1948).

R. Lippitt and L. Bradford, "Employee Success in Work Groups," Personnel Administration, 1945.

T. M. Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1950).

If the participants in the organization desire a healthy, more mature self-actualization, they will tend to experience:

1. Frustration because their self-expression will be blocked (Barker, Dembo, and Lewin, 1941; Dollard, 1939).

2. Failure because they will not be permitted to define their own goals in relation to central needs or the paths to these goals (Lewin, et. al., 1944; Lippitt and Bradford, 1945).

3. Short-time perspective because they have no control over the clarity and stability of their future (Lewin, 1948).

4. Conflict because, as healthy agents, they will dislike frustration, failure, and short-time perspective which is characteristic of the present job. However, if they leave they may not find a new job easily and, even if a new job is found, it may not be different (Newcomb, 1950).⁸⁵

Argyris' Proposition IV is also to the point: "The nature of the formal principles of organization cause the subordinates, at any given level, to experience competition, rivalry, intersubordinate hostility and to develop a focus toward the parts rather than the whole."⁸⁶

Argyris reasons,

1. Because of the degree of dependence or subordination of the subordinates toward the leader, and because the number of positions above any given level always tend to decrease, the subordinates aspiring to perform effectively and to advance will tend to find themselves in competition with and receiving hostility from each other.

2. Because, according to formal principles, subordinates are directed towards and rewarded for performing their own task well, subordinates tend to develop an orientation toward their own particular part rather than toward the whole.

3. This part-orientation increases the need for the leader to coordinate activity among the parts in order to maintain the whole. This need for the leader, in turn increases subordinates' degree of dependence or subordination, creating a circular process whose impact maintains or increases the degree of dependence and subordination plus the rivalry and competition for the leader's favor.⁸⁷

⁸⁵Argyris, op. cit., p. 332.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 333.

⁸⁷Ibid.

Argyris goes on to state that

. . .it can be shown that under conflict, frustration, failure, and short-time perspective, employees will tend to maintain self-integration by creating specific adaptive (informal) behavior such as:

1. Leaving the organization.
2. Climbing the organizational ladder.
3. Manifesting defense reactions (day dreaming, aggression, ambivalence, regression, projection).
4. Becoming apathetic and disinterested toward the organization, its make-up and goals. This leads to such phenomena as: (a) Employees reduce the number and potency of the needs they expect to fulfill while at work; (b) Employees goldbrick, set rates, restrict quotas, make errors, cheat, slow down.
5. Creating informal groups to sanction defense reactions, apathy, disinterest, and lack of self-involvement.
6. Forming informal groups.
7. Evolving group norms that perpetuate the behavior outlined in 3, 4, 5, and 6 above.
8. Evolving a psychological set that human or nonmaterial factors are becoming increasingly unimportant while material factors become increasingly important.
9. Acculturating the youth to accept the norms discussed in 7 and 8.⁸⁸

Argyris points out that this employee adaptive behavior maintains individual self-integration and simultaneously impedes integration with the formal organization. It also has a cumulative effect, feeds back into the formal organization, and further entrenches itself. The impact of these defense mechanisms on the output-input ratio is to make it necessary to increase the input (energy, money, machines) in order to maintain the same output. This degenerative cycle tends to be reinforced since certain management reactions tend to increase the antagonisms underlying the adaptive behavior. Argyris states it this way,

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 333-334.

Those managements that base their judgment on the logics of formal organization will tend to dislike the employee. It follows, therefore, that these managements should tend to take those "corrective" actions that are congruent with the logics of formal organization. These actions tend to be: (a) Increasing the degree of directive leadership; (b) Increasing the degree of management controls; (c) Increasing the number of pseudo-human relations programs.⁸⁹

The impact of (a) and (b) is to reinforce the adaptive behavior. The effect of (c) is to increase the mistrust between employee and management because it does not jibe with the realities of the system in which the employee works. Now management's behavior influences the output-input ratio so that more input is required to maintain the same output.

According to Argyris, then, a defense-inductive climate decreases efficiency. He concludes that the disturbance and adaptive behaviors and loss of efficiency can be predicted, but that the amount of disturbance, adaptive behaviors, and loss of efficiency cannot as yet—that is a matter for empirical research.

Gibb's work with a large, de-centralized business organization with several hundred thousand employees confirms this pattern. He reports that in nearly 200 discussion groups among managers at various levels in several of the member companies he found a consistent view that the conventional management behaviors and organizational structures in the corporation tended to increase distrust. The behaviors most frequently cited as distrust-inductive were the following, ". . .

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 334.

frequent reports, frequent inspections and check-ups, tight regulations and strict rules, channeling of communications, tight security systems, secrecy in communications, controls over out-of-company behaviors, and giving orders without explanations."⁹⁰ Such behaviors resulted in a number of predictable effects in the organization. He writes,

Fear and distrust lead to further distrust and generalized anxiety. Data distortion leads to ambiguity, counter-strategy, and counter-distortion of data. Manipulation of the reward system leads to extremes of either apathy or management-conforming work. Tight external controls and bargaining behavior lead to dependency or rebellion and the concomitant ambivalence.⁹¹

Though Gibb does not comment on the direct relationship between such effects and efficiency within the organization, it seems to me that it would be negative. An empirical study that gives support to the idea that such defense-inductive behaviors do affect performance negatively is reported by Robert L. Kahn of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan:

Next we looked at the effects of public esteem as communicated to one individual by another single person. French and Meyer studied the effects of the appraisal system in a large company. They interviewed 92 members of management before and after their annual appraisals. During each appraisal, trained observers recorded the behavior of both the boss and the subordinate. The number of criticisms made by the boss and the frequency of his praise were used to define communicated public esteem. Ten weeks later both the boss and the employee were interviewed again. The appraisals had indeed

⁹⁰ Gibb and Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction," op. cit., p. 9.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 7.

threatened self-esteem; 82 per cent of the employees reported that their ratings by the boss were lower than their self-evaluation.

Contrary to the usual assumptions of performance appraisal, French and Meyer had predicted that threats to self-esteem would be demoralizing, would inhibit rather than improve subsequent performance, especially for persons already low in self-esteem. They were right. If a person was low in occupational self-esteem, and his self-esteem was threatened further by a negative appraisal, his performance got worse.⁹²

Under these specific conditions defense-inductive behavior inhibited subsequent performance.

McGregor records an incident that is illustrative of the process but that also traces the roots back beyond behavior to inner feelings:

Over a period of several months, a group of workers in a manufacturing plant brought a lengthy series of grievances to management, all of them involving wages, working conditions, and plant rules. The intensity with which these grievances were pursued, and their frequency, led the personnel manager to suspect that they were symptoms of a deeper problem. He finally succeeded in creating a situation in which these employees felt free to express their private feelings and it turned out that his hunch was indeed correct. The real issue had nothing to do with the actual subject of the grievances, but with the fact that the behavior of their supervisor made them feel he regarded them as "stupid lunks" and "dirt under his feet." They recognized that they could not get anywhere by raising grievances over the largely intangible characteristics of his behavior, so they expressed their violent reaction by making issues over tangible but irrelevant matters.

When the personnel manager discussed the whole question with the supervisor, he finally said, "I guess that's the way I do feel about them, but I can't imagine what I've done to show it. I knew it would make my job tougher, so I hid my feelings even when they were making trouble with all their grievances!"⁹³

⁹²Robert L. Kahn, "Stress: From 9 to 5," Psychology Today, III (September, 1969), 38.

⁹³McGregor, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

McGregor's conclusion is that the climate of the superior-subordinate relationship is determined by the superior's underlying conception of management and his assumptions about people in general. If these are negative, employee response will be disruptive, and performance will deteriorate.

To summarize, the findings of Argyris, Gibb, Kahn, and McGregor indicate that a defense-inductive interpersonal climate within an organization will breed adaptive behavior on the part of subordinates, and such behavior will affect the output-input ratio so that the same input will result in a lesser output or that greater input will be required to maintain a constant output.

Production Related Effects of Defense-Reductive Climate

The approach here will be to examine first some general theoretical and experimental aspects of the defense-reductive climate and its impact on efficiency and then to examine specific effects on such variables as communication, goal integration, emergent controls, and role conflict.

General. After Rensis Likert completed his ten year program of studies and experimentation at the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, he observed (about ten years ago) that most companies and government agencies

. . . presently use standard operating procedures and prevailing practices which stem primarily from the classical task-oriented

and authority-oriented conception of organization. These concepts specify that management should follow such procedures as the following:

1. Break the total operation to be performed into its simple, component parts or tasks.
2. Develop the best way to perform each of the component parts.
3. Hire people with appropriate aptitudes and skills to perform each of these component tasks.
4. Train these people to do their respective tasks in the specified best way.
5. Provide supervision of such a kind that these employees perform their designated tasks using the specified procedure at an acceptable rate as determined by timing the job.
6. Where feasible, also, use incentives in the form of individual or group piece rates.⁹⁴

According to Likert this implied that any diversion of the manager or supervisor from task-centered activities is to be avoided; that immediate goals and work procedures should be specified in detail for each position; that pressure for performance of specified tasks and close control over performance are desirable; that influence over activities should be primarily at levels above the individual member.

Likert then noted that a large amount of research was yielding results which raised questions as to the validity of some of these propositions. He listed some typical conclusions along with representative sources in the literature:

1. Supervisors and managers who are "employee-centered" rather than exclusively "job-centered" tend to get better results (Kahn and Katz, 1953; Katz, Maccoby, and Morse, 1950; Katz, Maccoby, Gurin, and Floor, 1951).

⁹⁴Likert, op. cit., pp. 291-292.

2. Employees working under strong pressure for higher productivity, or strong pressure for acceptance of specified tasks, tend to perform less well (Jackson, 1953; Likert, 1952).

3. Close supervision tends to accompany poor performance rather than good performance (Katz and Kahn, 1951, 1952; Morse, 1953).

4. Freedom to set one's own work methods and work pace, within broad limits, is connected with good performance (Kahn, 1958; Meltzer, 1956; Pelz, 1957).

5. A high degree of mutual, rather than one-way, influence is associated with good performance (Pelz, 1952; Tannenbaum and Georgopoulos, 1957; Tannenbaum and Kahn, 1958).

6. Organizations with greater diffusion downward of control and influence, and wider participation in decisions, tend to show better results (Kahn and Tannenbaum, 1957; Tannenbaum and Kahn, 1958).

7. Better and poorer supervisors and managers are relatively undifferentiated with respect to fulfilling the task-centered aspects of their responsibilities but are differentiated a great deal with respect to activities representing concern for subordinates' well-being, training and development, self-confidence, security, encouragement of free communication (Katz and Kahn, 1951; Likert, 1952; Likert and Willits, 1940; Mann and Dent, 1954).

8. Supervisors and managers who are aware of and utilize group processes tend to achieve better results (Georgopoulos, 1957; Likert, 1953; Mann, 1957; Mann and Baumgartel, 1953; Mann and Dent, 1954).⁹⁵

Likert's study of high-producing managers and supervisors indicates that they are deviating in important and systematic ways from those advocated by their company, a company practicing formal organizational theory. As a result Likert developed a modified theory of organization and management based upon his studies and consisting of four major aspects. (1) It uses fully the tools, but not the philosophy, of scientific management, cost accounting and similar technologies and

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 292-293.

developments. (2) It emphasizes a high level of motivation throughout the organization, a level to be attained by integrating organizational goals and member needs. (3) It emphasizes an efficient mutual interaction system which serves for communication, influence, and decision-making processes. (4) It emphasizes the use of measurements not only of production, costs, waste, earnings, and so forth, but also of the human dimensions which affect the organization's capacity to produce—motivations, effectiveness of communications, decision-making, and so forth. Basic to the theory is the underlying idea that all of this must be done with behaviors that are perceived by members as supportive.

A partial test of the theory was made by using data collected in 1955 in a study conducted by the Institute for Social Research. Likert writes,

The data are from 31 geographically separated stations (from a company which operates nationally) which perform essentially identical operations and for which extensive productivity and cost figures are available continuously. These stations vary in size from about 15 to over 50 employees.

A single score was computed for the manager in charge of each of the 31 stations. The scores are based on seven items in a questionnaire and are intended to represent a crude approximation of the extent to which the managers have supportive attitudes toward their men and the extent to which the managers endeavor to use group methods of supervision. These scores, labeled for convenient reference attitude toward men, are based on the managers' own answers to the questionnaire and, consequently, reflect their own concept of their job. Their actual behavior in some instances may not be fully in accord with their expressions of point of view.⁹⁶

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 299-300.

The resultant data showed that "Managers who have a supportive attitude toward their men and endeavor to build them into well-knit groups obtain appreciably higher productivity than managers who have a threatening attitude and rely more on man-to-man patterns of supervision."⁹⁷

One of an additional series of tests that were made involving the same 31 stations is of special interest since it examined the impact of "effective group meetings" on productivity. It is significant for this study because Likert's view of an effective group is one which includes high data flow, high goal integration, and high mutual influence—conditions which indicate a supportive climate. The test involved classifying the 31 stations on the basis of the extent to which there existed effective group-based interaction. The 31 stations were divided into three clusters:

Cluster A included all 10 stations in which managers said meetings were held and were always or usually worthwhile and where the men's points of view were substantially the same.

Cluster B included all stations, a total of 7, in which managers stated group meetings were never held.

Cluster C consisted of 14 stations in which meetings were held but the men had felt that "nothing much was accomplished" or that the meetings were "just a waste of time," or both the men and the managers had felt the meetings were not worthwhile.⁹⁸

Likert adds,

The term group meetings means not only formal meetings but informal discussions and spontaneous work sessions. The

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 300.

⁹⁸Ibid.

formality of group meetings is not the significant dimension. The important dimension is the willingness of the manager in formal or informal setting to discuss problems fully with the men as well as his interest in their ideas, his use of their ideas, experience and recommendations, and his desire to stimulate constructive interaction among them.⁹⁹

Here is a summary of Likerts findings. Cluster A stations displayed to the greatest extent and Cluster C to the least extent the following:

1. Higher productivity.
2. Fuller, more candid communication throughout the organization (communication upward, downward, and sideward).
3. Higher levels of influence and interaction, including greater amounts of influence by subordinates upon superiors as well as influence by superiors upon subordinates. There was also more influence exerted by the men upon their own colleagues. That is, there was more influence exercised by each person as well as more influence felt by each person.
4. Greater decentralization of the decision-making process with decisions made at lower levels. This was reflected not only in a greater feeling by subordinates that they could exercise influence upon decisions but also that they had sufficient authority and that they were free to make important decisions affecting their work, such as setting their own work pace.
5. More ready acceptance of the goals of the organization. There were more favorable attitudes toward the company and a greater feeling that what was expected of them was reasonable.
6. Higher motivation and evidence of more cumulative and reinforcing motivation and less conflict in motivations and less conflict between personnel.¹⁰⁰

One additional pertinent fact was established: the results showed that it is better to hold no group meetings at all than to conduct meetings seen by the men as accomplishing nothing.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 305.

Likert's work suggests that a supportive interpersonal climate, especially as it is developed in a group format, increases productivity.

Jack Gibb's work, if you recall, has involved a three-strand concurrent process of empirical studies, theory development, and engineering development. He states one of his basic findings as follows:

For two decades I have been consulting with management in a wide variety of businesses to help management contribute to the effectiveness of the organization and to learn more about what determines productivity. One generalization stands out as inescapable: productivity over the long haul is directly related to the degree of trust in the system.¹⁰¹

He explains the process this way, "As people grow to trust one another they can share intrinsic motivations, give and receive data from one another, and build an interchangeable, interdependent organization which spontaneously meets the changing needs of the group."¹⁰² Gibb states that in terms of defense-reductive theory there is an intrinsic and inevitable relationship between personal growth (on the four dimensions of (1) self-acceptance and the ability to accept others, (2) greater awareness and openness, (3) self-determination and self-evaluation of progress toward one's own goals, and (4) the emergence of inner control systems) and organizational productivity.¹⁰³ That such growth does

¹⁰¹Jack Gibb, "Building A Teamwork Climate," Weyerhaeuser Management Viewpoint, I (August, 1969), 11.

¹⁰²Gibb, "Factors Producing Defensive Behavior Within Groups," op. cit., pp. 10-11.

¹⁰³Gibb and Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction," op. cit., p. 8.

take place in defense-reductive interpersonal climates has been established in the first half of this chapter. Gibb clearly states, after discussing specific methods of threat-reduction used in engineering tests of defense-reductive theory in an extended range of field situations, that "Carefully planned experiments have demonstrated that such methods induced a change in the productivity of the group. . . ."104

McGregor cites a company situation which he himself investigated. The company had been plagued by a violently hostile union. "Bargaining was a farce, grievances by the hundreds were pressed to the limit without regard for their merit, wildcat strikes were a regular phenomenon, restriction of production was widespread."105 After many heated discussions a member of top management persuaded the others to adopt a new approach. McGregor describes it as follows:

On the assumption that the bulk of the employees were decent human beings who would respond to reasonable treatment, the approach was to demonstrate in every possible way management's sincerity and integrity. The employee publications would no longer take a defensive position with respect to managerial practices. If a grievance hearing showed that management had been in the wrong, the error would be openly admitted and rectified immediately. Secrecy (motivated by fears of union misuse of information) would be replaced by complete openness and frankness. Extensive efforts would be made to help middle and lower management to understand and adopt this philosophy in their daily practice.106

104Gibb, "Factors Producing Defensive Behavior Within Groups," op. cit., p. 17.

105McGregor, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

106Ibid., p. 143.

Within two years the union had voted out its former leadership made up of the leading troublemakers in the company and had voted in highly respected, able individuals. Grievances were down to a normal level, bargaining had been conducted in good faith and in an atmosphere of reasonableness, wildcat strikes had dropped to zero.

Under the circumstances I think it unlikely that a direct correlation from an empirical point of view could be established between this management's change in attitude and the subsequent change in the company's productivity. However, in the light of other studies, it appears that such a correlation, could it have been established, would likely have been strong and positive.

In summary, from a general point of view, Likert's and Gibb's theory and testing indicate that certain behaviors produce a defense-reductive interpersonal climate within an organization, and that climate tends to increase productivity.

Climate, Communication, and Efficiency. One of the more specific evidences that interpersonal climate and efficiency are related has to do with the impact of climate on communication and, via communication, on productivity. Gibb's research has produced findings about communication flow that are relevant.¹⁰⁷ One is that ". . .

¹⁰⁷Gibb, "Factors Producing Defense Behavior Within Groups," op. cit.; Gibb, "Communication and Productivity," Personnel Administration, XXVII (January-February, 1964), 8-13, 45; Gibb and Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction," op. cit.

communication flow in the organization is related to the amount of trust in the system."¹⁰⁸ The other is that ". . .communication flow is closely related to the productivity and efficiency of the business organization."¹⁰⁹ The process develops as follows. Fear and distrust even in its mildest forms bring distortion to communication. Gibb observes,

Bosses "manage the news" in the attempt to manipulate plant morale and motivation. Workers cover up feelings toward supervisors to avoid incurring disfavor or retaliation. Almost everyone softens and distorts the message to avoid hurt feelings, make friends, or to cover up mistakes. Mill supervisors may show people from central headquarters the favorable side of local conditions. Reports may be prepared to influence opinion, rather than to present objective data. Headquarters may program the "news" to improve motivation, influence morale, or to needle the troops.¹¹⁰

Gibb points out that there are resulting credibility gaps between manager and workers, staff and line, central office and the field, and person and person. The gaps tend to increase. Distrust breeds distrust. In large organizations there are four effects that spring from this starvation communication diet each of which is associated with low productivity:

(1) Life gets impersonal. People see each other as objects, numbers, and roles—not as people.

(2) People get to feeling out of touch. They don't know what's going on. They don't understand why people are doing what they are doing. They can't predict or understand.

(3) People can't know if what they are doing is significant or useful. They don't know what part they are playing in the over-all picture.

¹⁰⁸Jack R. Gibb, "Management Tunes In," Weyerhaeuser World, I (August, 1969), 3.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

(4) People begin to feel powerless. They feel that they are unable to influence the company and the people with whom they work.¹¹¹

On the other hand, Gibb's research points out that when management behaviors are trust-inductive, communication flow increases inducing more trust, and the following four conditions tend to arise, each of which is associated in the long run with increased productivity:

People feel:

(1) They are treated as persons with greater respect, dignity, and worth.

(2) They are in touch with what is going on. They are in tune with each other. Someone is listening. People are more honest with each other.

(3) They are doing something that is significant both to themselves and to the company, and that they are a contributing part of a productive team or unit.

(4) They can influence what is going on around them, particularly things done by people who have power over them, or who are seen by them as important.¹¹²

To summarize, Gibb's findings indicate that a defense-reductive interpersonal climate increases communication and that increased communication is related to increased productivity and efficiency in an organization.

Climate, Need Satisfaction/Goal Integration, and Efficiency.

Another source of evidence that interpersonal climate is related to efficiency centers in the area of need satisfaction and goal integration.

The central principle of McGregor's Theory Y is the integration of goals. He writes, "The central principle which derives from Theory Y

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid.

is that of integration: the creation of conditions such that the members of the organization can achieve their own goals best by directing their efforts toward the success of the enterprise."¹¹³ He further theorizes, "The concept of integration and self-control carries the implication that the organization will be more effective in achieving its economic objectives if adjustments are made, in significant ways, to the needs and goals of its members."¹¹⁴

Basic to McGregor's position is A. H. Maslow's theory of hierarchy of needs.¹¹⁵ Moving from the base upwards they are: physiological needs, safety needs, love-affection-belonging needs, esteem needs, and self-actualizing needs. When lower needs are met, higher needs emerge. The evolvment of successive levels is not determined by 100 percent fulfillment of the previous levels. Emergence of higher needs are by degree, and it's possible that all levels may be in an emergent state at one time but the degree of emergence would be less as one ascends the hierarchy. The hierarchy is not so rigid that there are not exceptions. McGregor applies the theory to management situations as follows:

Above the social needs—in the sense that they do not usually become motivators until lower needs are reasonably satisfied—are the needs of greatest significance to management and to man himself. They are the egoistic needs, and they are of two kinds.

¹¹³McGregor, op. cit., p. 49.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 50.

¹¹⁵A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), pp. 80-106.

1. Those that relate to one's self-esteem: needs for self-respect, and self-confidence, for autonomy, for achievement, for competence, for knowledge
2. Those that relate to one's reputation: needs for status, for recognition, for appreciation, for the deserved respect of one's fellows

Unlike the lower needs, these are rarely satisfied; man seeks indefinitely for more satisfaction of these needs once they have become important to him. However, they do not usually appear in any significant way until physiological, safety, and social needs are reasonably satisfied.¹¹⁶

McGregor goes on to observe,

The man whose needs for safety, association, independence, or status are thwarted is sick, just as surely as is he who has rickets. And his sickness will have behavioral consequences. We will be mistaken if we attribute his resultant passivity, or his hostility, or his refusal to accept responsibility to his inherent "human nature." These forms of behavior are symptoms of illness—of deprivation of his social and egoistic needs.¹¹⁷

He points out that the rewards typically provided the worker are the kind that can be used only when he leaves the job. For example, wages cannot be spent at work. Most fringe benefits—overtime pay, shift differentials, vacations, health and medical benefits, annuities, and the proceeds from stock purchase plans or profit-sharing plans—yield needed satisfaction only when the individual leaves the job. He concludes that it is not surprising that for many wage earners work is perceived as a form of punishment which is the price to be paid for various kinds of satisfaction away from the job. Under today's conditions management has provided relatively well for the satisfaction of

¹¹⁶McGregor, op. cit., p. 38.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 39.

physiological and safety needs. That means that the motivational emphasis in employees has tended to shift to the social and the egoistic needs. McGregor concludes that "Unless there are opportunities at work to satisfy these higher-level needs, people will be deprived; and their behavior will reflect this deprivation."¹¹⁸

McGregor cites a study of the sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction among managerial and professional people that give support to his theory. The researchers found that

. . .the wants of employees divide into two groups. One group revolves around the need to develop in one's occupation as a source of personal growth. The second group operates as an essential base to the first and is associated with fair treatment in compensation, supervision, working conditions, and administrative practices. The fulfillment of the needs of the second group does not motivate the individual to high levels of job satisfaction and. . .to extra performance on the job. All we can expect from satisfying this second group of needs is the prevention of dissatisfaction and poor job performance.¹¹⁹

Gibb's research in small group process shows that there is an interrelationship between trust, communication, and goal integration. They are three of the four basic modal concerns which apparently arise in all social interaction—the fourth is control. He often refers to these modal concerns as dimensions. He explains the interrelationship as follows:

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 40.

¹¹⁹Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Block Snyderman, The Motivation to Work (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 114-115.

Growth in each dimension is contingent upon growth in each of the dimensions higher in the hierarchy. Each factor in the hierarchy provides a pace-setting or boundary function for the factors lower in the hierarchy. Thus, data-flow is possible only within the limits of trust formation. A free flow of data is possible only with antecedent or concurrent reduction of distrusts and fears. Defense mechanisms and organizational demands prevent functional processing of data beyond the trust limits. A person can look at his goals only as he begins to trust himself. This growing self-trust makes self-awareness possible. Integration of group goals occurs only as rapidly as members build sufficient trust and awareness to verbalize openly their intrinsic goals. Premature goal formulation beyond the trust and data boundaries leads to unrealistic, over-aspirational, or formalized goals, the pursuit or lack of which leads to apathy or various other forms of resistance.¹²⁰

In essence, when the defense level is high, communication is limited and the awareness of and sharing of one's goals is inhibited. When group goals are set without the integration of member goals, individual commitment is decreased and there is a resultant loss in efficiency and productivity.

It interests me that in 1916 John Dewey presented three criteria for measuring the goodness of aims (goals). The first asks whether the aim has arisen out of the needs of the people directly involved in whatever the situation may be. The second asks if the aim is tentative and flexible. The third asks if the aim facilitates voluntary, interested, meaningful activity. He criticized externally imposed aims (goals) on three counts: (1) they limit intelligence by permitting only a mechanical

¹²⁰Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," op. cit., p. 283.

choice of means; (2) they are inflexible in nature; and (3) they make instrumental activity a drudgery.¹²¹

To summarize, McGregor and Gibb are saying that studies indicate that defense-reductive climates facilitate the integration of member goals with organization goals and that such integration taps member commitment with resultant increases in efficiency and productivity.

Climate, Control, and Efficiency. Another specific area that gives some evidence that a defense-reductive climate increases efficiency is control. Gibb defines this dimension as follows:

The control dimension has to do with intrapersonal and interpersonal control or regulatory mechanisms that lead to coordinated sequences of behavior in the person, sequential flow of behavior in the group, formation of roles and expectancies, and integration of function into structure at all levels of social behavior.¹²²

According to Gibb's theory, the control system that leads to optimum productivity and creativity is one that emerges from the demands of the situation as seen by the people involved. Effective controls are those imposed upon the group by the group itself.¹²³ His theory further indicates that if there is a high level of trust, data flow, and goal integration, then ". . . the control and organization problems

¹²¹John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press (1916), 1966), pp. 104-106.

¹²²Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," op. cit., p. 281.

¹²³Gibb and Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction," op. cit., p. 23.

become relatively simple or disappear."¹²⁴ On the other hand, distrust, distorted communication, and imposed or ambiguous goals compound the problems of control and organization.¹²⁵ The early or immature group (whether it is a natural group or a T-Group) is marked by unresolved control concerns. There is advice giving, debate, argument, or constructive fighting. Power struggles may develop. Strategies for manipulation appear. There may be appeals to the leader or trainer for control. Some may fight all forms of control.¹²⁶

Drawing from observations of groups that had been under intensive T-Group training for more than 60 hours Gibb has described a hypothetical group at a high level of development on the control dimension. Not all the symptoms mentioned were present in all groups in comparable degree.

Legitimate influence is easily exerted. There is optimal inter-changeability of critical roles in the group. The power structure is relatively open and manageable and varies in nature with expertness, the nature of the problem, and the nature of the situation. There is an optimal distribution of member roles at any cross-sectional analysis of group activity. Organization is relatively spontaneous and occurs in response to the needs of the problem. Organization is easily changed. There is maximal flow of communication. Formal channeling is not necessary in problem solving. Control is exerted by the nature of the goal, the intrinsic

¹²⁴Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," op. cit., p. 287.

¹²⁵Gibb and Gibb, "The Process of the Basic Encounter Group," op. cit., p. 14.

¹²⁶Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," op. cit., p. 287.

motivations, and the objectives of the group. There is a participative structure.¹²⁷

He adds,

Many organizational functions disappear. Conventional concepts of span of control, channeling of information, and group composition seem to be appropriate to high-defense groups, and less appropriate and perhaps dysfunctional in more mature groups.¹²⁸

Gibb describes the results of engineering tests designed to increase understanding of the control dimension and performed in a broad variety of natural and training settings:

We began by imposing boundaries and various minimal controls in the early years, and by reducing imposed controls as the experiments progressed. In general it became apparent that as we reduced controls, groups generated intrinsic control systems that were more effective than the controls originally imposed. Of course, even the original controls represented much greater freedom than in comparison or [sic] control groups but various forms of resistance to controls would develop; resistance to meeting attendance regulations, taking personality tests, filling out the daily data collection sheets, trying out suggested procedures, etc. It seemed clear that in most instances when we reduced imposed controls to a minimum, we maximized the likelihood of emergence of the regenerative cycles of trust-feedback-intrinsic goals-internal controls.¹²⁹

A major element of the control dimension is the influence potential of members of the group. Gibb carried out a series of studies of the relationship between the defense level and influence potential in small groups. His findings are based on two major sources: (1) a series of laboratory experiments upon college students performing

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 291.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Gibb, "Factors Producing Defensive Behavior Within Groups," op. cit., pp. 18-19.

assigned laboratory group tasks, and (2) a series of field experiments and field observations upon adult groups engaged in human-relations training of various kinds.¹³⁰ His investigations led to the determination of certain functional relationships between the success of member influence attempts and each of three empirical variables: (1) the role boundaries prescribed by the group, (2) the role repertoire of the influencing member, and (3) the consonance of the member act with the group goal system. Further studies indicated that the defense level in the small group was systematically related to each of these three variables.

Regarding role boundary Gibb defines it as ". . . the boundary that encompasses the member acts the group will accept from the individual."¹³¹ He states that interviews and observations indicate that members respond to role actions outside of the role boundary by not seeing or hearing the behavior, by ignoring the behavior, by subtle fighting if this trespass is but dimly seen, by open rebellion if the circumvention of the boundary is seen as deliberate, by encapsulating the individual or forcing his withdrawal, by various perceptual distortions, or, in general, by using whatever means of behavior control the group

¹³⁰Jack R. Gibb, "Defense Level and Influence Potential in Small Groups," Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, eds. Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961).

¹³¹Ibid., p. 68.

has evolved as a norm. Rigid role boundaries limit role distribution in the group and there is some evidence that role distribution is associated with task efficiency over a long period of time. Gibb's studies show that there is greater rigidity of role boundaries in defensive atmospheres than in supportive.¹³² It follows then that supportive atmospheres tend to loosen role boundaries, increase role distribution, and increase small group efficiency.

Regarding role repertoire, Gibb defines it as ". . .the range and adequacy of the role behaviors of an individual or of a small group. Thus it is possible to speak of the role repertoire of a person and also to distinguish small groups on a dimension related to role repertoire."¹³³ Gibb records his findings:

From observations of experimental groups in the laboratory and of field training groups it is clear that the role repertoire of individuals is negatively correlated with the defense level in the group. When the defense level was significantly reduced a statistically significant increase in role-taking adequacy was seen in the groups. Many individuals were particularly susceptible to the effects of atmosphere change, as has been indicated in prior experimentation. For those individuals who were particularly sensitive to climate change, role repertoire changes were most dramatic. That this change may be at least partially a conscious or deliberate one is indicated by the fact that degree of awareness of climate is positively correlated with degree of change in role repertoire.¹³⁴

One of Gibb's final conclusions has to do with factors having a bearing on efficiency. He states that, analyzed in terms of the role categories, it is particularly clear that appreciable decrease in

¹³²Ibid., p. 72.

¹³³Ibid., p. 73.

¹³⁴Ibid., pp. 74-75.

defensiveness of the climate of the group is accompanied by a greater number of ideas produced, more reality testing, greater expression of negative feeling when present, and stronger initiatory attempts.¹³⁵

I think that it can be said, then, that low defense level tends to produce an increase in role-taking adequacy with resultant increase in efficiency in small groups.

Regarding role consonance, Gibb states that it has to do with the fact that ". . . initiations or regulations that are consonant with the goal system tend to be influential. Initiations which are dissonant with the group goal system tend to be ignored, misperceived, rejected, or accepted only under power or status pressure."¹³⁶

Gibb states that the evidence that consonance is greater with higher supportivity of climate and with lowered defense levels is found in several studies:

For instance, in field studies we found that during supportive atmosphere periods high goal integration is associated with maximum tractability levels, during which members find it relatively easy to exert influence upon the direction of group activities. With supportive climates members listen and modify activities in response to what are seen as legitimate influence attempts. During periods of maximum supportivity and defense reduction, the asynchronous ideas of the least-chosen or low-sociometric members will be listened to and reacted to. Conversely, during maximum defense climates, the same low-sociometric persons will be more often ignored or their ideas rejected.¹³⁷

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 75.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 76.

¹³⁷Ibid., pp. 77-78.

Gibb points out that the higher the defense level, the more rigid in appearance is the positive relationship between consonance and influence potential. Interviews with persons immediately following such states indicate a kind of fatalistic and cynical feeling about acts influencing the process. Members feel impotence, experience some resentment at the group, and express discouragement. I think it can be said that such feelings are detrimental in terms of efficiency.

I think it is safe to say, then, that low defense levels tend to increase role consonance, increase feelings of influence, and as a consequence, increase commitment and thus efficiency in small groups.

In summary, Gibb's work with small groups indicates that a supportive interpersonal climate tends to produce emergent controls which are more effective than imposed controls. His study of defense level and influence potential indicates that low defense level increases influence potential of individual member acts with concurrent loosening of role boundaries, increase of role-taking adequacy, and improvement of role consonance with consequent enhancement of efficiency.

Climate, Role Conflict, and Efficiency. The goal of the latest research at the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan, reports Robert L. Kahn, Program Director of the Institute's Survey Center, is to learn more about the human costs and benefits of industrial production, about the meaning of work and about the mental

and physical consequences of organizational life.¹³⁸ Kahn says that among the most potent aspects of status for health are incompatibilities between two or more behaviors required in a single role. He has called such incompatibilities role conflict, and it has been a major theme of the research.

According to Kahn a person's role set is made up of people who depend in some way upon the focal person's performance. A role set would normally include his supervisor, immediate supervisor, subordinates, and some colleagues of equal rank. His role set may also include close friends, family, respected models, and any others who are concerned with his job behavior. Because they have a stake in his performance, they develop attitudes and expectations about what he should and should not do in his role. They communicate these expectations, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Members of the role set may have conflicting expectations and impose conflicting pressures, and the man will experience psychological conflict.

Kahn's study shows role conflict to be common. He writes,

When we studied intensively 54 role sets in a number of different industries and surveyed 1,500 households across the nation, we discovered that role conflict is common. Almost half of our respondents reported being caught between conflicting persons or factions. These conflicts are usually hierarchical; 88 per cent of those involved report that at least one party to the conflict ranks above them in the organization. Fewer than half report that one of the conflicting parties is outside the organization. A dominant form of role conflict is

¹³⁸Kahn, op. cit.

overload, which can be thought of as a conflict among legitimate tasks, manageable singly but not simultaneously. Almost half of all respondents who reported role conflict described it in these terms.¹³⁹

The emphasis of Kahn's study is on the costs and benefits to the individual, so that he does not mention costs or benefits to the organization; he is not thinking in terms of organizational efficiency. However, when he reports that the emotional costs of role conflict include low job satisfaction, low confidence in the organization, and high tension, it is reasonable to assume some positive correlation with efficiency in the first two and a negative in the last.

Particularly relevant to the point at hand is Kahn's statement regarding interpersonal climate and its effect,

There is significant evidence that close and positive relations between a worker and members of his role set can ease the effects of role conflict. In such cases, a given degree of role conflict produces less sense of stress.¹⁴⁰

Though Kahn's data were not gathered to show these particular relationships, I think that they do support the generalization that a supportive interpersonal climate reduces the negative emotional effects of role conflict and thus increases efficiency within the organization.

Summary

The problem was to find the relationship between growth-producing climates and efficient performance. An examination of studies by

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., p. 37.

Argyris, Gibb, Kahn, and McGregor indicated that non-supportive interpersonal climates tended to decrease organizational efficiency because of disruptive adaptive behaviors of subordinates. An examination of researches by Likert and Gibb indicated that certain behaviors produced supportive (growth-producing) interpersonal climates which tended to increase productivity. Specific studies involving communication, need satisfaction/goal integration, control, and role conflict as intermediate variables between interpersonal climate and organizational efficiency showed a positive correlation between supportive climates and increases in efficiency.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Two questions were asked at the beginning of this chapter: (1) what interpersonal climate promotes the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons, and (2) what is the relationship between this climate and efficiency in an organizational setting. The bases for the generalizations reached in this chapter are primarily the separate research and theory development of two men, Jack Gibb and Carl Rogers. Additional data and corroboration were drawn chiefly from Argyris, Kahn, Likert, and McGregor. The following generalizations are drawn tentatively, the second more so than the first for two reasons: (1) some of the supporting data was drawn from small group process and generalization to large organizations may not be valid; and (2) any of the field studies done in large organizations are working with

such a complexity of variables that some caution must be exercised in assuming direct connections between analytically discreet variables which in a natural setting may not be that discreet. With these cautions in mind I suggest that the following two generalizations are sufficiently supported by research to be accepted as bases for experimental efforts to improve efficiency in an organizational setting.

1. A supportive, defense-reductive interpersonal climate facilitates the growth of individuals, who perceive it as such, toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

2. A supportive, defense-reductive interpersonal climate increases efficiency in an organizational setting when members of the organization so perceive it.

With these generalizations in mind I turn in the next chapter to an examination of the question: (1) how is the interpersonal climate in an organization changed toward a more supportive climate.

CHAPTER III

CHANGING INTERPERSONAL CLIMATE

I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the task of changing the interpersonal climates in an organization in the direction of a supportive climate.

Method

The method of examining this task follows three steps. The first is to survey the problems currently associated with any planned organizational change. The second is to review contemporary strategies for planned organizational change and to expand in some detail the general strategy which lends itself to changing interpersonal climate. The third is to lay out the basic elements in a strategy designed specifically to change the interpersonal climate in an organization toward one that is supportive or defense-reductive.

Review

In chapters I and II, I have presented a broad spectrum of evidence indicating that there is a need in the U.S. Navy for a change in

its interpersonal climates and have examined climate-centered research and have shown that there is a definable interpersonal climate, called supportive or defense-reductive, which tends to facilitate both personal growth (as defined in Chapter I) and organizational efficiency. The question now is: how does one intervene in an organization in order to bring about such a climate?

II. PROBLEMS OF PLANNED ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Planned organizational change in its present form is relatively recent. It is a development which has, in part, grown out of changing concepts underlying managerial behavior. Warren G. Bennis lists three specific areas in which there has been fundamental conceptual change in the decade preceding 1966:

1. A new concept of man, based on increased knowledge of his complex and shifting needs, which replaces the oversimplified, innocent push-button or inert idea of man.
2. A new concept of power, based on collaboration and reason, which replaces a model of power based on coercion and fear.
3. A new concept of organizational values, based on an humanistic existential orientation, which replaces the depersonalized, mechanistic value system.¹

Bennis clarifies the degree and breadth of the change to which he is referring as follows:

I do not mean that these transformations of man, power, and organizational values are fully accepted, or even understood, to say nothing of implemented in day-to-day organizational

¹Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 188.

affairs. These changes may be light-years away from actual adoption. I do mean that they have gained wide intellectual acceptance in enlightened management quarters, that they have caused a terrific amount of rethinking and search behavior on the part of many organizational planners, and that they have been used as a basis for policy fomulation [sic] by certain large organizations, mainly industrial leviathans, but also by many other nonindustrial institutions.²

As a consequence of these conceptual changes there has been a growing movement to intervene in our organizational environments in order to change them in directions that will make them more humanly satisfying. Illustrative of this sense of responsibility is the personal statement of Robert L. Kahn, Program Director of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research,

I have the conviction that more and more of human life is spent in the organizational context, that much of what we experience of joy or frustration reflects the characteristics of formal organizations, and that it behooves us to understand them and shape them to our needs.³

Jack R. and Lorriane M. Gibb conclude that

Life in the large organization can be healthful, creative, and productive. Work experiences in a person-centered and defense-reductive environment can lead to healthy psychological growth of the person. The large organization, as many persons have pointed out, often leads to apathy, dependency, distrust and other growth-inhibiting byproducts. But this is not necessarily the case.⁴

²Ibid., pp. 188-89.

³Robert L. Kahn, quoted by editor in "Authors," Psychology Today, III (September, 1969), 71.

⁴Jack R. and Lorraine M. Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction" (draft of unpublished chapter, Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, 1965).

The underlying concepts, a spreading sense of responsibility, and a realistic hope based on laboratory research and field studies are all present, but the process for bringing about the sought for changes is complicated by a set of associated difficulties. These difficulties center in what has come to be termed planned organizational change.

Bennis provides an abbreviated definition of planned change—"The process of planned change involves a change agent, a client system, and the collaborative attempt to apply valid knowledge to the client's problems."⁵ Though the target for the change process to be examined in this chapter is specifically the interpersonal climates in an organization, the determinants of interpersonal climate are manifold and interlaced throughout the organizational system. Consequently, the climate cannot be changed without concurrent changes in many other aspects of the organization. This means that a broad change program is involved even though the focused target area is a limited one. It also means that the change program will face the complications that arise from the following difficulties presently associated with planned organizational change.

Theories of Change, But Not of Changing

In 1965, Bennis wrote that no viable theory of social change has been established. ". . . it is a curious fact about present theories that

⁵Warren G. Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change, " The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, I (1965), 343.

they are strangely silent on matters of directing and implementing change. . . . They are theories of change, and not of changing."⁶

Crediting his colleague, Robert Chin, he listed some of the prerequisites for a theory of changing,

- a. A theory of changing must include manipulable variables—accessible levers for influencing the direction, tempo, and quality of change and improvement.
- b. The variables must not violate the client system's values.
- c. The cost of usage cannot be prohibitive.
- d. There must be provided a reliable basis of diagnosing the strength and weakness of conditions facing the client system.
- e. Phases of intervention must be clear so that the change agent can develop estimates for termination of the relationship.
- f. The theory must be communicable to the client system.
- g. It must be possible to assess appropriateness of the theory for different client systems.⁷

At the close of the list Bennis noted,

Such a theory does not now exist, and this probably explains why change agents appear to write like "theoretical orphans" and, more important, why so many change programs based on theories of social change have been inadequate.⁸

But the situation today is not quite that desolate. Just last year Bennis wrote with Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin,

By and large, theories of change have tended to ignore strategic factors and emphasize the descriptive, nonmanipulative factors. This has led to an abundance of what we have referred to as "astronomer's" models of change. These theories describe accurately the mechanisms of change but do not allow for manipulation of the strategic variables. This is almost like observing the mechanism of a watch through a sealed glass case. More recently, we have seen the growth of engineering models,

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., pp. 342-43.

⁸Ibid., p. 343.

theories, and strategies that encompass variables that can be controlled and manipulated.⁹

Theories of changing are beginning to develop, but it is only the beginning. In fact, Bennis, Benne, and Chin still shy away from the use of the term theory. They write,

. . . new notions continue to be invented and developed both by researchers and practitioners concerned with planned change. We use the term "notions" rather than "theory" advisedly. For the body of notions now available does not constitute a theory in any of the accepted usages of that term in contemporary philosophies of science.¹⁰

Research Base Undeveloped

Bennis, Benne, and Chin further observe that, in the face of not having a theory of changing that embodies testable hypotheses, there has been a notable lack of adequate guidance for empirical inquiry and research. As a consequence there is no body of carefully researched knowledge of processes of changing. In their opinion such a research base, for the most part, has yet to be developed.¹¹ Without question it would be desirable to have such a base, but its absence is not totally crippling since intelligent efforts of planned change can still be launched on other bases such as criticized values and evaluated practical experience. In their minds, what this means is that current conceptual

⁹Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 193.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 60.

¹¹Ibid., p. 61.

schemes for planned change are never right or wrong; they are only useful or not for some specified purpose. Such schemes have some use for observers and students of its processes and even greater use for steering the activities of change agents in the practice of their roles.¹²

Complexity of Variables

Each change situation is partly idiosyncratic and is made up of a complexity of interrelated variables. No organization is simple in terms of planned change. Louis B. Barnes puts it this way:

. . . despite the common occurrence of organizational change, its dynamics and underlying processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined ways. Managers and social scientists who create and study change situations find that organizational changes involve multiple sets of complex variables whose identity, interaction, and impact vary from situation to situation.¹³

Unpredictability and Lack of Control

For two reasons planned change has a certain unpredictability and lack of control about it. One reason has to do with the fact that planned change is still in its infancy. Sheldon A. Davis puts it this way, ". . . the state of the art of organizational change is, in my opinion, one where you cannot program in advance everything you are going

¹²Ibid.

¹³Louis B. Barnes, "Approaches to Organizational Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.: New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 79.

to do within the organization."¹⁴ The other reason has to do with the fact that it is characteristic of social change to be accompanied by unforeseen consequences. Benne, Chin, and Bennis note,

The behavioral scientist seeks to unravel the complex causal connections in personal and social change processes, often under artificially controlled conditions, and to report his results as proven or disproven hypotheses. His example has sometimes lured the practitioner into thinking that a predictable specificity of consequences will follow if he but learns to act in the correct manner. But, as Merton and others have pointed out, unforeseen consequences are always built into any social action. A change-agent always encounters varying degrees of low predictability and lack of control.¹⁵

Deep Level Resistance

Organizations are made up of persons. I think that it follows that significant organizational change does not take place without significant personal change. Though there are other reasons for and forms of resistance involved in planned organizational change, the resistance to personal change is critical. Edgar H. Schein writes,

Most of the kinds of changes we are concerned with involve attitudes or behaviors which are integrated around the self, where change implies the giving up of something to which the person has previously become committed and which he values.

Any change in behavior or attitudes of this sort tends to be emotionally resisted because even the possibility of change

¹⁴Sheldon A. Davis, "An Organic Problem-solving Method of Organizational Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 368.

¹⁵Kenneth D. Benne, Robert Chin, and Warren G. Bennis, "Science and Practice," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 122-23.

implies that previous behavior and attitudes were somehow wrong or inadequate, a conclusion which the change target would be motivated to reject.¹⁶

The problem of personal change is not insurmountable but it is difficult and one of the realities involved in planned change.

Summary

To summarize, the process of planned organizational change at its present state of development has its problems. (1) A genuine theory of changing has not yet been developed. (2) An adequate research base has yet to be established. (3) The variables involved in such change are complex and their interrelationships are complex. (4) There is always some degree of unpredictability and lack of control. (5) Personal change is involved and it is accompanied sometimes by deep level resistance.

III. STRATEGIES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

Although no complete theory of planned change exists, planned change is practiced. There are strategies for change which have been developed out of several sources such as the accumulated experience of field efforts to bring about change, the application of relevant findings from the behavioral sciences, and the intentional application of specific

¹⁶Edgar H. Schein, "The Mechanisms of Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 98-99.

values to the problem of planned change. Before examining the task of changing interpersonal climate, it is helpful (1) to have a basic conceptual schema for thinking about change, (2) to take a look at the current scope of strategies for organizational change, (3) to make some judgment regarding which type of strategy is most applicable to the presenting problems, and (4) to examine in more detail that particular type of strategy by looking at effective change programs that fit its category.

A Basic Schema

The profusion and variety of behaviors that accompany any process of change create a need for a schema through which they may be viewed with some semblance of order and meaning. One such schema for thinking about change has been proposed by Kurt Lewin. Kenneth D. Benne and Max Birnbaum have presented a brief of Lewin's model along with several principles of strategy for effecting institutional change that have been formulated on the basis of this model.¹⁷

According to Benne and Birnbaum, Lewin saw behavior in an institutional setting, not as a static habit or pattern, but as a dynamic balance of forces working in opposite directions within the social-psychological space of the institution. The production level of a work team in

¹⁷Kenneth D. Benne and Max Birnbaum, "Principle of Changing," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 328-35.

a factor fluctuates with narrow limits above and below a certain number of units of production per day. Lewin says that this pattern persists because the forces that tend to raise the level of production are equal to the forces that tend to depress it. Among the forces tending to raise the level of production might be: (a) the pressures of supervisors on the work team to produce more; (b) the desire of at least some team members to attract favorable attention from supervisors in order to get ahead individually; (c) the desire of team members to earn more under the incentive plan of the plant. Lewin would call these "driving forces." Among the forces tending to lower the level of production might be: (a) a group standard in the production team against "rate busting" or "eager beaver" by individual workers; (b) resistance of team members to accepting training and supervision from management; (c) feelings by workers that the product they are producing is not important. These forces Lewin would call "restraining forces." The balance between the driving forces and the restraining forces establishes the level of production. This pattern of opposing forces and resultant balance applies not only to levels of production in industry but also to such patterns as levels of discrimination in communities; atmosphere of democracy or autocracy in social agencies; supervisor-teacher-pupil relationships in school systems, and so forth.

Benne and Birnbaum point out that according to this way of looking at patterned behavior, change takes place when an imbalance occurs

between the sum of the restraining forces and the sum of the driving forces. Such imbalance unfreezes the pattern, and change in the level takes place until the opposing forces reach an equilibrium. Such an imbalance may occur through a change in the magnitude of any one force, through a change in the direction of a force, or through the addition of a new force.

In view of this schema Benne and Birnbaum conclude that,

Planned change must use situational forces to accomplish unfreezing, to influence the movement in generally desirable directions, and to rearrange the situation, not only to avoid return to the old level, but to stabilize the change improvement.

This discussion suggests three major strategies for achieving change in any given pattern of behavior; the driving forces may be increased; the restraining forces may be decreased; these two strategies may be combined. In general, if the first strategy only is adopted, the tension in the system is likely to increase. More tension means more instability and more unpredictability and the likelihood of irrational rather than rational responses to attempts to induce change.¹⁸

When discussing the problem of maintaining desirable change, they observe that

Backsliding takes place for various reasons. Those affected by the changes may not have participated in the planning enough to internalize the changes that those in authority are seeking to induce; when the pressure of authority is relaxed, there is no pressure from those affected to maintain the change. Or, a change in one part of the social system may not have been accompanied by enough co-relative changes in overlapping parts and subsystems.¹⁹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 330.

¹⁹Ibid.

Using Lewin's model as a basis Benne and Birnbaum formulate several principles of strategy for effecting organizational change.

1. To change a subsystem or any part of a subsystem, relevant aspects of the environment must also be changed. For example, a manager wishes to increase the efficiency of the secretarial forces by placing private secretaries in a pool. Driving forces: fewer secretaries can serve a large number of subexecutives; a substantial saving can be expected in office space and equipment. Restraining forces: the secretaries' resistance to a surrender of their personal relationship with a status person; the possible loss of the prestige implicit in the one-to-one secretary-boss relationship; the prospective dehumanization, as the secretaries see it, of their task; and a probable increase in work load. Acceptance of this change in role and relationship would require accompanying changes in other parts of the subsystem. Before the private secretaries could wholeheartedly accept the change, their bosses as well as lower-status clerks and typists would have to accept the alteration in the secretarial role as one that did not necessarily imply an undesirable change in status. If these changes are not effected, one can expect lowered morale, requests for transfers, and even resignations. Attempts to change any subsystem in a larger system must be preceded or accompanied by diagnosis of other subsystems that will be affected by the change.

2. To change behavior on any one level of hierarchical organization, it is necessary to achieve complementary and reinforcing

changes in organization levels above and below that level. Shortly after World War II, commanders in the United States Army decided to attempt to change the role of the sergeancy from that of the traditionally tough, driving leader of men to that of a supportive, counseling squad leader. It was soon seen that if the changed role of the sergeant was to be stabilized, the second lieutenant's role would have to be revised. No longer could he use the authority of the chain-of-command system in precisely the same way as before. The role of the enlisted man also had to be altered significantly. He welcomed being treated more like a civilian and less like a soldier, but he also felt a need for an authoritative spokesman who represented the army unequivocally. There was a consequent development of greater authority in the rank of corporal. Change at one level required changes at interface levels.

3. The place to begin change is at those points in the system where some stress and strain exist. Stress may give rise to dissatisfaction with the status quo and thus become a motivating factor for change in the system. One school principal used the dissatisfaction expressed by teachers over noise in the corridors during passing periods to secure agreement to extra assignments to hall duty. The need for teachers to use the passing period as a rest period gave way before dissatisfactions with the status quo. Until that occurred the principal could not secure their wholehearted agreement to the assignments. Of course, the need for the brief rest period is still at work and will need to be handled as the changed arrangements become stabilized.

4. In diagnosing the possibility of change in a given institution, it is always necessary to assess the degree of stress and strain at points where change is sought. One should ordinarily avoid beginning change at the point of greatest stress. Status relationships had become a major concern of staff members in a certain community agency. Morale was low in the professional staff and individual members were seeking for recognition from the lay board. Staff communication with the board had become a touchy prestige symbol. The board revamped the lay-professional relationships by restricting the intergroup communication channel to only the chief executive of the professional staff. The entire staff, exclusive of the chief, viewed this as a lowering of status and morale dropped further. The above principle suggests that the beginning of change should not have been at the focal point of critical stress—communication between the lay board and the professional staff. Perhaps a more oblique effort would have been appropriate such as an intervention that would permit the development of a more common perception of the situation.

5. If thoroughgoing changes in a hierarchical structure are desirable or necessary, change should ordinarily start with the policy-making body. Desegregation has been facilitated in school systems where the school board first agreed to the change. The board's statement of policy supporting desegregation and its refusal to panic at the opposition have been crucial factors in acceptance of the change

throughout the school system and eventually throughout the community. Sanction by the ruling body lends legitimacy to any institutional change.

6. Both the formal and the informal organization of an institution must be considered in planning any process of change. Besides a formal structure, every social system has a network of cliques and informal groupings. These informal groupings often exert such strong restraining influence on institutional changes initiated by formal authority that, unless their power can be harnessed in support of a change, no enduring change is likely to occur. To involve these informal groups in the planning of changes requires ingenuity and sensitivity as well as flexibility on the part of an administrator.

7. The effectiveness of a planned change is often directly related to the degree to which members at all levels of an institutional hierarchy take part in the fact-finding and the diagnosing of needed changes and in the formulating and reality-testing of goals and programs of change. Once the workers in an institution have agreed to share in investigating their work problems, a most significant state in overcoming restraining forces has been reached. Shared fact-finding and interpretation by those to be affected by the change increases the likelihood that new insights will be formed and that goals of change will be accepted. Part of the process of planning the change should include training those involved in the change in fact-finding and fact-interpreting methods.

To summarize, Benne and Birnbaum present Kurt Lewin's schema for viewing change. Lewin proposes that the stability of any particular state is maintained by driving forces and restraining forces that have reached an equilibrium. Change occurs when an imbalance in the forces occurs. Planned change occurs when intentional interventions are made which unfreeze the equilibrium and permit movement in planned directions. The change is sustained by interventions which bring about a refreezing of the equilibrium in the new state. Benne and Birnbaum have formulated seven basic principles for planned change based on Lewin's model.

With this basic pattern for a background, I turn to the consideration of three broad types of strategies for organizational change.

Types of Strategies

Chin and Benne have collaborated in a study that examines general strategies for effecting changes in human systems.²⁰ They limit their discussion ". . .to those changes which are planned changes—in which attempts to bring about change are conscious, deliberate, and intended, at least on the part of one or more agents related to the change attempt."²¹ They state, "We shall also attempt to categorize

²⁰Robert Chin and Kenneth D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Changes in Human Systems," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd. eds.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 32-57.

²¹Ibid., pp. 32-33.

strategies and procedures which have a few important elements in common but which, in fact, differ widely in other respects. And we shall neglect many of these differences."²² They base their analysis on three types or groups of strategies.

Three broad types of strategies. Chin's and Benne's three broad categories of change strategies are the empirical-rational, the normative-re-educative, and the power-coercive. They describe the first category as follows:

The first of these, and probably the most frequently employed by men of knowledge in America and Western Europe, are those we call empirical-rational strategies. One fundamental assumption underlying these strategies is that men are rational. Another assumption is that men will follow their rational self-interest once this is revealed to them. A change is proposed by some person or group which knows of a situation that is desirable, effective, and in line with the self-interest of the person, group, organization, or community which will be affected by the change. Because the person (or group) is assumed to be rational and moved by self-interest, it is assumed that he (or they) will adopt the proposed change if it can be rationally justified and if it can be shown by the proposer(s) that he (or they) will gain by the change.²³

In their detailed development of this type of broad strategy they include the following strategies: (a) basic research and dissemination of knowledge through general education, (b) personnel selection and replacement, (c) systems analysts as staff and consultants, (d) applied research and linkage systems for diffusion of research results, (e) utopian thinking

²²Ibid., p. 33.

²³Ibid., p. 34.

as a strategy of changing, and (f) perceptual and conceptual reorganization through the clarification of language.

Chin and Benne describe the second category as follows:

A second group of strategies we call normative-re-educative. These strategies build upon assumptions about human motivation different from those underlying the first. The rationality and intelligence of men are not denied. Patterns of action and practice are supported by sociocultural norms and by commitments on the part of individuals to these norms. Sociocultural norms are supported by the attitude and value systems of individuals—normative outlooks which undergird their commitments. Change in a pattern of practice or action, according to this view, will occur only as the persons involved are brought to change their normative orientations to old patterns and develop commitments to new ones. And changes in normative orientations involve changes in attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships, not just changes in knowledge, information, or intellectual rationales for action and practice.²⁴

They treat two strategies under this category: (a) improving the problem-solving capabilities of a system, and (b) releasing and fostering growth in the persons who make up the system to be changed.

Their third broad category is described as follows:

The third group of strategies is based on the application of power in some form, political or otherwise. The influence process involved is basically that of compliance of those with less power to the plans, directions, and leadership of those with greater power. Often the power to be applied is legitimate power or authority. Thus the strategy may involve getting the authority of law or administrative policy behind the change to be effected. Some power strategies may appeal less to the use of authoritative power to effect change than to the massing of coercive power, legitimate or not, in support of the change sought.²⁵

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

In this category they include: (a) strategies of nonviolence, (b) use of political institutions to achieve change, and (c) changing through the recomposition and manipulation of power elites.

A selective judgment. The three major categories of strategies for planned change do not all apply equally well to the task of changing interpersonal climate in an organization. I reject the power-coercive strategies as a basic approach because they tend to promote the induction of higher defense levels in the system. Interpersonal climates change but in the direction of defensive rather than supportive climates.

The empirical-rational approaches are better but they do not go far enough since they deal chiefly in knowledge, information, and intellectual rationales for action. A major determinant of interpersonal climate is the set of assumptions and attitudes and resultant behavior of the persons involved. Therefore, the changes sought when attempting to modify interpersonal climate have deeper roots than are normally touched by the empirical-rational group of strategies.

The normative-re-educative approaches aim at a level that is effective when working with interpersonal climates. A basic assumption of these approaches is that behavioral patterns are supported by sociocultural norms which in turn are supported by the attitude and value systems of individuals. Behavioral patterns change when normative orientations change, and changes in normative orientations involve changes in attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships. As

a consequence the interventions arising out of these strategies aim at changing attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships—the stuff out of which interpersonal climates are created.

It is my judgment that, for the most part, the cogent strategies and principles for changing interpersonal climate in an organization will be found chiefly in the normative-re-educative group.

Normative-re-educative strategies. I return now to Chin and Benne's study. They find the roots of the normative-re-educative strategies of changing in John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, and Sigmund Freud. Drawing from Dewey they describe the most basic assumption underlying this group of strategies:

Intelligence is social, rather than narrowly individual. Men are guided in their actions by socially funded and communicated meanings, norms, and institutions, in brief by a normative culture. At the personal level, men are guided by internalized meanings, habits, and values as well and, at the sociocultural level, changes are alterations in normative structures and in institutionalized roles and relationships, as well as in cognitive and perceptual orientations.²⁵

They go on to observe that Lewin's contribution stemmed from

. . .his vision of required interrelations between research, training, and action (and, for him, this meant collaborative relationships, often now lacking, between researchers, educators, and activists) in the solution of human problems, in the identification of needs for change, and in the working out of improved knowledge, technology, and patterns of action in meeting these needs. Man must participate in his own re-education if he is to be re-educated at all. And re-education is a normative change as well as a cognitive and

²⁵Ibid., p. 43.

perceptual change. These convictions led Lewin to emphasize action research as a strategy of changing, and participation in groups as a medium of re-education.²⁶

Freud's main contributions, according to Chin and Benne, are two. One is that he sought to demonstrate the unconscious and preconscious bases of man's actions. Only as a man finds ways of becoming aware of these non-conscious wellsprings of his attitudes and actions will he be able to bring them into conscious self-control. The other is that he discovered and developed ways of utilizing the relationship between change agent (therapist) and client (patient) as a major tool in re-educating the client toward expanded self-awareness, self-understanding, and self-control.

The combination of these fundamental ingredients has produced a distinctive set of approaches to effecting change. These approaches employ

. . . direct interventions by change agents, interventions based on a consciously worked out theory of change and of changing, into the life of a client system, be that system a person, a small group, an organization, or a community. The theory of changing is still crude but it is probably as explicitly stated as possible, granted our present state of knowledge about planned change.²⁷

Chin and Benne list five of the elements common to the variants within this family of change strategies.

First, all emphasize the client system and his (or its) involvement in working out programs of change and improvement for himself

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 44.

(or itself). The way the client sees himself and his problems must be brought into dialogic relationship with the way in which he and his problem are seen by the change agent, whether the latter is functioning as researcher, consultant, trainer, therapist, or friend in relation to the client.

Second, the problem of confronting the client is not assumed a priori to be one which can be met by more adequate technical information, though this possibility is not ruled out. The problem may lie rather in the attitudes, values, norms, and the external and internal relationships of the client system and may require alteration or re-education of these as a condition of its solution.

Third, the change agent must learn to intervene mutually and collaboratively along with the client into efforts to define and solve the client's problem(s). The here and now experience of the two provide an important basis for diagnosing the problem and for locating needs for re-education in the interest of solving it.

Fourth, nonconscious elements which impede problem solution must be brought into consciousness and publicly examined and reconstructed.

Fifth, the methods and concepts of the behavioral sciences are resources which change agent and client learn to use selectively, relevantly, and appropriately in learning to deal with the confronting problem and with problems of a similar kind in the future.

Chin and Benne emphasize that

These approaches center in the notion that people technology is just as necessary as thing technology in working out desirable changes in human affairs. . . .for the normative re-educative change agent, clarification and reconstruction of values is of pivotal importance in changing. By getting the values of various parts of the client system along with his own, openly into the arena of change and by working through value conflicts responsibly, the change agent seeks to avoid manipulation and indoctrination of the client, in the morally reprehensible meanings of these terms.²⁸

Since the establishment of the National Training Laboratories in 1947, various refinements of methodologies within the normative-re-educative framework have been developed and tested both under National Training Laboratory auspices and under other auspices. Over the years two sets of approaches within the general type have become differentiated. Chin and Benne point out that one set of approaches is oriented focally to the improvement of the problem-solving processes utilized by a client system and that the other set focuses on helping members of client systems to become aware of their attitude and value orientations and relationship difficulties through a probing of feelings, manifest and latent, involved in the functioning and operation of the client system.

Chin's and Benne's observations regarding these two families of approaches detail further the normative-re-educative strategies. The family of approaches which they designate as improving the problem-solving capabilities of a system is built on a series of assumptions. They write,

²⁸Ibid., p. 45.

Changes in a system, when they are reality oriented, take the form of problem solving. A system to achieve optimum reality orientation in its adaptations to its changing internal and external environments must develop and institutionalize its own problem-solving structures and processes. These structures and processes must be tuned both to human problems of relationship and morale and to technical problems of meeting the system's task requirements, . . . system problems are typically not social or technical but actually sociotechnical.²⁹

A further assumption is that the problem-solving structures and processes of a human system must be developed to deal with a range of sociotechnical difficulties, converting them into problems and organizing the relevant processes of data collection, planning, invention, and tryout of solutions, evaluation and feedback of results, replanning, and so forth, which are required for the solution of the problems. Chin and Benne emphasize that the human parts of the system must learn to function collaboratively in these processes and the system must develop institutionalized support and mechanisms for maintaining and improving these processes. It is a cooperative, action-research model.

A range of interventions by outside change agents have been comprehensively tested in organizational development programs in industrial settings. Chin and Benne list four of them and observe that a design for planned change would normally use a number of them in succession or in combination.

1. Collection of data about organizational functioning and feedback of data into processes of data interpretation and of

²⁹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

planning ways of correcting revealed dysfunctions by system managers and data collectors in collaboration.

2. Training of managers and working organizational units in methods of problem solving through self-examination of present ways of dealing with difficulties and through development and tryout of better ways with consultation by outside and/or inside change agents. Usually, the working unit leaves its working place for parts of its training. These laboratory sessions are ordinarily interspersed with on-the-job consultations.
3. Developing acceptance of feedback (research and development) roles and functions within the organization, training persons to fill these roles, and relating such roles strategically to the ongoing management of the organization.
4. Training internal change agents to function within the organization in carrying on needed applied research, consultation, and training.³⁰

The other family of approaches, which Chin and Benne designate as releasing and fostering growth in the persons who make up the system to be changed, is based on a different set of assumptions. They point out that those committed to this family of approaches to changing tend to see the person as the basic unit of social organization. Persons, it is believed, are capable of creative, life-affirming, self- and other-regarding and respecting responses, choices, and actions, if conditions which thwart these kinds of responses are removed and other supporting conditions developed. Chin and Benne point to the work of Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, and Douglas McGregor as basic—Rogers' conditions for a therapeutic climate, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and McGregor's concept of an organization designed to release and support the growth

³⁰Ibid., pp. 47-48.

of persons in fulfilling their higher motivations as they function within the organization.

Chin and Benne list four intervention methods for this family:

1. One early effort to install personal counseling widely and strategically in an organization has been reported by Roethlisberger [sic] and Dickson. ^[31]
2. Training groups designed to facilitate personal confrontation and growth of members in an open, trusting, and accepting atmosphere have been conducted for individuals from various back-home situations and for persons from the same back-home setting. The processes of these groups have sometimes been described as "therapy for normals."
3. Groups and laboratories designed to stimulate and support personal growth have been designed to utilize the resources of nonverbal exchange and communication among members along with verbal dialogue in inducing personal confrontation, discovery, and commitment to continuing growth.
4. Many psychotherapists, building on the work of Freud and Adler, have come to use groups, as well as two-person situations, as media of personal re-education and growth. Such efforts are prominent in mental health approaches to changing and have been conducted in educational, religious, community, industrial, and hospital settings. While these efforts focus primarily upon helping individuals to change themselves toward greater self-clarity and fuller self-actualization, they are frequently designed and conducted in the hope that personal changes will lead to changes in organization, institutions, and communities as well. ³²

Though the problem-solving and personal growth variants of the normative-re-educative approaches to changing have significant differences which make them quite distinct, they also enjoy sufficient important similarities which justify keeping them under the same

³¹William J. Dickson and F. J. Roethlisberger, Personal Counseling in an Organization: A Sequel to the Hawthorne Researches (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1966).

³²Chin and Benne, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

heading. Chin and Benne point out several. (1) Both approaches, frequently use temporary systems—a residential laboratory or workshop, a temporary group with special resources built in, an ongoing system which incorporates a change agent (trainer, consultant, counselor, or therapist) temporarily—as an aid to growth in the system and/or in its members. (2) Both approaches emphasize experience-based learning as an ingredient of all enduring changes in human systems. (3) A major objective in both is the learning of how to learn from on-going experience. (4) Both emphasize norms of openness of communication, trust between persons, lowering of status barriers between parts of the system, and mutuality between parts as necessary conditions of the re-educative process.

Summary. Chin and Benne divide the strategies for planned change into three groups: empirical-rational, normative-re-educative, and power-coercive. Of these three groups the normative-re-educative, in my judgment, is the most appropriate for effecting change in interpersonal climates in organizations. It is a set of strategies based on the assumptions that behavior patterns are supported by sociocultural norms which in turn are supported by individual attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships. Effective behavioral change, then, must be based on a change in attitudes, values, skills, and relationships—the major target area of this group of strategies. The basic principles involve (1) client system participation in working out a

program of change, (2) the recognition of the relevance of attitudes, values, norms, and relationships and the bringing of them to awareness, (3) the collaborative intervention by change agent and client to define and solve the client's problems, and (4) learning to use the behavioral sciences as a resource in dealing with the confronting problems and for dealing with future problems. Over the years two distinct variants have appeared in the normative-re-educative groups. One focuses on problem-solving, the other focuses on personal growth. Though their assumptions and interventions are somewhat different, they share a number of common elements such as the use of temporary systems, experience-based learning, and norms such as openness of communication, trust between persons, and lowering of status barriers.

Effective Change Programs

For illustrative purposes I have selected two normative-re-educative change programs that have been successful in industry. One is a very orderly, systematic approach developed by Robert R. Blake and based upon his Managerial Grid, an analytic framework of managerial styles.³³ The other is a much more fluid approach used at TRW Systems and described by Sheldon A. Davis.

Robert R. Blake. Blake's approach is a six-phase program of organizational improvement. According to Bennis it is based on

³³Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid (Houston: Gulf Publishing Co., 1964).

experience with fifteen different factories.³⁴ Some indication of its success is revealed in an evaluation study of the program in a petrochemical plant employing 4,000 people.³⁵ Blake, Mouton, Barnes, and Greiner found both significant changes in the values, morale, and interpersonal behavior of the employees, and significant improvements in productivity, profits, and cost reduction.

Blake states that the primary goal of this approach is to change patterns of relationships between people and groups or between a group and the organization so that more effective problem-solving and greater production effort can occur throughout the entire organization. After this has been achieved, he states that it can be expected that there will be an improvement in the actual operation of the factory—through detecting and correcting technical failures, making better economic or business decisions, doing a better job of conducting union and management affairs, or getting greater production.³⁶

Blake describes the first phase:

³⁴Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," op. cit., p. 351.

³⁵R. R. Blake, Jane S. Mouton, L. B. Barnes, and L. E. Greiner, "Breakthrough in Organizational Development," Harvard Business Review, XLII (1964), 133-155.

³⁶Robert R. Blake and Jane Srygley Mouton, "A 9,9 Approach for Increasing Organizational Productivity," Personal and Organizational Change Through Group Methods: The Laboratory Approach, eds. Edgar H. Schein and Warren G. Bennis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 170.

A learning program based on behavioral science laboratory experiments is the first phase. The program consists of a series of learning sessions in which all managerial members (and operational personnel, where feasible) examine theories of human behavior and participate in controlled experiments to test these theories. There also is face-to-face feedback in which each organization member learns how he and others are reacting to the experiments and to one another. Each participant is provided the opportunity to examine and to study a variety of alternatives for dealing with people in connection with production.³⁷

Bennis indicates that this phase is normally carried out in an off-site laboratory with the personnel divided into small groups on a "diagonal slice" basis, i.e., members of a particular group are persons of different rank but not in the same work group or in direct relationship.³⁸

Blake describes the second phase:

Team training, in the second phase, involves direct interpersonal feedback among actual work group members. These are people who have boss-subordinate relationships and who are on the same level in a work group. The aim is to examine and to resolve problems of communication, control, and decision making among those whose work requires unity of effort and close cooperation.³⁹

Bennis reports that this is also an off-site part of the program.⁴⁰

Blake continues his description with the third phase:

³⁷Ibid., p. 171.

³⁸Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," loc. cit.

³⁹Blake and Mouton, loc. cit.

⁴⁰Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," loc. cit.

A third phase is similar to the second phase. There [in phase three], however, the problems which are faced and resolved are between groups. This horizontal linking includes people from the same organizational level but from different groups who come into contact with each other in day-to-day activities. They are people who can accomplish their own production goals best when those from other units with whom they work are meshing their efforts with them in a coordinated way.⁴¹

This phase is carried out at the plant location.⁴²

Blake states that in the fourth phase the entire managerial force sets broad organizational improvement goals. This is done in diagonal slice groups of about fifteen persons each. Blake feels that this phase is the one that gives meaning to the concept of planned change. It provides a mechanism for insuring that changes sought after not only are planned, but also are carried through. Blake claims that only when all organizational members who share responsibility for bringing change about have the opportunity to contribute their thinking to the definition of realistic and obtainable goals can best results be obtained.⁴³

Depending on the size of the organization and on the amount of effort applied, the accomplishing of the first four phases may take two years or longer.⁴⁴

⁴¹Blake and Mouton, loc. cit.

⁴²Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," loc. cit.

⁴³Blake and Mouton, op. cit., p. 181.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 182.

Blake continues with the fifth phase: "The fifth phase is designed to bring about, in a concrete way, the organizational goals which were set in phase four and to correct the faulty problem-solving actions that were discovered in the earlier phases."⁴⁵

The sixth phase:

Once the strategy of problem solving and production improvement has been learned, the goal is to insure that it will be applied continuously until it becomes a stable way of organization life. Thus, the sixth and final phase is a stabilization period. Its aim is to insure that changes already achieved are maintained and that they have become firmly embedded into organizational operations.⁴⁶

Phases five and six may take as much as two more years to complete.

Blake concludes,

The phases described are pictured as successive steps. In actual practice, various phases may occur simultaneously in different parts of the organization, or, depending on circumstances, a different order than that described may occur. The point to be emphasized is that greater insurance that an organization improvement effort will be successful is possible when all of the phases described are included.⁴⁷

There are several key aspects of Blake's program apart from the phasing which, in my opinion, should be mentioned. One is that the framework for the Behavioral Science Laboratories in phase one is Blake's own Managerial Grid. Its horizontal axis indicates concern for production. Its vertical axis indicates concern for people. The two scales run from 1 to 9. Eleven managerial theories can be shown on the resulting grid, e.g., a 1,9 style consists of

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 171.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

maximum concern for people but minimum concern for production, a 5,5 style is middle of the road for both concerns.

Another is that the laboratory instructors are line personnel, not academic behavioral scientists. This means that line personnel will have increased teaching skills and will feel increased responsibility for seeing that the laboratory learning is used in work.

Another is that in the second phase the top team of the organization is trained first, but it is emphasized that the top-team members rarely are able to discharge their responsibilities effectively unless lower levels have learned to work by the same rules of the game.

Blake's approach is based on four critical assumptions. The first is that concepts which can guide action are needed for individuals to feel confident in efforts to behave in new and more effective ways. The Managerial Grid provides the framework for such concepts.

The second is that facing conflict and working through differences and attaining commitment to action through understanding and agreement is far more effective than coaxing people, as in 1,9, using the stick and carrot approach of 5,5, or the command decision/edict of 9,1.

The third is that engaging in new behavior frequently requires skills of a sort that can be and are practiced in the Behavioral Science Laboratory sessions.

The fourth assumption is that success in achieving improvement objectives is insured by involving all organization members in a committed way.

Sheldon A. Davis. Sheldon A. Davis, Director of Industrial Relations at TRW Systems, has described the organizational change effort of that company.⁴⁸ At the time of writing, 1967, it is a four year program with roots going back two years earlier. It is a program built on McGregor's Theory Y assumptions. Davis calls it a "non-mechanical, organic approach to career development" where the development of the careers of the individuals in the organization and the career of the organization itself are inextricably tied.

Davis describes TRW Systems as follows,

TRW Systems currently has about 12,500 people. About a third are professional engineers, and half of these have advanced degrees. It is an organization with products of tremendous innovation and change. It is an organization that is highly interdependent. We have a matrix organization: there are project offices and functional areas of technical capabilities such as structures, dynamics, guidance and control. A project office, to perform its task, must call upon capabilities and people throughout the organization. This is a very complicated matrix of interdependencies. No one can really get his job done in this kind of a system without working with others. As a result, problems of relationships, of communication, of people being effectively able to problem-solve with each other are extremely critical.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Davis, op. cit., pp. 357-370.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 360-361.

Davis records that in the middle of 1961, TRW Systems began to think about organizational development. That summer and the following summer Herb Shephard of the Case Institute of Technology spent time with the organization, especially with key executives. Davis and an associate attended a laboratory conducted by UCLA. Then several things happened.

Davis wrote a white paper on career development. It discussed ". . . why a program was needed, assumptions to be made about employees (a paraphrase of McGregor's Theory Y), the type of organizational climate and training needed as well as some general indications of how we might proceed."⁵⁰ The white paper was circulated to a number of key people. Follow-up interviews were held to determine possible next steps.

It was at this point that the first of many team development laboratories was held. He explains, "By team development laboratory, I mean an activity which might, for example, be a three-day off-site meeting involving a supervisor and the people who immediately report to him. The agenda for the meeting is: 'How can we improve our own effectiveness?'"⁵¹ The first team meeting involved one of the program offices of the company. It was successful. Employees within the Personnel organization began attending sensitivity training labs such as the Arden House Laboratory conducted by NTL.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 361.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 362.

What Davis calls a "very significant event" in the total development of the change effort occurred in late spring of 1963 when twelve key executives attended a laboratory. The co-trainers were Shephard and Davis. The feedback from the participants was very positive.

Another significant but gradual development was the evolvement of a consulting team. Davis writes,

The consultants were not used in any one-shot way, but were asked to make a significant commitment of time over a long-term period. They have become involved with us. They have learned our culture and our problems. While our consultants are all qualified T-group trainers, most of their time is spent in on-the-job situations. There is a need to function as a team since we are all dealing with one organization, with one culture, one social system. The kind of cohesiveness that takes place during consulting team meetings has been a very critical part of the program here at TRW Systems.⁵²

The program did and did not start at the top. Davis records, "In the beginning, there was a shared general understanding between the president and the key people in Industrial Relations about the type of program we wanted."⁵³ The president had given specific support for them to be experimental. The program did not start at the top in the sense that the president and a number of the top management team were relatively late in getting involved in laboratory training and applying this training to their own job families—this did not occur till 1965.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

Since the beginning of the program, more than 500 key people in the organization have attended sensitivity training laboratories, primarily laboratories conducted by the company. The company has also conducted more than 85 team development efforts. In addition, much effort has been devoted to intergroup problems:

. . .relationships between manufacturing and engineering, between Product Assurance and other parts of the organization, between various interfacing elements in the engineering organizations. We have found that these efforts have a great deal of leverage. We have done some work on facilitating mergers, and with key people on approaching satellite launches—the latter become very tense, tight operations where people can become very competitive and behave in ways which clearly get in the way of having an effective launch.⁵⁴

Davis came up with a number of desired characteristics for the company program which he called "notions". I quote them here in a slightly modified format:

We did not want to have a program that was canned, but one that was experimental.

We wanted it to have a voluntary characteristic on the part of the participants, rather than something that the company forced upon them.

We did not want it to be a crash program (in our industry, there are many crash programs).

We wanted the training to be very task oriented. If it was not relevant to making a difference on today's problems, it was not a successful program.

We wanted to have the emphasis on experience-based learning, which implies, in a very general sense, the use of laboratory

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 363.

methods, of people really looking at how they were doing, examining the assumptions behind their management style, identifying alternate ways of problem solving, and making choices based on a wider range of possibilities.

We wanted to be concerned with everyone's career, not just key people.

We wanted to be concerned about company goals and the actual on-the-job work environment, since this has a profound effect on the careers of people.

We wanted to place the emphasis on measuring ourselves against our potential, on being quite introspective on how we were doing. . . we would rather not have someone come in and lecture on how to conduct staff meetings, but have ourselves look introspectively at our own staff meetings as they are conducted.

We wanted to continuously do research on how we were doing so that it could be fed back into the program for further development.⁵⁵

Davis describes what he means by organic methods in the following points:

1. There is the notion that if you are interested in improving a particular culture, a particular social system, you must be able to step out of it in the sense of being very analytical about it, of understanding what is going on, by not being trapped within the culture and its own values, you are not going to come up with anything very startling and different for it to do. . . .
2. A bias toward optimism regarding the chances of meaningful organizational development to take place increases the psychological freedom for those trying to introduce the change. There is certainly a tremendous amount of evidence at this point that significant, even profound changes can occur in the behavior of individuals and organizations.
3. Taking a system engineering approach to the effort (i.e., looking at the totality of the system, dealing with fundamentals within it, considering how a change in one part

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 363-364.

affects parts elsewhere) provides an analytical approach which increases the conceptual freedom.

4. The extensive use of third party facilitation is made with respect to interpersonal and organizational problems. A consultant who is not directly involved in an emotional sense in a situation can be useful just by that fact.
5. Direct confrontation of relevant situations in an organization is essential. If we do not confront each other, we keep the trouble within ourselves and we stay in trouble. With respect to confrontation, the whole notion of feedback is crucial. Giving persons feedback on how they are doing gives them a choice to do better. Caring is an important part. Confronting without caring can be a rather destructive process. . . .
6. Becoming the other is an important part of the organic method. This is the empathic notion that Carl Rogers and others have developed. To really have a meaningful exchange, one somehow has to look at the situation as the other sees it. For a consultant to work effectively with an organization, he has to be perceptive and understanding about the organization and its people from their point of view.
7. Dealing with the here and now and increasing the ability of people within the organization to do the same has a great deal of leverage. It is important in an organizational development effort to start with what is going on now within the organization, and deal with those things effectively. One of our objectives is to help the organization build its own capability, to deal with its problems as they emerge. . . .
8. Multiplier planning is rather crucial in the early stages of introducing organizational change. What can we next do that will have the largest effect? There is always a wide range of alternatives and possibilities, there is never enough time, money and energy to do all the things you might do, so you are constantly picking and choosing.
9. Fanning out is coupled with the multiplier planning aspect . . . someone does something that leads to others doing something that leads to still others.
10. A person can act and then act again and then act again, or he can act, critique what he just did, then act, then critique, then act. And, that is the whole notion of going back and forth between content and process, between doing the job and then looking at how we are doing it. Building that into the day-to-day culture is a major objective.

11. Finally, there is the notion of testing of choices. One always has choices, within any particular situation. However, it is typically true that we don't test the choices we have. So someone might say, "Well, I really can't do that because these fellows won't let me," or "Yes, I would very much like to do the following but I can't because of so and so." These limits, these choices, do not get tested. One of the efforts is to get people to be aware of the various possibilities they have and to test them, not to accept the stereotypes in the situation, the sacred cows, that exist in any kind of organization, but to really say, "Okay, this is what makes sense to me in working that problem, this is what I want to try to do."⁵⁶

The central thrust underlying this organic methodology is expressed in this proposition, "There is no real growth, there is no real development in the organization or in the individuals within it, if they do not confront and deal directly with their problems."⁵⁷ Consequently, a major theme in the organizational change effort has been that laboratory training (sensitivity training, T-grouping) is clearly a means to an end. Laboratory training ". . . in and of itself is not enough to really make the kind of difference that might be made in an organization forcefully trying to become more rational in its processes of freeing up the untapped potential of its people and of dealing more sensibly with its own realities."⁵⁸ The ultimate goal is to establish in on-site living work teams the same attitudes, values, norms, and confronting-caring relationships that are developed in off-site laboratory settings and that make effective problem solving possible. As a result

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 364-365.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 358.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 359.

of this basic goal (1) only 10 to 15 percent of the training program energy is expended in laboratory training while 85 to 90 percent is expended in on-the-job situations, and (2) important pre-and post-laboratory efforts have been designed and implemented to focus the laboratory learnings on the day-to-day on-site operations.

TRW System's program has successfully attempted to build up its own internal resources for carrying out the program so that its efforts now are conducted chiefly by the company's own people.

Davis sees the overall planned change strategy in four phases. The first is characterized by problem awareness—"...that point in time during which there is general recognition and awareness on the part of some people within the organization that there are crucial interdependencies which exist in order for us to function, and there are problems due to inappropriate means of dealing with these interdependencies."⁵⁹

The second phase is in two parts. The first has to do with the identification of key people in the organization who seem to be perceptive about the problems the company is experiencing, and who have a desire to work at them. They are key people in that their actions would have a multiplier effect. The second part is the effort to provide situations that will free these key people from organizational and personal restraints that have kept them from responding to the problems

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 366-367.

effectively. The various forms of laboratory training are relevant here.

The third phase involves the on-the-job experimental actions stimulated by the laboratory experiences.

The fourth phase occurs when the change effort

. . . gains an independent status and becomes a self-supporting system. At this plateau, there are norms within the organization that support open, direct confrontation of conflict, resolution of conflict without resorting to the power structure unless there was somehow a failure in the process, and a shared commitment to objectives as a consequence of being interdependent. These organizational norms would support the giving and receiving of feed-back, openness, experimentation and day-to-day problem-solving.⁶⁰

Summary

Though there are many problems associated with planned organizational change, it is still being attempted, but with varying degrees of success. Kurt Lewin has suggested a basic schema for perceiving the dynamics of social change. Any stable state is a product of impinging forces—driving and restraining. Change takes place when any of the forces is modified in such a manner and to a degree sufficient to bring about an unfreezing of the stable state. Planned change is the intentional modification of forces in a manner to change the state in a designed direction with subsequent interventions for the purpose of stabilizing

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 367.

the newly attained state. Some basic principles for planned change have been based on this schema.

Chin and Benne have categorized strategies of planned change into three broad groups: the empirical-rational, the normative-re-educative, and the power-coercive. Of the three groups only the normative-re-educative operates at the level of experience-based learning, the most effective means of changing attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships. This means to me that it is the group of strategies most likely to provide data for building an effective strategy for changing interpersonal climates.

The normative-re-educative strategies emphasize (1) involvement of the client system in the process of developing and implementing the change program, (2) the changing of attitudes, values, norms, and internal relationships by experience-based learning, (3) the collaborative relationship between the change agent and the client system, (4) the bringing to awareness of unconscious elements that impede problem-solving, and (5) the use of the methods and concepts of the behavioral sciences as resources.

Two families of strategies have grown up within this broad grouping. The one approaches planned organizational change by focusing on problem-solving, the other by focusing on personal growth. Their assumptions and interventions differ, but they share sufficient similarities to be classed in the same broad category.

The Planned change process was illustrated by two contrasting but successful contemporary change programs, one developed by Robert Blake and the other by Sheldon Davis.

Having examined the problems and the current state of development of the theory and practice of planned organizational change, I turn now to the specific question raised at the beginning of this chapter: how does one change interpersonal climate in an organization in the direction of a supportive climate?

IV. CHANGING INTERPERSONAL CLIMATE

The purpose of this section is to examine the critical issues involved in changing the interpersonal climates of an organization in the direction of a supportive climate. Put in question form, the critical areas are, in my opinion, the following: (1) what is a supportive climate? (2) what are the determinants of a supportive climate? (3) what change principles apply to these determinants? (4) what interventions are appropriate? (5) what about resistance to this kind of change?

Direction: the Supportive Climate

Drawing on data included in Chapter II, the supportive climate may be defined as one which reduces fear and develops trust. Empirically, a supportive climate lowers the defense level. In terms of Gibb's four-part structure, it may be described as a climate in which one feels accepted, in which one can safely be open and spontaneous, in which one

senses that personal goals as well as organizational goals are important, and in which one knows he has some part in the setting up of controls that affect him.

The goal of the change effort is to bring about such changes as are necessary to provide a sound base in reality for trust to grow and fear to be reduced in persons in the organization.

Determinants of the Supportive Climate

If one is to make effective interventions in terms of producing a supportive climate, they must be of such a nature as to affect the major determinants. Some of the major determinants are the assumptions, values, norms, behaviors, skills, and conceptual structures which are operative in the persons that make up the organization. The organizational structure itself is another. These factors are interrelated so that changes in one affect the others, and limitations in one affect the functioning of others.

Assumptions. Assumptions are deep level personal conclusions that have developed out of life experiences and which form part of the basic structure on which a person's behavior now turns. Assumptions are not necessarily conscious. The assumptions that are of major significance regarding interpersonal climate are those which have to do with the nature of human beings. Examples of the kind of assumptions that produce a supportive climate are those expressed in connection with McGregor's Theory Y, e.g., man expends physical

and mental effort in work as naturally as in play or rest, man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed, and so forth. The kind of assumptions that underlie his theory X are defense-inductive, e.g., man has an inherent dislike for work and avoids it if he can, man must be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with punishment to get him to put forth adequate effort toward the achievement of organizational objectives, and so forth.

Assumptions can and do change. Any effective approach to changing interpersonal climate needs to be of such a nature that it will affect assumptions. Since assumptions grow largely out of personal experience, I think that they also change through personal experience.

Values. Values are focal points of personal commitment and are developed and changed on the basis of one's needs and their satisfaction. They may not be conscious. They are interwoven with one's assumptions and when they are operative (as opposed to professed), they are strong determiners of behavior. The sort of values that tend to produce a supportive interpersonal climate have been suggested by Gibb (cf. Chapter II). He has said that the basic values involved are trust and its correlative values: openness, integrity, and freedom. An effective change program needs to have a means for facilitating the change of values.

Norms. Group norms arise out of the prepotent assumptions and values of the members. The normative structure of a group is ". . .the system of 'oughts,' and 'don'ts,' and 'ideals' which guide action and toward which commitment of its followers is imperative."⁶¹ Some idea of the detailed complexity of an established group's normative structure is indicated in Gibb's listing of some of the key areas where norms are operative. He labels this ". . .a selected list of central norm areas that concern groups as they consciously attend to their own processes."⁶² Risk, trust, nonconformity, membership, rejection, feedback, consensus, process, diagnosis, feeling-perception, goal determination, reward-punishment, learning-growth, provisional try, work, conflict, permissiveness, boundaries, resources, and organization. Each area is really a focal point for a cluster of norms. For example, Gibb writes about the norm development concerning risk, "The group develops more or less consistent ways of limiting risk, handling fears, testing level of risk, punishing or rewarding risk takers, or handling those who either expose too much or fail to share in what are seen as the common dangers."⁶³ In another

⁶¹Edgar H. Schein and Warren G. Bennis, Personal and Organizational Change Through Group Methods: The Laboratory Approach (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 7.

⁶²Jack R. Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method, eds. Leland P. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 306.

⁶³Ibid.

example, he writes about norm development concerning feedback, "In working through the data-processing concerns, groups learn ways of giving feedback, determining who can give such data to whom, ignoring demands for feedback, and acceptable ways of reacting to such data."⁶⁴

It is easy to see that changing a normative structure in a prescribed direction is a formidable task. Any effective change program must include interventions that are effective at this level.

Behaviors. Behaviors are, in part, a product of assumptions, values, and normative structures. They are also a major determinant of interpersonal climate. Tables II and III on pages 93 and 94 of this study list, respectively, representative clusters of defense-reductive behaviors and of defense-inductive behaviors. A planned change program aimed at producing a supportive climate needs to include interventions that would tend to change behavior in the organization away from that which induces defensiveness and toward that which reduces defensiveness.

Skills. New behaviors demand matching skills to support those behaviors. Behaviors that produce supportive interpersonal climates require skills in participation, process awareness, group problem solving, data gathering and processing, role flexibility, learning from experience, and a cluster labeled interpersonal skills. The planned

⁶⁴Ibid.

change program needs to provide a means for persons to learn the skills necessary to support the new behaviors.

Conceptual structures. Conceptual structures are cognitive models which help a person to see some order in and to facilitate the integration of masses of new data. They are useful in expediting change and in stabilizing new states. The Gibbs write,

A number of studies have indicated that cognitive presentations of behavioral science findings were highly ineffective. Since that time several exploratory studies have indicated rather clearly that a cognitive model can be internalized if (a) it is presented in a situation where the model is consistent with the role practice that occurs in the training program itself, and (b) the model is consistent with the models in use in the immediate managerial work environment of the person. Consistency between the internalized cognitive models used by the manager and his immediate opportunity to practice roles reasonably consistent with the cognitive model is apparently a critical condition leading to prolonged behavioral change.⁶⁵

An effective change program needs to have relevant schemas for seeing the pattern toward which an organization is moving and for seeing the changes involved in getting there. Blake's Managerial Grid and Gibb's four-fold modal concerns are illustrative.

Organizational structure. As was noted in Chapter II, Argyris has made two pointed observations. One is that formal organization is defense-inductive, the other is that formal organization, directive leadership, and managerial control is a trio of elements that are not

⁶⁵Gibb and Gibb, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

isolable in practice. The implications are that any effective change program involving the production of a supportive interpersonal climate must find a means, consistent with the values of the change program, of gradually changing the organizational structure to match the changes toward participative management and emergent controls that take place as assumptions, values, norms, and behaviors change.

Change Principles

In view of the specific determinants of interpersonal climate, some change principles are more appropriate than others. I consider the following list suggestive, basic, general, and not exhaustive.

Emergence. The idiosyncratic nature of any client system and of any change agent means that the specific form of the change program for that system should be emergent, i.e., the most effective change program can only emerge out of the system itself in transaction with its change agent. The change program cannot be specified in advance. This leading principle necessitates that the following principles be general in nature.

Change agent. Since an important part of the change process is the facilitation of the client system's member's ability to look at the system from outside its own inbred value structure, it is important to select an outside change agent. He needs to be carefully selected in terms of his value system (it should approach the value system

toward which the client system is to move) and his professional capabilities.

Values. Values are key determinants in a change program involving interpersonal climates, consequently the change process itself needs to be built on the same values that underlie a supportive interpersonal climate. An incongruency at this level can be devastating. The change process needs to be as defense-reductive as a change process can be.

Collaboration. Bennis, Benne, and Chin have concluded, ". . . the more transactional the influence, the more durable and genuine the change."⁶⁶ It follows that there should be a fully involved collaboration between change agent and client system in data gathering and processing, diagnosis, formulation of change plans, and the making of interventions.

Legitimization and participation. The process and direction of change is legitimized when it begins at the top level of the client system. Since the functioning of top management is limited if the rest of the system hasn't integrated the new rules of the game, it is important to go as deep as possible in the system as soon as possible.

⁶⁶Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, "Collaboration and Conflict," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 148.

Strategy. In my judgment the general strategy needs to incorporate the principles of volunteerism, multiplier planning (what can we do next that will have the greatest effect), fanning out (doing something that leads to others doing something), and ultimate in-system staffing of the change process. Borrowing from Davis, I see five major stages in the change process. The stages are not clearly experienced by the client system as a whole; they overlap and may be proceeding at a different pace in different subsystems. They provide a general pattern for seeing the process.

The first stage is problem awareness. This is a period during which there develops on the part of some people an awareness that a problem exists. Such procedures as informal presentations, interviews, and group discussions may be the means. The second stage is the selection of key people. Selection would be based on several criteria: (1) awareness of problem and eagerness to do something about it, (2) multiplier capacity, (3) fanning out capacity, and (4) effect in terms of systems engineering. The third stage is experience-based unfreezing and skill learning. During this stage, the key people who have been selected and who so desire are exposed to a process designed to free them from the organizational and personal restraints that have kept them from responding to the problem in an effective manner. Various forms of laboratory training are appropriate at this point. The fourth stage is action steps. During this stage change ideas that have emerged from the collaboration and stimulation of the laboratory

training are implemented for testing, feedback, modification, and integration or rejection. The fifth stage has arrived when the change mechanisms become a self-support-system.

Cognitive model. Because of the human need to see and understand, the change process is enhanced when a relevant cognitive model is employed. The change agent would use whatever models are most meaningful to him.

Therapy for normals. It is not uncommon for graduates of laboratory training to seek psychotherapy. One reason for this is that for some the insights gained in the laboratory program produce a desire to grow beyond some of the personal constraints they have discovered. And since some of the personal constraints may continue to produce behaviors inimical to a supportive interpersonal climate, I think it wise to legitimize therapy for normals and to provide it in-system if the problems associated with in-system therapy can be resolved, or to subsidize it in an out-system form.

Interventions

I think that the most effective interventions are those which emerge out of the collaborative process involving the change agent and the client system. There are, however, three major interventions which appear to have major potential as effective change facilitators for the kind of change under discussion. They are laboratory training,

survey feedback, and the confrontation meeting. It is not the purpose of this section to present them in any detail. The purpose is to bring them forward as particularly appropriate to changing interpersonal climate in the desired direction.

Laboratory training. Laboratory training is a special method of re-educating human behavior and social relationships. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne describe its major method of learning as

. . .one in which participants are helped to diagnose and experiment with their own behavior and relationships in a specially designed environment. Participants are both experimenters and subjects in joint learning activities. Staff members or trainers serve as guides in the institutionalization of experimental and collaborative approaches to learning in the laboratory community. They also guide participants in the transfer of these approaches outside the laboratory.⁶⁷

The core of the laboratory training is the T (Training) Group. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne describe its functions as follows:

In a T Group, participants have the task of constructing a group which will meet the requirements of all of its members for growth. Members have the opportunity to learn about themselves, about interpersonal relations, about groups, and about larger social systems. Trainers help to establish processes of data collection, data analysis, and diagnosis of the changing here-and-now experiences of the groups and its members.⁶⁸

⁶⁷Leland P. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne, "Preface," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-education, eds. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. vii.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. viii.

Laboratory training is particularly appropriate as an intervention toward producing a supportive interpersonal climate because of the following reasons.

(1) It is the major tool available for unfreezing. It provides a cluster of conditions which support the unfreezing process: here-and-now, feedback, psychological safety, observant participation, cognitive maps.⁶⁹

(2) It has an appropriate underlying value structure consisting of the following values:⁷⁰ (a) the spirit of inquiry—the seeking out of facts with a respect for probable error and a willingness to expose ideas to test, (b) expanded consciousness and choice—a deliberate practice of becoming more aware of human phenomena and how one chooses to behave, (c) authenticity in interpersonal relations, (d) collaboration—the spirit of interdependence rather than dependence or counterdependence, and (e) conflict resolution based on a problem-solving orientation rather than approaches based on bargains, power plays, suppression, or compromise.

(3) It provides experience-based learning. The most effective type of learning-for changing our target determinants.

(4) It provides learning in key skills. Bradford points out that "The T Group approaches and reapproaches the same basic problems

⁶⁹Schein and Bennis, op. cit., pp. 38-47.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 30-35.

of relationships to authority, of interpersonal distance and relationships, of goal formation, of decision making, of norm setting, of communication."⁷¹

It is important to keep in mind that the laboratory method is only a means to an end, the end being change within the client system. To insure such change the laboratory training must be sandwiched between carefully prepared pre-lab and post-lab work.

Survey feedback. Survey feedback is described by Matthew B. Miles, et al., as a process

. . . in which outside staff and members of the organization collaboratively gather, analyze and interpret data that deal with various aspects of the organization's functioning and its members' work lives, and using the data as a base, begin to correctively alter the organizational structure and the members' work relationships.⁷²

Survey feedback is a particularly valuable intervention for the following reasons:

(1) It provides relevant here-and-now data about the system as a realistic basis for action planning. There is support for the idea that, "Change processes organized around objective new social facts about

⁷¹Leland P. Bradford, "Membership and the Learning Process," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-education, eds. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 205.

⁷²Matthew B. Miles et al., "The Consequences of Survey Feedback: Theory and Evaluation," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 458.

one's own organizational situation have more force for change than those organized around general principles about human behavior."⁷³

(2) It involves both the change agent and the system members in a collaborative effort.

(3) It provides a series of interaction situations for process analysis in a reality-oriented, problem-solving setting.

(4) Increased data-flow tends to decrease the defense levels.

Confrontation meeting. Richard Beckhard reports the discovery of what appears to be a significant intervention. He writes,

Recently I have experimented with an activity that allows a total management group, drawn from all levels of the organization, to take a quick reading on its own health, and—within a matter of hours—to set action plans for improving it. I call this a "confrontation meeting."⁷⁴

Beckhard describes the conditions under which it is appropriate:

There is a need for the total management group to examine its own workings.

Very limited time is available for the activity.

Top management wishes to improve the conditions quickly.

There is enough cohesion in the top team to ensure follow-up.

There is real commitment to resolving the issues on the part of top management.

⁷³Floyd Mann, "Studying and Creating Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962).

⁷⁴Richard Beckhard, "The Confrontation Meeting," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 479.

The organization is experiencing, or has recently experienced, some major change.⁷⁵

The process takes about 4-1/2 to 5 hours and involves the following components:

1. Climate setting—establishing willingness to participate.
2. Information collecting—getting the attitudes and feelings out in the open.
3. Information sharing—making total information available to all.
4. Priority setting and group action planning—holding work-unit sessions to set priority actions and to make timetable commitments.
5. Organization action planning—getting commitment by top management to the working of these priorities.
6. Immediate follow-up by the top management committee—planning first actions and commitments.⁷⁶

The confrontation meeting is a particularly valuable intervention because (1) there are times in the change process when a quick reading of the system's condition is needed along with rapid action plans for change, (2) it involves here-and-now data, (3) it is collaborative in nature, and (4) Beckhard reports that one of its products is an increase in trust and confidence both toward the top management team and toward colleagues.

Resistance

All of the forces that bring stability to the individual personality and to any particular social system become forces of resistance in the face of change. Since the change process envisioned in this study

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 480-481.

proposes changes within individuals and within a social system, it faces the gamut of the resistance systems involved. Goodwin Watson, after analyzing the sources of resistance in both persons and institutions, summarizes his recommendations for lessening resistance in terms of three headings: (1) who brings the change? (2) what kind of change? and (3) procedures in instituting change.

A. Who brings the change?

1. Resistance will be less if administrators, teachers, Board members and community leaders feel that the project is their own—not one devised and operated by outsiders.
2. Resistance will be less if the project clearly has whole-hearted support from top officials of the system.

B. What kind of change?

3. Resistance will be less if participants see the change as reducing rather than increasing their present burdens.
4. Resistance will be less if the project accords with values and ideals which have long been acknowledged by participants.
5. Resistance will be less if the program offers the kind of new experience which interests participants.
6. Resistance will be less if participants feel that their autonomy and their security is not threatened.

C. Procedures in instituting change.

7. Resistance will be less if participants have joined in diagnostic efforts leading them to agree on what the basic problem is and to feel its importance.
8. Resistance will be less if the project is adopted by consensual group decision.
9. Resistance will be reduced if proponents are able to empathize with opponents; to recognize valid objections; and to take steps to relieve unnecessary fears.
10. Resistance will be reduced if it is recognized that innovations are likely to be misunderstood and misinterpreted, and if provision is made for feedback of perceptions of the project and for further clarification as needed.

11. Resistance will be reduced if participants experience acceptance, support, trust, and confidence in their relations with one another.
12. Resistance will be reduced if the project is kept open to revision and reconsideration if experience indicates that changes would be desirable.⁷⁷

The nature of the principles and interventions suggested in the two previous sections is congruent with all of Watson's principles except number four where, it seems to me, some incongruence is necessary.

Summary

The critical issues in changing the interpersonal climates of an organization toward one that is supportive are: (1) the determinants of such a climate—assumptions, values, norms, behaviors, skills, conceptual structures, and the organizational structure, (2) the appropriate change principles, (3) the appropriate interventions, and (4) the appropriate measures for reducing resistance. The change principles emphasize the emergence of an idiosyncratic change program out of a process of collaboration between a change agent representing the basic values of the goal climate and the client system. The basic strategy suggested is based on the principles of volunteerism, multiplier planning, fanning out, and ultimate in-system staffing. The suggested interventions of laboratory training, survey feedback, and confrontation

⁷⁷Goodwin Watson, "Resistance to Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 496-497.

meetings provide settings in which the members of the system and the system itself may make headway toward the development of a supportive interpersonal climate. Watson's principles for the reduction of resistance to change were found to be compatible with the suggested principles of change and interventions with the exception of the one regarding values where some discrepancy could be expected.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the task of changing the interpersonal climates in an organization in the direction of a supportive climate. It was observed that the process of planned organizational change at its present state of development has a cluster of associated problems—a genuine theory of changing has not been developed, an adequate research base has yet to be established, the variables in organizational change are complex in themselves and in their interrelationships, there is always some degree of unpredictability and lack of control, and pockets of resistance accompany change efforts. And yet it was observed that planned change efforts are being made with varying degrees of success.

Three general groupings of change strategies were then considered: empirical-rational, normative-re-educative, and power-coercive. Of the three groups the normative-re-educative was selected for further examination because its strategies focused on those human and social factors that determine interpersonal climates. Basic

normative-re-educative principles are: (1) client system participation in working out a program of change, (2) recognition of the relevance of attitudes, values, skills, and relationships and the bringing of them to awareness, (3) the collaborative intervention by change agent and client to define and solve the client's problems, and (4) learning to use the behavioral sciences as a resource.

Two major variants of this group of change strategies center around different focal points: problem solving and personal growth. However, they share common elements such as the use of temporary systems, experience-based learning, and norms such as openness of communication, trust between persons, and lowering of status barriers.

Two successful but contrasting change programs were outlined: Robert Blake's and Sheldon Davis'.

A general model for changing interpersonal climate in a supportive direction was developed in terms of change principles and interventions effective at the level of the determinants of interpersonal climate and consistent with Watson's principles for reducing resistance.

This general model for changing interpersonal climate forms a base for approaching the specific problem of changing the interpersonal climates in the U.S. Navy in the direction of a supportive climate—the problem to be examined in the next and final chapter.

CHAPTER IV

CHANGING INTERPERSONAL CLIMATE IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY

I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to set up a tentative and partial approach for changing the interpersonal climates in the United States Navy in the direction of what has been defined as supportive or defense-reductive.

Method

The method will consist of examining four critical areas of the problem: (1) the direction of change, (2) special change problems, (3) basic change principles, and (4) suggested interventions.

Review

In Chapter I, I listed and described the growing pressures that confront the Navy. Leaders within the Navy have been unable to create the climate of trust, respect, commitment, and comradeship that they desire throughout the organization. Retention has reached a critical point. The young men coming into the Navy today have different attitudes

toward authority, they come with a different set of values, and they are more outspoken. The society which has produced them and which supports the military system is in process of deep shifts in its value structure. There is an increasing awareness of the philosophical discrepancy between the arbitrary use of military authority and basic democratic values. The increase in technological sophistication and consequent specialization makes teamwork more difficult even though it is more essential than ever. The very acceleration of change is now producing its own unique tensions. Concurrently, the behavioral sciences have been producing findings relevant to these rising threats to the efficient functioning of the system and there is an additional wealth of resources in the contemporary changes in organizational theory and practice.

Something very basic needs to be done. My thesis is that for the personnel of the Navy to function more efficiently, their interpersonal climates need to change in the direction that will promote the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

As delineated in Chapter II, the evidence indicates that a perceived supportive interpersonal climate facilitates growth in individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons, and that it also tends to increase efficiency in an organizational setting.

In Chapter III, I examined the problem of attempting to change the interpersonal climate in an organization. Though significant problems are still associated with planned organizational change, it is being

practiced. There are change strategies which work at the level of the determinants of interpersonal climate—assumptions, values, norms, behaviors, skills, conceptual structures, and the organizational structure itself. I presented a tentative approach to changing the interpersonal climate in an organization listing relevant principles and interventions.

The focus in this chapter is to make a more specific application to the United States Navy.

II. DIRECTION OF CHANGE

Introduction

The meaning of the Navy must somehow become intertwined with my own personal meaning or I won't commit myself to it. That is stated in the first person, but I believe that it is also true in a general sense. A man will not commit himself to an organization where he feels that he is doing things that do not matter and where he feels that he himself does not matter as a person. He is especially non-inclined to commit himself to the organization when he must continue this "life of insignificance" under stress conditions.

The Navy is a sub-bureaucracy in a massive governmental bureaucracy. It cannot avoid having the above impact on many of its personnel. Warren G. Bennis described bureaucracy's origin and nature and makes a prediction regarding its future:

Let me begin by describing the dominant form of human organization employed throughout the industrial world. It is a unique and extremely durable social arrangement called "bureaucracy," a social invention, perfected during the industrial revolution to organize and direct the activities of the business firm. It is today the prevailing and supreme type of organization wherever people direct concerted effort toward the achievement of some goal. This holds for university systems, for hospitals, for large voluntary organizations, for governmental organizations.

Corsica, according to Gibbon, is much easier to deplore than to describe. The same holds true for bureaucracy. Basically, bureaucracy is a social invention which relies exclusively on the power to influence through rules, reason, and the law. Max Weber, the German sociologist who developed the theory of bureaucracy around the turn of the century, once described bureaucracy, as a social machine: "Bureaucracy," he wrote, "is like a modern judge who is a vending machine into which the pleadings are inserted together with the fee and which then disgorges the judgement together with its reasons mechanically derived from the code."

The bureaucratic "machine model" Weber outlined was developed as a reaction against the personal subjugation, nepotism, cruelty, and capricious and subjective judgments which passed for managerial practices in the early days of the industrial revolution. The true hope for man, it was thought, lay in his ability to rationalize, to calculate, to use his head as well as his hands and heart. Bureaucracy emerged out of the need for more predictability, order, and precision. It was an organization ideally suited to the values of Victorian Empire.

Most students of organizations would say that the anatomy of bureaucracy consists of the following "organs": a division of labor based on functional specialization, a well-defined hierarchy of authority, a system of procedures and rules for dealing with all contingencies relating to work activities, impersonality of interpersonal relations, and promotion and selection based on technical competence. It is the pyramidal arrangement we see on most organizational charts.

Allow me to leap-frog to the conclusion of my paper now. It is my premise that the bureaucratic form of organization is out of joint with contemporary realities; that new shapes, patterns, and models are emerging which promise drastic changes in the conduct of the corporation and of managerial practices in general. In the next 25 to 50 years we should witness, and participate in, the end of bureaucracy as we

know it and the rise of new social systems better suited to twentieth-century demands of industrialization.¹

The bureaucratic system arose and survived because it met a structure of needs that existed. The needs are changing, and there is a danger of clinging to a system that is now inadequate in view of a newly evolving set of needs. Bennis cites Alexis de Tocqueville writing over one hundred years ago:

I am tempted to believe that what we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we have grown accustomed. In matters of social constitution, the field of possibilities is much more extensive than men living in their various societies are ready to imagine.²

Barry Stevens once raised the question, "Why should we arrange a 'civilization' which is a torture to many and not very good for anybody? The world we live in doesn't have to be the way it is."³ It would be too strong a statement if we substituted Navy for civilization even considering our present critical retention rate; but the basic truth is still there—the Navy we have doesn't have to be the way it is. Gardner Murphy has observed that there are various kinds of future societies and various kinds of individual lives which are realistically possible

¹Warren G. Bennis, "Changing Organizations," The Planning of Change, eds. Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 570.

²Ibid., p. 579.

³Carl R. Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human (Lafayette, Calif.: Real People Press, 1967), p. 129.

and regarding which we can make conscious and voluntary choices.⁴

The point is that we can decide.

The critical area of decision has to do with meeting the needs of people involved in the system. F. Kenneth Berrien holds that there are two criteria for group perpetuation: (1) it must discharge the function for which it was organized, and (2) it must meet the needs of group members.⁵ He writes concerning the second,

It is axiomatic that people will not willingly continue to associate with and act in a group unless by so doing they satisfy some need of their own. Compliance with, or participation in, group activities can be coerced, but this is necessary only when group activities by themselves do not satisfy personal needs.⁶

One of the great needs has to do with the interpersonal climate in the work situation. Charles K. Ferguson uncovers a great imbalance when he notes that, "In our society we spend millions of dollars insuring via proper coaching that athletic teams will learn to work together for greater effectiveness. . . . Yet when adults work together in the

⁴Gardner Murphy, Human Potentialities (New York: Basic Books, 1958).

⁵F. Kenneth Berrien, "Homeostatis Theory of Groups—Implications for Leadership," Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, eds. Luigi Petrullo and Bernard M. Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), p. 84.

⁶Ibid.

vocational world we fairly well assume they should know how to work together effectively."⁷

The fact is that a whole new people technology is rising and time and energy need to be expended to integrate it into any critical system that involves people. The development, care, and maintenance of plant and machinery and other equipment has been cranked in; now we are beginning to understand how to develop, care for, and maintain people as integral parts of the overall system. The end result of an effective application of people technology is a defense-reductive climate with its concomitants of personal growth and organizational efficiency.

Tentative Goal

It is impossible to describe a fixed result for the sort of change effort proposed in this study. This is partly because any planned change effort for a social system has a certain degree of unpredictability and lack of control about it. But a more basic reason is that the change effort proposed has an openness about it due to its collaborative and participative nature. In any case, the result anticipated would not be static because it is hoped that it would be what John W. Gardner called ". . . a system that will continuously reform (i.e., renew) itself,

⁷Charles F. Ferguson, "Concerning the Nature of Human Systems and the Consultant's Role," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 416.

beginning with presently specifiable ills and moving on to ills that we cannot now foresee. . . ."⁸

However, something can be said in terms of the qualities that might characterize the Navy organization after the change process has matured. The basic unitary quality sought for is a supportive or defense-reductive interpersonal climate.

A correlative change to be expected would be the move from McGregor's Theory X of management to his Theory Y.

Theory X leads naturally to an emphasis on the tactics of control—to procedures and techniques for telling people what to do, for determining whether they are doing it, and for administering rewards and punishments. Since an underlying assumption is that people must be made to do what is necessary for the success of the enterprise, attention is naturally directed to the techniques of direction and control.

Theory Y, on the other hand, leads to a preoccupation with the nature of relationships, with the creation of an environment which will encourage commitment to organizational objectives and which will provide opportunities for the maximum exercise of initiative, ingenuity, and self-direction in achieving them.⁹

Another correlative change to be expected would be a change from maintaining the organization by fear, strategy, persuasion, and

⁸John W. Gardner, Self-Renewal: The Individual and the Innovative Society (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 5.

⁹Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 132.

power, to maintaining it by trust, reality data, intrinsic motivation, and interdependence of roles.¹⁰

It could be expected that the following three values would be prepotent throughout the organization: (1) the facing of reality—the obligation to be open to all the facts involved in a problem and its solution, (2) an objectivity that extends to one's own assumptions, perspectives, and preferences as factors in problem solving, and (3) commitment to rational collaboration in problem definition and solution.¹¹

Drawing on a list of qualities prepared by Sheldon A. Davis,¹² I suggest that the following characteristics could be expected of the Navy organization as concomitant with the above expected changes.

1. Navy policies, procedures, and practices would be seen as a platform from which the individual operates rather than a set of ground rules within which he must confine himself.

2. Navy management would be experimental rather than traditional.

¹⁰Jack R. Gibb, "Climate for Trust Formation," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-education, eds. Leland P. Bradford, Jack R. Gibb, and Kenneth D. Benne (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 279-309.

¹¹Bradford, Gibb, and Benne, "Two Educational Innovations," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-education, eds. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 8-9.

¹²Sheldon A. Davis, "An Organic Problem-solving Method of Organizational Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 369-370.

3. There would be a great deal of emphasis on quality: attract the best people, give them best working conditions, provide them with challenging assignments, demonstrate that paramount importance is placed on the professional, technical excellence of work assignments.

4. There would be a great deal of delegation downward within the organization, so that a relatively large number of people end up with relatively highly responsible tasks.

5. The individual Navy man would enjoy relative freedom to be personally responsible for himself and his job, and his job would be seen as important, making a significant contribution.

6. A great deal of trust would be displayed in the individual. There would be a minimum of rules, controls, and forces outside the individual telling him what to do and how to do it.

7. The Navy organization would be a society of peers rather than a rigid hierarchy. Rank would still have accouterments, but they would not be used as barriers between individuals and others at lower levels in the organization.

8. Navy personnel importantly affected by decisions would have opportunity to a greater degree than is customary to participate in that decision-making process.

9. On task issues there would be a great deal of direct confrontation rather than passing the buck, maneuvering, and so forth.

10. Relatively speaking, there would be less "politicking" and more focus on task.

11. A basic Navy experience throughout the organization would be that a man's work would be personally rewarding, meaningful, and enjoyable.

12. There would be much more idiosyncratic development in sub-units and less organization-wide conformity.

Some of the above, such as number eleven, are already desired goals at upper levels of the organization, but I am writing of a future Navy where such a goal would, in reality, be actively pursued throughout the organization. Some of the above, such as number seven, seem incompatible with the effective functioning of a military organization, especially when viewed from the standpoint of military tradition. This raises the matter of the feasibility of such change for a military organization. Can the Navy move in this direction and still operate effectively in combat—or even as a peacetime organization?

Military Feasibility

In speaking casually with Navy commanding officers about interventions that might lead in these directions, I have noticed a common rise in their defense levels. The source of their concern was revealed in the recurrence of one word—control. Each was concerned about how such interventions would affect his control over his men and, subsequently, the successful completion of his assigned missions, and I think it would be fair to assess that there was some natural concern regarding the ultimate effect on his own career.

The unfeasibility of the suggested direction of change, then, seems to turn on the issue of control. Where will the necessary controls come from? Underlying that question are the assumptions of Theory X and a theory of leadership that hypothesizes that men must be controlled by external means—the chief of which is command authority, an authority backed by military law and heavy penalties.

Luigi Petrullo, former head of the Office of Naval Research, has made some observations which give some perspective to this problem of military leadership.¹³ He observes that there are two extreme situations in which leadership cannot possibly exist. One is where people are acting in a purely random manner, and where one person's behavior is as completely unpredictable as another's—there is no interpersonal influence and obviously no leadership. The other is where a group is highly organized, with a complete set of rules for every conceivable act and no slightest deviation permitted—no personal leadership is possible. Leadership can only exist somewhere between these theoretical poles. Petrullo writes,

In the continuum stretching from complete individual freedom to completely structured order, all groups of whatsoever kind take their place. Our place is in a purposeful world where leadership must take account of the free choice of those who are led. In a tightly organized society the people who sit at the top may rule, or dominate, or command, but unless those who follow them have some choice to follow or not follow, there is

¹³Luigi Petrullo, "Introduction," Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, eds. Petrullo and Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), pp. xii-xxix.

no personal leadership. . . where there is no choice there is domination, the antithesis of leadership.¹⁴

In actuality, a broad spectrum of leadership styles on this continuum exists in the Navy. It is my own judgment that the modal style, however, tends toward domination. Top level leadership within the Navy organization has made a concerted attempt in the last decade to move away from that pole. In 1958 it published General Order 21. I quote its definition of naval leadership.

By naval leadership is meant the art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people. It is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understanding and of moral character that enable a man to inspire and to manage a group of people successfully. Effective leadership, therefore, is based on personal example, good management practices, and moral responsibility. The term leadership as used in this order shall include all three of these elements.¹⁵

I do not know of any objective attempts to measure the effectiveness of the leadership training program initiated by General Order 21. I have at times been involved with the program and am familiar with its nature. My own judgment is that it has been much less effective in bringing about change than its sponsors had hoped. I base that judgment on two factors: (1) my own personal observations, and (2) the fact that the change effort falls basically in the rational-empirical group of change strategies, a group which is relatively ineffective for changing assumptions, values, and norms.

¹⁴ibid., p. xv.

¹⁵U. S. Navy, General Order 21 (17 May, 1958).

The changes necessary to bring about that interpersonal climate that produces individual growth and organizational efficiency are deeper and more far reaching. They involve an approach to leadership similar to that suggested by Petrullo in the following two concepts: (1) The ". . . concept of the leader, whether selected from above or below, as a freely followed person who is concerned with fulfilling the purposes of the group and the needs of the individual in it."¹⁶ (2) The concept of ". . . the follower as an aspiring and creative individual, seeking and seeing, in the leader, a means of accomplishing his own purpose."¹⁷ Control under these circumstances is not missing, it is of a different nature. It is emergent not external.

Fears regarding interventions inimical to external control are reality based. Emergent control simply will not work if an attempt is made to develop it suddenly in a traditional military structure. To use a middle-eastern analogy, it would be like putting new wine in old wine-skins; the wine-skins would burst and all would be lost. A completely new military structure needs to be formulated based on different and more realistic assumptions, different values, different norms, different behaviors, different skills, different concepts, and a different organizational structure. Within that new setting emergent controls would be far more effective than external controls ever were in the traditional setting.

¹⁶Petrullo, op. cit., pp. xvii-xviii.

¹⁷Ibid., p. xviii.

Such a change task seems overwhelmingly formidable, but I believe that emerging forces in our society will gain such potency that the Navy will either change or become inoperative.

Critical and changing needs and the ways of scientific research, sometimes separately and sometimes in conjunction, have brought about innovation along these lines on a small scale here and there. Some of them, like sand castles, have existed for a little, and then the tide of the traditional military structure has wiped them out without a trace.

McGregor comments,

. . . it is becoming increasingly difficult to manage a weapons team in the field as a typical infantry unit was managed a couple of decades ago. Such a team requires a high degree of autonomy. Instead of following explicit orders from superiors, it must be able to adjust its behavior to fit local circumstances within the context of relatively broad objectives. (It is interesting to note the attempts that are made—by "programming" for example—to retain central control over the operations of such units. Established theories of control are not abandoned easily, even in the face of clear evidence of their inappropriateness.)¹⁸

An innovative and practical use of alternating organizational forms occurred during World War II. Herbert A. Shephard reports,

. . . a military raiding unit in the Pacific War made use of alternating organizational forms. The planning before a raid was done jointly by the entire unit—the private having as much opportunity to contribute to the planning as the colonel. During the raid, the group operated under strict military command system. Following each raid, the unit returned to the open

¹⁸McGregor, op. cit., p. 17.

system used in planning for purposes of evaluating and maximizing learning from each raid.¹⁹

Some traditionalists would say that such a switch back and forth in structure would be impossible without destroying command control.

M. Dean Havron and Joseph E. McGrath report the development of a system of leadership training for army squads that breaks away from the traditional one-way authoritarian approach by using a "shared" leadership concept. The study was sponsored by the Human Resources Research Office of George Washington University. Havron and McGrath write,

. . . part of our effort was directed toward the development of a concept of leadership and a feeling of the need for good leadership in all members of the unit. Consequently, we set out early to impress trainees that the success and the very lives of combat-unit members are interdependent, that teamwork is required, that the careless mistake of one man can lead to disaster for the whole group. By both direct and indirect means we showed trainees that leadership was necessary, and that whatever the personality or capabilities of the leader, the leadership function must be properly performed.²⁰

They describe the unique part of the concept as follows:

Observations from prior studies had indicated that leadership frequently breaks down because events occur too quickly for the leader to assimilate and act upon them intelligently.

¹⁹Herbert A. Shephard, "Innovation-Resisting and Innovation-Producing Organizations," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 523.

²⁰M. Dean Havron and Joseph E. McGrath, "The Contribution of the Leader to the Effectiveness of Small Military Groups," Leadership and Interpersonal Behavior, eds. Petrullo and Bass (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1961), pp. 173-174.

In this study, those conditions which overburden the leader were anticipated and squad members were designated as responsible for suggesting an order to the leader if he did not notice the occasion for it or remember to give it. Group members had to appreciate that the orders still had to be channelled through the leader, that is, the leader had to give them his sanction by repeating them. Further, he had to know what was going on. Thus, a man would suggest an order to the leader, who would generally act upon it by announcing it and supervising its execution. This system of leadership sharing greatly improved the leader's ability to handle fast-moving situations.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this training program was that it generated in the groups in question a concept of leadership that was appreciated, irrespective of who held the particular leader position. We have excellent validation of this statement. At the conclusion of the training program one test was administered which involved a mission in which the leader and his assistant were both "killed." The problem of the unit was to complete its mission. We tested 24 squads we had trained and another 24 Army-trained squads in this "leaderless" mission. We encountered a finding that is rare in socio-psychological data. There was no overlap in performance scores between the two groups. All of the squads trained by methods we had developed scored higher than any of the 24 Army-trained squads. . . . It was obvious to those who umpired both groups that in the Army-trained squads the members depended entirely upon the leader to take initiative. As a result, once the formal leadership was withdrawn, the unit did a very poor job. On the other hand, in the squads trained by experimental methods, although both leader and assistant leader were removed and no one had been specifically designated as third leader, someone inevitably took over and the unit's performance on the mission was almost as good as the performance of those same squads when the leaders were present.

. . . A group can act effectively and in a co-ordinated way even with a leader of indifferent ability or can reorganize quickly without leaders, if the concept of leadership and how it is to be exercised operationally is learned and appreciated by all group members.²¹

²¹Ibid., pp. 174-175.

In a very recent project in the Army, Lt. Col. William E. Datel, a psychologist, and Lt. Col. Llewellyn J. Legters, a medical doctor, ran an experiment in two companies in basic training at Ft. Ord, California. Datel points out that military traditionalists argue it is necessary to "break" the recruit to make him a well-disciplined soldier. He described the traditional training as essentially an initiation rite that strips the young man of his personal identity by constant reminders that are demeaning to his status. In Datel and Legters' experimental companies the recruits were treated with kid gloves. There was no demeaning punishment, nor were there abusive rebukes from the drill sergeant. The news release stated,

Each recruit was awarded merits by his drill sergeant for performing tasks well. The merits were exchanged for privileges, such as a Saturday night pass or movie and, at the end of basic, the top 35 percent were considered for promotion.

The best evidence of the program's success, Datel said, is the fact that no one in the two 150-man companies went absent without leave (AWOL) during basic. The recruits also scored higher than average on marksmanship and combat-proficiency tests at the end of basic.²²

These illustrations of innovations that have deviated from the traditional approach to military command are limited in number and are taken from non-Navy military organizations, but they support the point that there are other ways to achieve military objectives and that some of them are better than those currently practiced in conformity with the traditional system.

²²News item in the San Diego Union, June 24, 1970.

When input to a system facilitates a change in the system which appears to threaten the system as pre-conceived, perhaps the solution is to recognize that the preconceptions of the system may be inadequate in terms of current developments and that the gates to new conceptualizations should be opened.

I think that the changes necessary to produce the sought-for interpersonal climate are not only feasible for the Navy but essential. But I also recognize the truth of what I overheard Carl Rogers say at a recent seminar, "No changes of significance will occur without turbulence."

III. SPECIAL CHANGE PROBLEMS

Some indication of the magnitude of the change problems involved is that without exception every person with whom I have discussed the possibility of changing the Navy's interpersonal climate has seriously questioned the possibility. I have talked to people ranging from a professional in the field of planned change to simply an interested observer and the modal response has been a high degree of skepticism. There is basis in reality for that skepticism, because there are a number of deterrents. Two of the major barriers are: the type of organization and the size of the organization.

Type of Organization

I observed earlier that the Navy is a sub-bureaucracy in a massive governmental bureaucracy. It has a division of labor based on

functional specialization, a well-defined hierarchy of authority, a system of procedures and rules for dealing with all contingencies relating to work activities, impersonality of interpersonal relations, and promotion and selection based on technical competence. Its bureaucratic nature is intensified by the fact that it is also a military organization. By virtue of that fact, unusual power over others is placed in the hands of individuals. The combination of a power-laden formal military organization, directive leadership, and tight controls is a formidable system in which to attempt significant change. There is a cluster of spin-off deterrents associated with this type of organization. They include value discrepancy, lack of collaborative and participative skills, career vulnerability, dependence needs, and polarization.

Value discrepancy. Perhaps the most serious deterrent to planned change in the Navy is the discrepancy between the core values of the target system and the core values of the envisioned goal system and the most effective planned change intervention in use today—laboratory training. Warren G. Bennis and Edgar H. Schein write,

Every target system has a core of values that characterizes it and determines a good deal of its decisions. Laboratory training, also, has a system of core values. . . the target system's values should be somewhat in accord with, or potentially congruent to, laboratory training values. Where the two systems of values are widely discrepant and rigid, and where the value system of the target cannot yield

without vitally endangering the target system's core values, change induced by laboratory training will probably not succeed.²³

Bennis and Schein provide an example from letters received from a consultant (Dr. A) at a large military training base. The efforts to disguise the identities include calling the Commanding General, the Director (Mr. Z), and referring to officers as officials. In introducing the letters they state that laboratory training had been started at the training center several months before and since that time several things had happened:

(1) the Director (Mr. Z) went to a two-week laboratory at Bethel, (2) about 250 governmental officials underwent a five-day laboratory at the center under Dr. A's leadership with other staff drawn from officials Dr. A had personally trained, and (3) Dr. A with the support of Mr. B (a strong advocate of laboratory training and second in command of the center) planned to set up a laboratory training experience for all 2,000 officials stationed there.²⁴

The following letter from which excerpts are quoted came to one of the authors shortly after plans were laid out to train trainers in order to execute a massive design.

The Director who went to the two week lab away from here feels that those who have only gone through four or five days training here don't really have the capacity to talk to him.

Those members of the faculty who got the training late wonder why they were left to last. An "in" group and "out"

²³Warren G. Bennis and Edgar H. Schein, "Principles and Strategies in the Use of Laboratory Training for Improving Social Systems," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 353.

group developed in the faculty. Some of the outs resented being trained by one of their peers. Some wanted to know: "How did you get to be a trainer?"

The head of our medical department told the Director that lab training type of training is dangerous.

The chief in Washington (over our Director!) asked someone in an aside: "What the hell is Dr. A doing giving that kind of training!"

A Grade 15 called in a Grade 12 scheduled to attend a five-day lab in April and said, not once but twice: "You don't have to go to this thing you know. I want you to understand it is entirely voluntary, you don't have to go unless you want to. . . . What are you going to do if some younger official tells you he doesn't like the way you conduct yourself?"

One man comes up to me occasionally, looks around as if to make sure no one is watching, and then makes the sign of T with both hands.

The Director's deputy wrote a letter to Headquarters and asked for an evaluation of lab training. "If it's good for one, is it good for all?"

I received an informal request from a staff official in Headquarters asking me to answer about 12 objections commonly raised to lab training.

In short, a considerable number of anxieties have been raised. Some are intrigued, some are scared.²⁵

Two weeks later another letter arrived from Dr. A. In it he reported a serious snag. Mr. B (Dr. A's main line support) had been transferred, and within a week the Director, Mr. Z, called in the head of curriculum and outlined how he wanted lab training put into the curriculum. Mr. Z then took the position that the National Training Laboratories did not have any final answers to lab training and that he would train the officials himself. He thought possibly one afternoon would be enough. Dr. A continues,

²⁵Ibid.

What he proposed then was that after about six or seven weeks all the students be given one or two days to give each other feedback. This would be preceded by four or five lectures during the first week or so which would tell them what to be watching for. Keeping what they had observed in mind, they would then tell each other after the sixth week what they had observed. At the end of school, the students would be given another day or two days to give each other feedback. And so on. One or two of us tried to offer some comments or observations and were either cut off or ignored. As a consultant of sorts, I didn't feel quite up to exploring all the implications of his plan in front of the staff because I felt it was his prerogative to run the school as he wanted to.

Since that time various staff sections have been busy trying to pass on to other staff sections the job of trying to figure out what Mr. Z wants and making plans for his wishes. I've been invited to a meeting in the morning and will see what develops. I intend to talk to Mr. Z by himself after this if I can.

I'm curious to find out if he will tell me why he changed his mind, apparently, so suddenly and why he chose not to build on any of the data we had so painstakingly gathered. All this he just threw out of the window. . . .

We are unable to figure out whether Mr. B's leaving triggered the change, whether he is scared to try a four-day lab with students, whether he balks at paying the training price, whether he is irked at me, or just what the score is. But what makes it so hard to figure is that all the reports, letters, plans, etc., that he has seen and signed have nothing to do with what he has proposed. . . in the meeting he brooked no comment—all he wanted was a rubber stamp.²⁶

Bennis and Schein noted that several weeks following this letter, Dr. A called to say that the Government Training Center had stopped its laboratory training and had gone back to more traditional training methods. They conclude that General Z was ". . . perfectly justified in going slowly on laboratory training at the military base. It is revolutionary to the extent that the score of institutional values that the leadership was

²⁶Ibid., p. 349.

striving to preserve was basically threatened by the laboratory training change programs."²⁷

This is not to say that the institutional values should not be changed, but that a major discrepancy is a problem of considerable proportions. For the interpersonal climate in the Navy to change there must be changes at the fundamental levels of assumptions, values, and norms. Whatever change strategy and interventions are used they will not succeed unless they cope effectively with this problem of value discrepancy.

Examined from the viewpoint of value discrepancy, there is a difficulty with limited change efforts such as the one attempted by Dr. A and the experimental efforts by Datel and Letgers in Army recruit training. In the long run they can become more disruptive than helpful. Limited change efforts are like tiny capsules in a system. Whatever significant changes take place in the men who pass through them either become sources of frustration or just disappear in the face of the demands of the basic encompassing system to which they return. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a seriously discrepant set of values to be maintained within the military organization.

Lack of collaborative and participative skills. Collaboration in problem solving and participation in goal setting and in decision

²⁷Ibid., p. 354.

making is largely foreign to the traditional military system. Consequently, military men rarely possess collaborative and participative skills. This is not unique to the military. Herbert A. Shephard points out that one of the situations faced in the T-Group is that of shared human responsibility. It is his observation that this

. . . sometimes confronts T-Group members with such force, and in such contradiction to the norms of society at large, that even the trainer may back away from its implications. Cultural emphasis on interpersonal and intergroup competition leaves members without an adequate language, philosophy, reward structure, or set of behavioral skills for collaboration in work and in the resolution of conflict.²⁸

The military is even further removed than society at large from collaborative and participative norms and the change agent faces a system that has an unusual dearth of helpful skills. When threat arose, Dr. A was neatly shut off and closed out by the Commanding General. There was no attempt to discuss, to consider alternatives, or to critique the problem.

Career vulnerability. Career development and advancement for both enlisted men and for officers is vulnerable to intervention by those senior to them. This is one of the potent military sanctions sometimes used to control personnel. Since the writing of the first chapter of this study in which the controversy over hair, beards, and mustaches was

²⁸Herbert A. Shephard, "Explorations In Observant Participation," T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method: Innovation in Re-education, eds. Bradford, Gibb, and Benne (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 380.

raised, the Navy has recognized that neatly trimmed beards and mustaches is what Navy Regulations permit. But company commanders in a Navy training program kept their men clean-shaven by threatening to make it impossible for them to be promoted to Petty Officer Third Class. It was effective until the Commanding Officer learned of the harrassment and stopped it. However, in individual and less public situations the mechanism still operates.

Officer promotions are dependent on fitness reports written by their seniors. A commanding officer told his weapons officer that he was to obtain a competitive score on an upcoming gunnery run no matter what he had to do. The weapons officer was a man who lived by a high moral standard, and he knew that under present conditions he would have to act dishonestly to get the competitive score. The stress over this conflict nearly put him in the hospital. He was a career naval officer, married, and had two small children. He feared for his career if he didn't cheat. When the time came, he cheated.

I am not suggesting by these two illustrations that this conduct is representative of the Navy, I am only illustrating career dependency as a potent force in the military and a force with which any change effort will have to contend.

Dependency needs. Since the Navy is a highly directive and controlling type of organization it tends to lead subordinates to become dependent, submissive, and leader-centered. Since the organization

tends to cultivate this sort of dependency, it can be expected that a certain percentage of career personnel are careerists because of their own dependency needs. Some of these would respond well to appropriate change training, but I think it can be predicted that some would find it too threatening. A successful change program must make provision for this group.

A correlative is that some in the line of command whose autocratic style of leadership is largely determined by deep psychological needs may find it impossible to tolerate even minor modifications in leadership behavior. Such individuals may become strong deterrents to a change effort.

Polarization. One of the effects reported in many change programs is polarization. Jack and Lorraine Gibb refer to the phenomenon as "backlash" effect. They write,

There seems to be an authentic "backlash" effect in certain companies: the more innovative and unconventional some of the programs get the more resistant some other staffs become. The differences in approaches in the various parts of the system is leading to presumably productive controversy and to some useful research in parts of the system.²⁹

The Gibbs presume that such controversy is productive. Other change agents refer to these polarized responses and many of them think that the conflict, largely unavoidable, is desirable. However, it seems to

²⁹Jack R. Gibb and Lorraine M. Gibb, "Organizational Improvement Through Focus on Trust Induction" (draft of unpublished chapter, Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, 1965), p. 14.

me that polarization in any organization has potential for both destructive and constructive outcomes. If not anticipated and appropriately used, it could become a terminal deterrent.

Change process. Change does take place in the military system, but for the most part it is change based on a process identified by Edgar H. Schein as defensive identification.³⁰ Schein notes the conditions under which defensive identification occurs—the target is captive in the change situation; the target role has been nonvoluntarily acquired; the agent is in a formal role such as senior rank or instructor; the target feels helpless, impotent, fearful, and threatened; the target must change. Schein describes the process—the agent is the primary source of unfreezing; the target becomes position oriented rather than person oriented to acquire the agent's perceived power; the target has a limited and distorted view of the agent, and lacks empathy for the agent; the target tends to imitate limited portions of the agent's behavior rather than assimilating it. Schein writes that the new behavior in the target is stilted, ritualized, restrictive, and narrowing, but it is more likely to be acceptable to the influencing institution.

Some members of the military are accustomed to this process of change and its underlying assumptions and values; in fact, some know

³⁰Edgar H. Schein, "The Mechanisms of Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), pp. 98-107.

no other way to bring about change. This can make it very difficult to introduce a change system that is of a totally different nature.

Size of Organization

The Navy organization is shrinking and, at the writing, has just passed below the 700,000 mark, exclusive of the Marine Corps. To give some idea of the extensive undertaking that a planned change program would be for such an organization, Blake's work has been with factory organizations of 3,000 to 4,000; Davis' work with TRW Systems involved 12,500; Gibb worked with a large, decentralized business corporation with several hundred thousand employees—but his was not an overall, coordinated program designed for the whole corporation, it proceeded on a fortuitous and opportunistic basis.

The size of the Navy organization poses two problems. One is that, to my knowledge, no one has ever designed and attempted to carry out a planned change program for an organization of this size. It would be a pioneering task of major proportions.

The other problem is the fear-distrust cycle that tends to develop in large organizations. The Gibbs observe that, "The normal fears of life are exaggerated by the ambiguity, high control, and threat of the large organization. A kind of fear-distrust cycle sustains the defensive behavior of management in the organization."³¹ When such a cycle has

³¹Ibid., pp. 5-6.

developed, all organizational actions initiated from above tend to be viewed from a fear-distrust stance. Large organizations, in that respect, tend to have high resistance to change efforts.

Conclusion

If one proposes to change the interpersonal climate in the Navy, the deterrents to this sort of change that are intrinsic to a military bureaucracy of this size are so formidable, that one would be wise to give up the plan—under other circumstances than those in which we live. In my opinion, the facts outlined to show the need for this study also indicate the urgency for such a change program. One source of hope is that Navy leadership has never voluntarily backed down from any task that it was convinced was essential. The key to having this change program, then, is a thoroughly convinced leadership at the top level of the hierarchy.

IV. BASIC CHANGE PRINCIPLES

The purpose of this section is to set forth those basic change principles which in my judgment are particularly appropriate for approaching the planned change proposed for the Navy.

Emergence

The fundamental change principle is emergence. This principle is essential to the quality of the change result; but more important, it is essential for the change process even to continue in an organization

that functions with such high defense levels as the military. Emergence means that there is a change agent and a target system; there is an interaction between the two in all stages of the change process; the specific forms of data gathering, processing, diagnosing, planning, intervening, critiquing, modifying, and stabilizing should be emergent forms arising out of a collaborative and participative process.

Because of the great discrepancy between the values of the target system and those underlying a supportive interpersonal climate the emergent process will be difficult at best. The following factors are, I think, critical to its successful application in the Navy.

Change agent. The change agent needs to be a highly experienced and capable professional. Working successfully with such a value incongruity will require all of the professional knowledge and skill that can be mustered. The change agent should have the privilege of selecting and developing his own non-military staff so that he can bring to the task the knowledge, talent, and skills he feels would be the most effective.

Values. If the values of trust, authenticity, and fact finding, along with the norms of collaborative problem solving and participative management, are, in fact, not only growth producing for individuals but more efficient for a military organization, then the emergent process of planned change must be built on those values and norms. The great temptation for the target system will be to use its own ingrained system

for producing change, especially when it runs into a threatening snag. One of the major advantages in having an outside change agent is his sensitivity to such overtures when they occur.

Legitimization. Another critical element of the emergence principle is legitimization. The ultimate in legitimization occurs when the new behavior becomes a norm through the organization; but the initiation of the process that will lead to that goal in the military is the arrival of such behavior as a norm at the top levels of the organization. In my opinion the initial interaction between change agent and target systems should be at the very top—at the level of the Chief of Naval Operations and his immediate subordinates. The approach should be consistent with the values of the change program and the goals should include a full understanding of the problem and the issues, of the underlying assumptions and values, of the correlative skills and behaviors. Experience-based learning should be involved on a voluntary basis. Ample opportunity must be provided for all questionable issues and conflicts to be worked out. This process itself can be the most potent learning experience of all. The life of the change effort depends on the outcome of this interaction. Without commitment at this level, the program cannot succeed. They must know that it is their program. They are not to be shown a plan for their stamp of approval. They are to have an experience out of which will emerge an understanding and a commitment which is theirs. The value of this commitment goes beyond

the fact that these men make up the top of the Navy's hierarchy; it means that some of the finest minds and talents the Navy possesses will be resources for building the change process.

Strategy

The basic model for strategy is a five step procedure: (1) problem awareness, (2) selection, (3) unfreezing, (4) action steps, and (5) freezing.

Problem awareness. The problem awareness stage is a period during which a target population is exposed to a variety of situations designed to facilitate an appreciation of the interpersonal climate problem along with the implications it has for the Navy's organization, its people, and its operational capabilities. Some of the procedures might be the use of written materials, informal presentations with ample opportunity for immediate feedback, one-to-one sessions, and so forth. The approaches would be low pressure and problem-centered with every effort made to discount those elements which produce defensive identification in subordinates (described under Section III above).

Selection. Some within the target population will develop a responsiveness to the problem and will express a desire to do something about it. Those who so respond are "selected" in the sense that the opportunity to participate in an unfreezing process will be opened to them. In no case should someone be selected who serves under a

senior who has had this opportunity and turned it down. Normally, such subordinates would not be included in the target population of stage one. However, the word does get around. In the case of such a volunteer, serious consideration should be given to transferring him and giving him the opportunity. The purposes behind this are (1) to decrease threat for those who do not wish to move in this direction, and (2) to minimize the negative effects of the polarization that experience demonstrates almost invariably occurs.

Unfreezing. The third stage is a period of experience-based unfreezing and skill learning. During this stage the people who have so elected are exposed to a process designed to free them from the organizational and personal restraints that have kept them from responding to the problem in an effective manner. The goal is to provide them with an experience that permits them to become aware of their own assumptions and values and then to modify them and their resultant behaviors more in line with human realities. Various forms of laboratory training are appropriate to this end. The strategy being suggested serves as a screening process so that those who reach the unfreezing stage are going to be people much more open to the value system underlying the unfreezing process.

Action steps. The fourth stage is action steps. This is a period during which action steps in line with new values and assumptions are planned, tested, modified, and implemented within the sphere of

responsibility of individuals and teams that have gone through the unfreezing process. This is the stage when idiosyncratic development begins to occur within the organization, a form of development which takes full advantage of a leader's capacities in interaction with his own unique situation. McGregor writes,

. . . one of the important lessons from research and experience in this field is that the attempt to train supervisors to adopt a single leadership "style" yields poorer results than encouraging them to create the essential conditions in their individual ways and with due regard for their own particular situations. Note also in this connection how organization structure and management philosophy may either encourage or inhibit the supervisor in establishing these conditions.³²

As this form of development takes hold, each naval unit will be seen more and more as a functioning organismic whole capable of its own growth and change. It will come to fashion within itself its own norms, roles, supports, and rewards—always within the limits imposed by its reasons for existence, its mission. In accordance with current policy it will lessen the need for reports, requirements, and standards from higher commands. In turn, meaningful innovations, creative problem solving, personal commitment, and general efficiency will tend to increase.

Freezing. The final stage is a stabilizing stage during which the change mechanisms become a self-supporting system within the overall organization.

³²McGregor, op. cit., p. 184.

It is worth emphasizing that this strategy must be applied from the top down and that its development throughout the organization will be uneven.

This strategy is designed to minimize the negative effects of traditional military values and assumptions, to reduce threat and consequent defense levels, to lessen the value gap during experience-based learning, to recognize dependence needs, and to ease the impact of polarization.

Cognitive Model

It is important to the change effort to have a clear cognitive schema, preferably one which facilitates seeing the problem, the training interactions, the change process, and the change goals. Such a schema is essential to the maintenance of cognitive orientation in the face of the pressures from old values, norms, and behaviors and the demands of the unchanged organization. My personal preference is Gibb's four modal concerns described in Chapter II; however, the change agent's preference is the meaningful one.

In-System Staff

The Navy needs to have a program for training its own staff for continuing the planned change process because (1) it is too expensive to hire the necessary number of outside consultants, and (2) since interpersonal climate is basically a line problem, the change process is enhanced by using line personnel as trainers. The Gibbs' report,

One of the most notable changes seen as a result of the total program is the incidence of dramatic and relatively permanent changes made in the behavior of line managers who have spent extended periods of time serving as training staff on the various management programs where participative management models and trust behavior have been emphasized. . . . In one of the companies, 24 line managers were brought in for six month periods to serve as trainers. Informal reports and observations of the effects of this program indicate that the most significant change due to training was the change in the trainers themselves. This finding adds support to the theories that are stressing the role of participation, active role taking, and role practice in inducing behavior change. Particularly significant are the findings about relative permanence of the changes. We have attributed the permanence to the intensity and long duration of the role practice, done under optimal conditions of support, exposure, and feedback.³³

For purposes of drawing on varieties of talent, pertinent professional skills and experience, and of enhancing the integration of line, educational, and research interests in the Navy, it seems valid to be sure that adequate representation among in-staff trainees be had from research and educational activities as well as the line.

One possible implementation would be a replica in-system staff assigned to the professional consultant staff right from the beginning on a man-to-man matching assignment for training purposes. In later stages trainees might be assigned to experienced in-system staff. The ultimate goal is a totally in-system planned-change training staff.

Therapy for Normals

As persons consciously and intentionally come to grips with their

³³Gibb and Gibb, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

own behaviors in a group situation where feedback becomes almost immediate and where shared human responsibility is an underlying value, they develop a new awareness of themselves and their behavior. Sometimes along with this new sensitivity there are insights regarding intra-personal constraints that produce behaviors which they no longer desire or which prevent behaviors they seek to have. Consequently, there is an inner pressure to seek psychotherapy as a growth-enabling process. In my judgment, such "therapy for normals" would have a positive effect on the change program in that it would reduce an area of personal frustration and induce further significant personal changes to the enhancement of the naval organization. For these reasons I think that therapy for normals needs to be legitimized. Further, I think it should be provided in-system, if the problem of in-system therapy can be resolved, or it should be subsidized in an out-system form.

Research

Because of the nature and size of the organization this particular planned change is rich in research possibilities. The benefits to the Navy of having a research section in its change process is that it will provide a growing fund of clinical-experimental data on which to base modifications of change interventions that are yet future. The change program will be a long one, and there will be ample opportunity to feed back research findings into the process.

V. SUGGESTED INTERVENTIONS

In consonance with the basic change principle of emergence, the specific nature and forms of the interventions need to arise out of interaction between the change agent and the target system. However, there are two major interventions that are particularly appropriate in terms of the two basic needs presented by the goal of changing interpersonal climate. The first is the need for experience-based learning, and the second is the need for facts about the human elements of the system and opportunity to work with them in a collaborative situation. The first need can be met by laboratory training, and the second by feedback survey. There is a third intervention that is still experimental in nature but which shows promise for meeting the need that arises at times in a change program for a quick reading of the state of the organization and for quick, intelligent, collaborative action—the confrontation meetings.

Laboratory Training

There are two major problems connected with instituting a laboratory training program in the military. One has to do with the fears its prospect stimulates, and the other has to do with the values that are intrinsic to the form.

The basic fear is that laboratory training will break military discipline, and essential control will be lost. But it seems to me that this fear is premised on the assumption that there is only one form of

effective military control—external. There is evidence that emergent controls when developed can be more effective. The problem is providing the training and the organizational structure and the interpersonal climate that will produce and maintain emergent controls.

Another source of fear is the vague concepts of the nature of laboratory training. The process of seeing it is complicated by the fact that if one is looking at it through a set of traditional military assumptions and values, it will be a distorted perception. It is further complicated by the fact that laboratory training in itself is a complex process very difficult to describe effectively. Schein and Bennis write,

Many attempts have been made to characterize the nature of laboratory training, but most of them have not been successful for several reasons: (1) laboratories vary tremendously in goals, training design, delegate population, length, and setting, making it difficult to describe this experience in general; (2) laboratories attempt to provide a total and integrated learning experience for the participants, making it difficult to communicate in written words the interdependence of the many separate aspects of the laboratory training design; (3) laboratories intend to provide a learning experience which is, in part, emotional, and to provide the opportunity for the participants to explore the interdependence of emotional and intellectual learning. It is difficult without observing the process first-hand to describe and understand the nature of this emotional learning and its meaning to the learner.³⁴

Because of these fears, great care must be exercised both in deciding where in the organization it will be used and when it will be used as well as in designing the pre-laboratory work for the target

³⁴Edgar H. Schein and Warren G. Bennis, Personal and Organizational Change Through Group Methods: The Laboratory Approach (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 10.

population. Schein and Bennis point out that, "How the person later responds to laboratory training experiences will depend on (1) whether goals such as these are meaningful to him in terms of the interpersonal and group problems he experiences, and (2) whether or not he genuinely volunteers for the experience."³⁵

The problem of a major incongruency between the values of the military system and the values of the laboratory training is alleviated some by the strategy outlined in the preceding section.

Of the forms of laboratory training, family laboratories or team training, according to Bennis, is the most effective for affecting the total organization.³⁶ But Alexander Winn of Alcan, where the laboratory method has been introduced on a scale unprecedented in a large organization, reports that when it comes to filling places for a family or an inter-group laboratory, volunteerism decreases markedly and resistances reappear in strength. He notes, "It is all right to play 'the behavior-change game' away from subordinates or peers or work companions, but it is not quite the same to play this 'forbidden game' at

³⁵Ibid., p. 11.

³⁶Warren G. Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 70.

one's work. It is too threatening."³⁷ In view of this, it is doubtful that laboratory training should begin at team level; but it needs to be part of the program, since it seems to have great effect for organizational change.

Team training is particularly important at the top of the hierarchy. McGregor reports,

One research study of top management groups found that 85 per cent of the communications within the group took place between individual subordinates and the superior (up and down), and only 15 per cent laterally between the subordinates. Many executives who talk about their "teams" of subordinates would be appalled to discover how low is the actual level of collaboration among them, and how high is the mutual suspicion and antagonism.³⁸

The laboratory method, when used clearly as a means and not as an end in itself, remains the most effective contemporary tool for facilitating change in the determinants of interpersonal climate.

Survey Feedback

As mentioned in Chapter III, survey feedback is a valuable intervention because (1) it provides relevant here-and-now data about the system as a realistic basis for action planning, (2) it involves both the change agent and the system members in a collaborative effort, (3) it

³⁷Alexander Winn, "Social Change in Industry: From Insight to Implementation," The Planning of Change, eds. Bennis, Benne, and Chin (2nd ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 325.

³⁸McGregor, op. cit., p. 228.

provides a series of interaction situations for process analysis in a reality-oriented, problem-solving setting, and (4) the increased data-flow tends to decrease the defense levels.

Confrontation Meeting

The confrontation meeting is of no value as a tool until the Navy unit that wishes to use it has experienced sufficient change training to possess the concepts and skills necessary to carry it through. When a unit has reached that level of development, I think that the confrontation meeting or a modified form of it will become the action research tool for achieving swift, effective, unit-wide changes with a high level of commitment, when circumstances so demand.

VI. SUMMARY

Observation

The Navy has a hard mission and its task configuration is exceptionally complex. To succeed, it needs all the human and technical resources it can develop. It is possible to see in the suggestion that a supportive or defense-reductive climate is essential the implication of very soft human relationships that are not task oriented. I want it very clear that a supportive interpersonal climate is not soft; it has a tough, realistic fiber. Davis puts it well:

The values that Doug McGregor stood for and articulated regarding organizational development have in them a very real toughness: in dealing with each other we will be open, direct, explicit. Our feelings will be available to each other,

and we will try to problem-solve rather than be defensive. These values have in them a very tough way of living, not a soft way. But unfortunately, in much of the behavioral science literature, the messages come out sounding soft and easy, as if what we are trying to do is build happy teams of employees who feel "good" about things, rather than saying we're trying to build effective organizations with groups that function well and that can zero in quickly on their problems and deal with them rationally, in the very real sense of the word. . . .

There is no real growth, there is no real development in the organization or in the individuals within it, if they do not confront and deal directly with their problems.³⁹

The whole point behind the supportive interpersonal climate is to unleash individual functioning in a manner that meets both personal and organizational needs. The evidence says that it does just that.

Summary

The Navy's top level leadership desires that the organization function as smoothly and efficiently as possible. To that end, it has sought to establish throughout the organization an interpersonal climate of trust, respect, commitment, and comradeship. That it has been unable to achieve that objective is evidenced by the Navy's critical retention problem. It's young personnel are, in part, a new breed. Its societal and technical environments are in rapid change. In the face of these events the traditional military approach is not working as well as it used to.

³⁹Davis, op. cit., p. 358.

My thesis is that for naval personnel to perform more efficiently as a force, their interpersonal climates need to change in a direction that will promote the growth of individuals toward becoming more fully functioning persons.

Examination of climate-centered research reveals that a perceived defense-reductive climate both facilitates growth in individuals toward more fully functioning and increases efficiency in an organization.

The problem of changing the interpersonal climates in an organization toward a supportive one is complicated by the fact that planned organizational change is still in its infancy. Nevertheless planned change is being practiced with varying success. There is a group of change strategies, normative-re-educative, which operate effectively at the level of the determinants of interpersonal climate: assumptions, values, norms, behaviors, conceptual structures, and the organization itself. The basic principle involved in these strategies is the collaborative, problem-centered interaction between the change agent and the client system in all phases of the change effort from initial data gathering to final stabilization. The major interventions are laboratory training and survey feedback.

Whether or not the changes correlative to producing and maintaining a supportive climate are militarily feasible centers in the issue of control. The fear is of loss of control, but the planned change does not destroy control, it substitutes a great deal of emergent control.

The problems facing a change effort in a bureaucratic-military organization the size of the Navy are formidable but not impossible. The keys to success are (1) knowing the deterrents unique to the Navy, (2) modifying change principles and interventions accordingly, and (3) starting at the very top.

In brief, one reason naval leadership has been unable to produce the interpersonal climate it desires is that it has not recognized the determinants and, therefore, has not been using the appropriate methods. Research indicates that the supportive interpersonal climate is the one to seek. Determinants are known. A change strategy effective at their level is known. The time of need is here. It can be done.

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
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